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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
This work represents an attempt to utilize the tools 
of a general theory in the analysis of a specific research 
problem. The basic assumption made is that attempts such 
as this are highly desirable in contrast to attempts at 
describing without benefit of theory or theorizing without 
the benefit of data.
The topic of this study is the reform of local govern­
ment in the Canadian province of Ontario. This task is 
complex, often to the point of the absurd, due to the many 
varied actors and actions which are involved. Because of 
this complexity the need of an organizing or conceptual 
framework is clear. At the same time, however, the need 
for an organizing conceptual framework must not obscure the 
first task of this study, and of theory itself, which is 
description. Accordingly, the general conceptual framework 
utilized in this study is what is conmionly referred to as 
"structural-functionalism," which is derived from the pio­
neering works of Talcott Parsons. Functionalism, however, 
is the term used throughout this study as a means for dif­
ferentiating the work cf Parsons from those variations 
penned by other scholars such as Gabriel Almond.
1
The general theory of functionalism^ is basically a 
collection of interrelated definitions, categories and ques­
tions. Functional theory is mainly a research strategy; or, 
a group of suggestions about which are the relevant ques­
tions to ask and which would be the most useful concepts to 
employ. In this study no assumption is made as to the 
utility of functional analysis to all concrete research 
problems. Rather, it is assumed that some ■: f Parson's basic 
concepts seem useful as guides to political research of the 
type embodied in this study.
At this point it should be noted that there is often 
a built-in conflict between the descriptive and the theoret­
ical purposes of a study such as this one. When this clash 
occurs in this study, the decision will be to pursue a 
course of priority to description. This course has been 
decided upon because the first purpose conceived for this 
study is to describe and analyze the Ontario government's 
program of regional local governments rather than to make a 
theoretical contribution to the literature.
The following brief discussion of functionalism 
relies heavily upon Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems :
A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1967), pp. 1-40; and Talcott Parsons, The 
Social System (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd.,
1951) . For a more complete and in depth discussion the 
reader is also referred to Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, 
eds.. Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1951), esp. Part II.
2Kaplan, A Functional Analysis, p. 2.
Functional theory rests upon the notion that politics, 
like any other area of human behavior, can be described as 
the operation of one or more social systems, analogous in 
structure and performance to biological or physical systems.
The fundamental starting point is the concept 
of social systems of action. The interaction of 
individual actors, that is, takes place under such 
conditions that it is possible to treat such a 
process of interaction as a system in the scientific 
sense and subject it to the same order of theoreti­
cal analysis which has been successfully applied to 
other types of systems in other sciences.1
Kaplan notes that a system consists of a collection 
of individuals who interact on a regular basis and who agree 
on certain values.^ Furthermore, the system will, in time, 
develop norms about what constitutes appropriate behavior 
for system members. These norms give rise to expectations 
about the exact behavior that is to be found in interaction 
situations; which is referred to as roles. Roles, as spe­
cific prescriptions, will reflect the more general norms of 
the system.^ Parsons puts it in the following manner:
Reduced to the simplest possible terms, then a 
social system consists in a plurality of individual 
actors interacting with each other in a situation 
which has at least a physical or environmental 
aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a 
tendency to the "optimization of gratification" and 
whose relation to their situations, including each 
other is defined and mediated in terms of a system 
of culturally structured and shared symbols.4
^Parsons, The Social System, p. 3.
2Kaplan, A Functional Analysis, p. 4. 
^Ibid., pp. 4-5.
4Parsons, The Social System, pp. 5-6.
We now can see that functionalism is mainly interested in 
routinized or institutionalized behavior. As a result, a 
system is viewed as a network of interrelated roles.
Parsons further alerts us to the existence of certain 
functional imperatives,^ or certain tasks that every system 
must undertake and fulfill if it is to survive. Among the 
functional imperatives are the minimizing or managing of 
internal conflict and tension, the recruiting of new system 
members and the teaching to them the norms of the system, 
the adapting of the system to the demands of the physical 
and social environment, the mobilizing of the members for 
the purpose of system goal attainment, and the maintenance 
of the solidarity of the system including the guarantee of
2the personal commitment of individuals to the collectivity. 
In short, because these functions are necessary to the sur­
vival of system, particular systems may be evaluated on the 
basis of how well they meet these imperatives, that is, how 
well they provide for their own survival.^ The notion of 
functional imperatives, further, may be applied to the 
various levels of analysis— to political institutions as 
well as to an entire society, to particular political sub­
systems as well as to an entire political system.
^Sometimes referred to as prerequisites, or simply, 
conditions.
2Parsons, The Social System, pp. 26-36.
^Kaplan, A Functional Analysis, p. 7.
For Talcott Parsons, the classification of system is 
based on the orientation of the major roles in each system. 
This classification is accomplished via a series of continua 
such as ascription-achievement, diffuseness-specificity, 
affectivity-neutrality and particularism-universalism.^
The social system may be viewed as a series of ex­
changes between its component parts. In other words, every 
subsystem in a society has a product or output, which is its 
contribution to the overall functioning of the society. The 
outputs of one subsystem form the inputs to another. In 
reference to political subsystems, their outputs, whether 
they be of a local government, a regional government or an 
entire political subsystem, consist of authoritative deci- 
sions or public policies. Kaplan notes that these authori­
tative decisions relate mainly to the allocation of costs 
and benefits, the adaptation of the society to environmental 
changes, the management of conflict internally and the mobil­
ization of behavior in support of the society's varied goals.^ 
The basis for these outputs, the inputs, include the material 
and financial resources of the subsystem, the support of the
4subsystem members and the demands made upon the subsystem.
^Parsons, The Social System, pp. 180-200. 
^Ibid., pp. 135-136.
^Kaplan, A Functional Analysis, p. 8. 
^Ibid., p. 8.
In addition, the extent to which a subsystem or system 
is able to meet the demands of its members will clearly 
influence the members' motivation to continue playing roles 
in the system.^ In short, if it is to survive, a system 
must provide inducements sufficient to evoke some minimal 
degree of membership support. The above can be summed up 
by saying that the core of Parsons' functional approach is 
the attempt to define certain basic conditions for the suc­
cess and survival of social systems concomitant with the 
perception of the structure of the system as a set of mech­
anisms that attempt to fulfill these conditions.
This study attempts to describe and analyze the reform 
of local government in Ontario in terms of these functional 
imperatives posited by Parsons. The necessary basic assump­
tion is that:
Most of the functional imperatives discussed 
in the literature can be subsumed under two broad 
types of functions: Adaptation to the physical and
social environment, and maintenance of internal 
solidarity. The first might be called the "adap­
tive," "external," or "problem-solving" function; 
the second might be called the "internal" or 
"integrating" function.2
As an example, it may be noted that an adaptive leader will 
very likely be oriented to problems perceived in the envi­
ronment, to more generalized value schemes, or to the
^Ibid., p. 9.
^Ibid., p. 25.
demands of other systems. On the other hand, the integra­
tive leader is likely to be more committed to the system 
itself rather than to any set of substantive goals. In 
addition, the integrative leader is apt to be mainly inter­
ested in defending the status quo or in forestalling the 
internal strain that might be induced by problem solving and 
may be primarily concerned with the mediation of conflicts 
which may arise in the system.
Throughout this study adaptation is conceived of as 
the ability of an individual or an organization to reallo­
cate or recommit a part of its resources to new uses without 
destroying the organization as a whole.^ At the same time 
that change, or adaptation, takes place within the system 
it must be able to integrate these changes if it is to sur­
vive. Integrative behavior may have a normative or non- 
normative basis. If there are indications that system mem­
bers have developed a diffuse, noncalculative support for 
the system and that their loyalty to the system equals or 
outranks their loyalties to other systems; and, if there is 
a growing consensus on goals, a lessening degree of overt 
conflict, and a willingness to ignore conflict in order to 
preserve the system, we are dealing with normative integration.
Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: 
An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, The M.I.T. Press, 1953), p. 82.
2Kaplan, A Functional Analysis, pp. 25-26.
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In this study the concern is with integration in both its
normative and non-normative aspects.
Most writers have not focused their attention upon
the tension which clearly must exist between contradictory
functional imperatives. It is just this tension, however,
with which this study is primarily concerned. The basic
notion is as follows:
. . . all social systems are, at one time or another, 
plagued by contradictory functional requirements (or 
imperatives) and that these are associated with the 
formation of mutually antagonistic structural 
arrangements that function to meet these require­
ments . 1
To place this problem specifically in terms of adaptation 
and integration is to realize that problem solving (adapta­
tion) , because it requires some rearrangement of internal 
relations, expectations and rewards, induces stress into 
the system and thereby may threaten the system's integra­
tion. Further, it may be noted that this conflict between 
a system's two basic imperatives appears to be both endemic 
and incapable of permanent solution. A successful system
usually seeks to strike a series of temporary balances
2between the two needs. Clearly, the implication is that a 
system may meet failure because it overemphasizes problem 
solving and tries to move too fast, because it may exclude
Gideon Sjoberg, "Contradictory Functional Require­
ments and Social Systems," The Journal of Conflict Resolu­
tion, IV (June, 1960), p. 199.
2Kaplan, A Functional Analysis, p. 27.
certain groups from policy making, or because it fails to 
reconcile conflict among the various segments of the system. 
In these cases the integrative function is not adequately 
performed.
It is precisely this situation with which I am con­
cerned in this study of Ontario's regional local government 
reforms and with the possible threat to the system which 
may be generated by the concomitant conflict. Accordingly, 
this study is concerned primarily with the short run affects 
of the provincial program. The emphasis is upon the short 
run because it seems clear that over the long run, a sys­
tem's success in the performance of one imperative will 
enhance its ability to perform the other. For example, 
raising the relative level of integration, over the long 
run, increases the adaptive potential of a system. In the 
short run, however, as has already been noted, tension 
between the integrative and the adaptive functions— and 
conflict between those who embody these different orienta­
tions— seems inherent in political systems.^
The argument in support of this approach is simply 
that the admission of the presence of contradictory impera­
tives permits the scholar to both pursue an interest in 
integration while, at the same time, raising the more real­
istic question of "How does a political order maintain
^Ibid., p. 27
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integration in the face of coexistent contradictory require­
ments and structures?" As one scholar puts it:
Explicit recognition of the contradictory functional 
requirements that impinge upon a social system, or a 
subsystem thereof, assists the structural functional­
ist in analyzing the competitive struggles, conflicts 
and change that besets social orders.^
The above is not identical to the concept of dysfunc­
tion as conceived of by Merton,although dysfunction may be 
a part of the total situation. Dysfunction, however, implies 
a relatively static situation. Merton, for example, defines
dysfunction as ". . . those observed consequences which
2lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system." The 
clear problem here is to understand how the observed dys­
functions are contained within a particular structure so 
that they do not produce instability.^ Those who deal only 
with dysfunction show a concern for the static rather than 
the dynamic aspects of systems because what is considered 
"dysfunctional" is primarily that which may be detrimental 
to the harmony and integration of the system. In addition, 
Sjoberg notes that they often assume that a system which is 
beset with internal strains is not maintaining itself satis­
factorily— although empirically just the reverse might be
^Sjoberg, "Contradictory Requirements," p. 205.
2Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Struc­
ture, Rev. ed. (Toronto, Ontario: Collier-Macmillan Canada,
Ltd., 1957), p. 51.
^For example, see Ibid., pp. 52-53.
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true.^ Sjoberg further asserts that we should recognize
that certain contradictory prerequisites, and the structures
2that answer to them, may well serve to sustain the system. 
This is a proposition which is of clear relevance for the 
purposes of this study and one that is dealt with in the 
analysis of the provincial-local system in Ontario.
We easily accept the assertion that the society or 
the political system must be adaptive and we usually agree 
that an integrative subsystem is needed to facilitate inter­
nal adjustments and to adapt the system to the demands of 
the changing external situation.^ The question then becomes 
one of defining, or at least identifying, integration and 
adaptation.
For the purposes of this study, integration is seen 
as a relative, rather than absolute, term. That is, instead 
of considering political integration as a specific condition 
that exists or does not exist, it seems more useful to con­
ceive of a set of relationships which are more or less inte­
grated, or a series of events leading to an increase or a 
decrease of integration. Then, as Jacob and Teune note, a 
rough test of the degree of cohesiveness necessary for
^Sjoberg, "Contradictory Requirements," p. 200. 
^Ibid., p. 199.
^John McLeish, The Theory of Social Change; Four 
Views Considered (New York; Shocken Books, 1969), p. 59.
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integration may be worked out. The test would simply be 
the proportion of "public-oriented," cooperative or cor­
porate activities in which people in various political units 
engage themselves, as against actions that are non-corporate, 
or "privatistic" (concerned with personal or special group 
interests rather than with the general well-being).^
It was noted above that, for the purposes of this 
study, adaptation is conceived of as the ability of an indi­
vidual or an organization to reallocate or recommit a part 
of its resources to new uses without destroying the organi­
zation as a whole. As Leonard Sayles notes, then, change 
is not a special, for holidays only, activity. It is an 
integral part of the normal, ongoing process of assessing 
how the system is operating, determining where significant 
deviations are occurring, identifying the source of the 
disturbances, taking administrative actions to eliminate 
the source of the instability (short-run change) and, final­
ly, where the disturbance or deviation is recurring— the
introduction of "long-run" change and its implementation 
2and control. Thus, adaptation has both a short-run and
Phillip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative 
Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Basis of Political
Community," Phillip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (editors). 
The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 7.
2Leonard R. Sayles, "Accommodating for Change," in 
Fremont J. Lyden, George A. Shipman and Morton Knoll, eds.. 
Policies, Decisions, and Organizations (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 229.
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long-run aspect. In this study, concern is mainly with the 
long-run aspect of adaptation because it is within this con­
figuration that adaptation seems most likely to come into 
conflict with subsystem integration.
The notion of tension, or conflict, between the needs 
of adaptation and integration further forces us to consider 
the nature of this tension. Often, this takes the form of 
what might be called "resistance" to any change because it 
presents a threat. For example, Luther Gulick has noted 
that:
Each defined human institution, especially when 
created by law and endowed with even the smallest 
modicum of power, tends to develop into an inde­
pendent "institutional personality." This 
involves not only asserting itself, but also 
extending itself and seeking to perpetuate 
itself. This apparently is a law of group 
structure, as it is of individual existence.
And among governmental institutions, the suicide 
complex is notably absent . . . The existence of a 
fixed and immortal boundary tends to create and 
sustain,a fixed and immortal governmental insti­
tution.
Gulick's observation, however, does not completely explain 
the tension and resistance that may be present. There is 
need, therefore, for a concept to further assist in the 
analysis of this tension. Selznick provides that link with 
his concept of "recalcitrance." This concept revolves 
around the "tools of action," which in this study are those 
local officials who will, in the last analysis, make the
^Luther Gulick, The Metropolitan Problem and American 
Ideas (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 36.
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regional government reforms either a success or a failure.
In this regard, Selznick notes that there is a general
source of tension observable in the split between "the
motion and the act." In other words, Selznick says that
various plans and programs merely reflect the freedom of
ideal or technical choice, but that organized action cannot
escape an involvement, or a commitment, to personnel or
institutions or procedures which may effectively qualify the
2initial ideal plan. Selznick goes on to note that:
In organized action, this ultimate wisdom finds a 
temporal meaning in the recalcitrance of the tools 
of action. We are inescapably committed to the 
mediation of human structures which are at once 
indispensable to our goals and at the same time 
stand between them and ourselves. The selection 
of agents generates immediately a bifurcation of 
interest, expressed in new centers of need and 
power, placing effective constraints upon the 
arena of action, and resulting in tensions which 
are never completely r e s olved.3
Thus, to Selznick, recalcitrance is conceived as a quality 
of the tools of social or political action, involving a 
break in the continuum of adjustment and defining an envi­
ronment of constraint, commitment and tension. Selznick's 
concept of "recalcitrance" will be utilized as both a des­
criptive and an analytical tool for the study of the tension
^Phillip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of 





between the functional imperatives of adaptation and inte­
gration.
Finally, one other note seems relevant here. The use 
of the terms "system" and "subsystem" must necessarily 
depend upon the level of analysis. For the purposes of this 
study, I shall refer to the Ontario government as the polit­
ical "system" and the various municipal corporations, such 
as Timmons, Thunder Bay or Toronto, as "subsystems" and the 
Canadian government as the "larger system" of which Ontario 
is a part.
Chapter Two is a review of some of the common problems 
which have beset local government in the North American con­
text, along with some of the basic proposals for change.
This is necessary as a background to the problem of local 
reform in the specific case of Ontario to be considered in 
Chapter III.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM 
AND REFORM PROPOSALS
The literature relating to what, in the North Amer­
ican context, is usually called "the metropolitan problem" 
often revolves around the assertion that many, if not 
most, of the local units are clearly unequal to the chal­
lenge facing them. As the Committee for Economic Develop­
ment puts it: "They are ineffective in coping with present
problems, and inadequate in facing the escalation that 
surely lies ahead,
The picture that emerges from the relevant litera­
ture is not a particularly happy one. The portrayal is 
of a general fragmentation and "balkanization" of local 
government authority. In addition, it seems clear that 
the nature of the local government system often leads to 
duplication in effort, confusion in the assignment of 
authority, many taxing governments within a single general- 
purpose local government's boundaries and an absence of 
coincidence between governmental and population
Committee for Economic Development (CED), Modernizing 
Local Government: To Secure a Balanced Federalism, a state­




boundaries.^ An example of the local government balkani­
zation referred to can be demonstrated by the fact that, 
as of 1967, nearly 21,000 local units of government were 
located in the United States in over 200 metropolitan 
areas— an average of 91 governments per metropolitan 
area.^
The general fragmented condition of the core city 
and its suburbs in turn is the cause of other difficul­
ties. For example few local units are large enough— in 
population, area or taxable resources— to apply modern 
methods in solving the current as well as the future prob­
lems. Even the largest jurisdictions find many major 
problems insoluble because of limits on their geographic 
areas, their taxable resources and their legal powers. In 
addition, popular control over many local jurisdictions is 
ineffective or sporadic and public interest in local poli­
tics is quite often as a very low level. In short, it 
seems that confusion stemming from the many-layered sys­
tem, profusion of elective offices without policy signifi­
cance and increasing mobility of the population all con­
tribute to disinterest.^ Yet there seems to be a
Hugh L. LeBlanc and Allensworth D. Trudeau, The 
Politics of States and Urban Communities (New York; Harper 
and Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 206.
^Ibid. , p. 204.
^CED, Modernizing Local Government, pp. 11-13.
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concomitant desire of citizens to have access to the 
decision-making centers of local government. Clearly, 
this psychological fact has been a contributing factor to 
the increased balkanization of the core city and the sub­
urbs .
As urban life became more impersonal with the 
growth of population and as the old-fashioned 
political machine, which had served as an access 
point to great numbers of citizens, declined, the 
feeling of isolation and of frustration on the part 
of the urbanite must have increased. The reform- 
period practice of electing all councilman at large 
contributed to the iron curtain that the ordinary 
citizen saw as being dropped between himself and 
those who decided things that mattered. But in 
the suburb, he found a reestablishment of those 
close relationships that symbolized democracy on the 
frontier, and he regained the comfortable feeling 
that goes with confidence in the thought of having 
influence over governmental decisions and of having 
officeholders who share one's social values.1
Further, in many local jurisdictions, positions requiring 
knowledge of modern technical developments are frequently 
occupied by unqualified personnel. With exceptions among 
the larger cities, department heads are often amateurs.
Pay scales are usually too low to attract competent pro­
fessional applicants and specialized skills in the public 
service are often a cause for suspicion among those who 
make personnel policy. This, combined with the fact of
antiquated administrative organizations, hamper most local 
2governments. The above problems caused by the fragmented
Charles R. Adrian, State and Local Governments, A 
Study in the Political Process (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 241.
2CED, Modernizing Local Government, pp. 12-13.
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condition of local government has been summed up by Daniel 
R. Grant as follows; (1) an unequal distribution of finan­
cial resources and burdens; (2) unequal service levels;
(3) absence of area-wide authority to cope with area-wide 
problems, especially in regard to matters such as transit, 
water supply, sewers, health and planning; (4) wasteful 
duplication and inefficiency; (5) an inability on the part 
of citizens to fix responsibility for local government 
action or inaction; and (6) political segregation of able 
suburban leaders from the most serious urban (core city) 
problems.^
It has been noted that the real cost of operating 
municipal governments is constantly increasing concomitant 
with population movement toward the suburbs which has meant 
an increasing loss of tax base by the core cities. Indus­
tries tend to move to the suburbs when they expand or build 
new plants, retail merchants expand by building suburban 
branches and the people best able to pay property taxes on 
their homes are the first to move into the suburbs. In 
addition, one text notes a situation where the moribund 
core cities, in some states, are forced to subsidize the 
suburbs and as the tax base declined, the number and amount 
of subisidies increases. Two ways in which the core city
Daniel R. Grant, "State Governments and Metropolitan 
Areas," in Lee S. Greene, Malcolm E. Jewell and Daniel R. 
Grant, The States and the Metropolis (University, Alabama: 
University of Alabama Press, 1968), pp. 118-121.
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is forced to help the suburbanite pay for his governmental 
services are; by furnishing services of the city free or 
below cost to the suburbs and by paying a disproportion­
ately large share of state and county taxes in return for 
a disproportionately small share of their services.^
Along with the many problems internal to the metrop­
olis is the external question of the state (or province) 
and its role. There is a general consensus among reformers 
that there is an urgent need for a greater and more equit­
able state aid contribution and that there needs to be more 
attention by the states to the needs and adequacy of their 
local governmental systems. After all, the states do have 
responsibilities for their local government systems. They 
should be able to adapt their aid systems to the facts of
metropolitanism and initiate actions for change and reform
2where necessary.
The various proposed reorganizations of the present 
metropolitan, or local, system take many different forms. 
These proposals range from informal cooperative agreements 
among existing local governments to the establishment of a 
"super government" that would absorb all powers and
^Adrian, State and Local Governments, pp. 238-239.
2Committee for Economic Development (CED), Reshaping 
Government in Metropolitan Areas, a statement by the 
Research and Policy Committee (New York: February, 1970),
p. 49.
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prerogatives of numerous independent jurisdictions that 
together comprise the metropolitan area.^ These proposals 
can further be classified as two relatively separate 
streams of suggestions for reform. One stream is primar­
ily concerned with substantive problems— education, trans­
portation, housing, welfare, pollution and the like. The 
other stream analyses the structure that governs metro­
politan areas. Although the interrelationship between 
structure and substance is sometimes mentioned, it seldom 
is analyzed in depth. The result, of course, is simply 
that the important connection between substantive problems 
and governmental structure is only vaguely understood. In 
sum, these two streams must be merged. Even though the 
concern may be primarily with the structure and organiza­
tion of government in metropolitan areas, it must be remem­
bered that the purpose of recommended changes it to build 
a governmental system capable of responding to the substan­
tive problems that plague the metropolis instead of one 
which merely pleases one's aesthetic sensibilities. The 
point here simply is that the present governmental system 
often stands in the way of applying new and different
Winston W. Crouch and Beatrice Dinerman, Southern 
California Metropolis; A Study in Develoment of Govern­
ment for a Metropolitan Area (Berkeley; University of 
California Press, 1963), p. 376.
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policies, and in some instances is a significant cause of 
the problems.^
Finally, before going on to look at some of the var­
ious proposals for change, it should be noted that exper­
ience to date suggests that relatively minor reorganiza­
tion is likely to be consummated by the official govern­
mental units while major changes, in the United States, 
usually require voter ratification. Experience also sug­
gests that voter approval is difficult to come by; indeed, 
when given the opportunity, voters have often turned down
metropolitan governmental reorganization proposals, espec-
2ially those involving radical change.
One of the most commonly proposed remedies for the 
problems of suburban sprawl and fragmentation has been 
annexation. Briefly, this method was used by the great 
cities of the United States in achieving their present 
size, and the case for it is strong from the viewpoint of 
both the suburbs and the core city. For example, certain 
expensive services can, by annexation, be provided at a
^CED, Reshaping Government, p. 23.
2Thomas M. Scott, "Metropolitan Governmental Reorgan­
ization Proposals," The Western Political Quarterly, XXI 
(June, 1968). For examples of voter disapproval see Table 1, 
p. 253; and for factors affecting the lack of success see 
Table 6, p. 253. Also the reader is referred to Amos H. 
Hawley and Basil B. Zimmer, "Resistance to Unification in 
a Metropolitan Community," in Morris Janowitz, ed.,
Community Political Systems (New York: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1961).
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lower cost than could be realized by a suburb action 
alone. And, as a result, property values may rise, fire 
protection would be better and fire insurance rates might 
be lowered. The city would gain by an increase in the 
base for the financing of municipal government, the city 
could also insure a suburban development consistent with 
its own and it would be possible, for the first time, to 
make a unified area-wide attack on such metropolitan prob­
lems as disease, transportation, crime, slums, juvenile 
delinquency and the like.^
The record relating to the success and failure (or 
usefulness or lack of same) of the strategy of annexation 
is mixed. At best annexations have brought an appreciable 
portion of land within the jurisdiction of a single munici­
pal unit, thus helping establish a unified governmental 
operation in the entire territory encompassed by the metrop­
olis. At worst, such absorptions have at times tended to
produce defensive incorporations, thereby contributing to
2the proliferation of municipalities.
Further, on the debit side of the ledger, annexation 
is not always applicable or successful in part because laws
Daniel R. Grant, "Urban Needs and State Response: 
Local Government Reorganization," in Alan K. Campbell, ed.. 
The States and the Urban Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 66.
2John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metrop­
olis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life, 2nd. ed.
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), p. 290.
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in most states in the United States require that outlying 
areas may be annexed only after a referendum has been held 
and the annexation approved by the voters of the outlying 
areas as well as by those of the core city. And annexa­
tion is quite often unpopular in the fringe areas.^ In 
addition, it must be noted that annexations do not neces­
sarily represent a metropolitan-wide device. They often 
fall short in two important ways: first, they have often
taken place in urban areas already containing a consider­
able number of municipalities (and frequently with many 
special districts and one or more county governments as 
well); second, those cities that have utilized annexation 
in a large-scale way still, after annexation, embrace
merely a portion, most often a relatively small part, of
2the total metropolitan area.
The typical recent large land acquisitions through 
annexation have taken place chiefly under condition® which 
are not generally present in, especially the older, metro­
politan areas. In short, most cities which have been and 
are presently involved in these actions are aided by favor­
able annexation laws and are those newer cities which are
^Adrian, State and Local Governments, p. 248.
2Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, p. 290.
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usually bordered by substantial unincorporated territory 
and thus have had room for expansion.^
Finally, notwithstanding the persuasive arguments in 
favor of annexation, the fact is simply that it has been 
virtually impossible for the larger cities in the past few 
decades to keep pace by means of annexation with the popu­
lation growth beyond their borders. Opposition to the 
whole idea of annexation is often strong in the suburbs, 
with any one of several arguments being sufficient to 
insure a negative referendum vote: the fear of higher
taxes, a real, or alleged, corrupt or incompetent central 
city government, false promises on the delivery of ser­
vices, and annexations are often perceived as devious tax- 
grabbing schemes. It has become difficult, as a result, 
to annex unincorporated suburbs and it has become virtually
impossible for a central city to annex a suburb that is
2already separately incorporated.
1Ibid., p. 288. In the period between 1950 and 1967, 
the top five United States' cities in terms of annexed 
territory were, in decreasing order: Oklahoma City, Okla­
homa; Houston, Texas; Kansas City, Missouri; Phoenix, 
Arizona; and San Diego, California. The reader will note 
that all of these cities are in areas of the country which 
can be classified as "newer" in terms of the growth of 
major cities. See Bollens and Schmandt, p. 286. The point 
is simply that what was once the natural and common method 
of achieving area-wide urban government has now fallen pre­
dominantly into disuse except in the case of the newer and 
smaller cities in the United States.
2Grant, "Urban Needs and State Response," p. 66.
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The inclusion of decentralization as a local govern­
ment reform proposal may strike some readers as incongru­
ous in a study dealing largely with various reform pro­
posals implying centralization. We may note, however, that 
centralization and decentralization are not necessarily 
opposites, although they may be so. At the present time, 
in the context of the United States, much of the popular 
discussion of decentralization centers on current demands 
of many black groups for control over those institutions 
which most affect their lives and for a stronger voice in 
the political process.
The notion of decentralization of authority and 
administration is sometimes defended on the grounds of 
efficiency; however, it is more frequently justified in 
terms of effective popular participation in government.^
Decentralization can be given a wide range of defi­
nitions and can have an equally wide range of different 
implications to various individuals. However, it usually 
implies a delegation of authority, either within estab­
lished standards or for certain situations, from a central
organization to its subunits, usually accompanied by the
2provision of separate branch establishments.
Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization 
and Political Power," Public Administration Review, XXIX 
(January, February, 1969), p. 8.
2Crouch and Dinerman, Southern California Metropolis,
p. 295.
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The varied suggestions for decentralization usually 
involve such notions as the establishment of "little city 
halls" or neighborhood centers from which certain services 
would be supplied and through which a more direct means of 
communication between government and neighborhood residents 
could be realized.^ Other suggestions visualize the place­
ment of a trained person in the neighborhood, employed by 
the city government but preferably from the neighborhood, 
to serve as a communication link between the locality and 
the city and other governments and to take care of citizen 
complaints and requests. Also included are suggestions 
for the decentralization of advice and decision-making 
itself. In its strongest form, this suggestion calls for 
"participatory democracy" which is based on the notion of 
local community control in which neighborhood boards would 
have final decision-making authority over particular activ­
ities . ̂
Some of the decentralization suggestions, in addi­
tion, border on proposals for a federal system of local 
government. For exanç>le, one notion is that in order to 
insure attention to distinctive neighborhood needs with 
the concomitant effective action, large metropolitan centers 
might be divided into "neighborhood districts" on the order
^Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, p. 309. 
2%bid., p. 309-310.
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of magnitude of about 40,000 residents each. There are 
already administrative units which could serve in forming 
these districts, such as high school districts and police 
precincts. Each district could have a small, popularly 
elected body to study neighborhood needs and recommend 
solutions to the city council or county board.^
One author, however, goes much further than this. 
Milton Kotler flatly asserts that the object of local power 
can be nothing more than re-creating neighborhood govern­
ment which has political autonomy and representation in 
2larger units. Kotler feels that the development of 
neighborhood corporations to gain and exercise local con­
trol is quite consistent with the historical character of 
neighborhoods as political units. ̂  When neighbors organize 
to win control of public institutions in the neighborhood, 
they are utilizing the political nature of the neighbor­
hood. He feels that to control these institutions is to 
free the territory from the downtown power. This inde­
pendence is not conceived as something new to the
^CED, Modernizing Local Government, p. 47.
2Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government; The Local 
Foundations of Political Life (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1969), p. 39.
^Kotler insists that it is an error to define neigh­
borhoods as social units. Rather, to Kotler, a neighbor­
hood is in origin and continuity a political unit. See
p. 8.
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neighborhood, but is a liberty which the territory is 
seeking to regain.^
Kotler views the modern city as an imperial power 
vis-a-vis its neighborhoods. He asserts that the imperial 
purpose of the city functions on the basis of three prin­
ciples: (1) The first is to monopolize all regional
political power in the original city, or downtown; (2) The 
second purpose is to exploit the wealth of the region until 
the neighborhoods become impoverished, while the downtown 
becomes enriched; and (3) The third purpose, served by 
annexation, has been to impose upon the subjugated politi­
cal units the burden of paying disproportionately the costs
2of city administration. Kotler discards notions such as 
local advisory councils on the basis that they are based 
on the mistaken notion that the political object of the 
present movement of neighborhood power is merely better 
services; rather, he says that this drive is part of man's 
primary desire for the liberty of local rule and democratic 
decision.^ As a result, Kotler's basic conclusion is that 
the best form of neighborhood organization is the corporate 
organization of a neighborhood territory, chartered by the 
state and legally constituted for governing public




authorities in the neighborhood. He calls this form of 
organization the "neighborhood corporation."^
In summary, the decentralization literature consists 
of many proposals ranging from decentralization of admin­
istration to neighborhood "advisory" councils and, finally, 
to the more radical proposals for making the neighborhood 
the basic local political unit.
Interlocal cooperation is a broad term and takes many 
possible forms. At one extreme are informal, verbal under­
standings which involve such elementary matters as the 
exchange of information by administrators or techniques of 
two local governments operating in the same substantive 
field. A good example is the general exchange of informa­
tion that takes place many times daily between various 
law enforcement agencies. At the other extreme are formal, 
written agreements among a sizable number of local units 
that might, for example, work jointly to build and operate 
a major facility such as a sewage treatment plant or a 
water works.^ It seems fairly clear that the greatest attrac­
tion of interlocal cooperation is that it seems to be a pro­
cess for dealing with needs and problems on a voluntary
^Ibid., p. 44.
2Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, p. 350,
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basis and, concomitantly, a means of maintaining local 
determination and control.
The present interest in interlocal cooperation seems 
to date from 1954, with the negotiation of a multifunction 
contract between Los Angeles County and the newly incor­
porated City of Lakewood. Briefly stated, the county 
agreed to perform numerous services, including police and 
fire protection, and service levels and charges were also 
spelled out. Although many services were agreed upon by 
means of single-function contracts, a general services 
agreement was also signed making a variety of routine aids 
available to the city at cost.^
The interlocal city-county contracts have been most
prolific in Los Angeles County. By voluntary action, most
of the cities have contracted with the county government
to perform a broad array of local functions. In fact, Los
Angeles County has approximately 1600 such agreements,
involving all of the seventy-seven municipalities within
its borders, with the number of services furnished to any
particular city ranging from seven in one city to forty-
2five in another.
Crouch and Dinerman, Southern California Metropolis, 
P. 199. For the interested reader Crouch and Dinerman pro­
ceed to go into depth about what came to be called the 
"Lakewood Plan," pp. 180-211.
2Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, p. 360.
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Closely related to the notion of interlocal coopera­
tion is the idea of functional consolidation, or the merger 
of a single service or activity formerly being performed 
separately by a city or county. Functional consolidation, 
further, is sometimes seen as a method of encouraging fur­
ther cooperation leading, ultimately, to an overall politi­
cal consolidation. However, whether the consolidation of 
schools or health activities for a single metropolitan 
area contributes to, or detracts from, the prospects for 
eventual overall consolidation is, of course, the subject 
of much debate.^ At best it can only be a very long-run 
possibility.
Along this same view, some have supported the use of 
single-purpose districts partly on the assumption that they 
may lead, in some mystical way, to general-purpose dis­
tricts for metropolitan government. However, there appears 
to be no trend in that direction. And, in addition, special 
districts are often used for areas of less than the total
metropolitan area, thus, further contributing to the
2general problem of governmental proliferation.
Another suggestion, voluntary in nature, is the 
metropolitan council of governments (COG). Briefly, a 
metropolitan council of governments is a voluntary associa­
tion of governments which seeks to solve the various
^Grant, "Urban Needs and State Response," pp. 70-71. 
2Adrian, State and Local Governments, p. 248.
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area-wide problems by identifying and studying the problems, 
and developing a consensus for joint remedial action. Most 
councils are composed of elected officials and a few also 
have appointed public officials and representations of civic 
organizations as members.^ Like all voluntary associations, 
metropolitan councils of governments suffer from parochial­
ism among the various members.
City-county consolidation is another of the proposed 
solutions to the metropolitan problem. This idea (and 
there are many possible variations of it) calls for an 
integration of the functions of the core city with those 
of the county. The county may retain a partial identity 
and the incorporated municipalities may remain independent 
for certain local purposes. In short, it is basically an 
extension of a city's boundaries to make them coterminous 
with the county boundaries and the consolidation of the 
two governments into a single unit, at least for certain 
purposes. Variations of the common pattern may occur; on 
some occasions more than one county government is involved
Joseph F. Zimmerman, "Metropolitan Ecumenism: The
Road to the Promised Land," Journal of Urban Law (Spring, 
1967), p. 438. For a more indepth account of the problems 
and prospects of COGs the reader is referred to Melvin B. 
Mogulof, Governing Metropolitan Areas: A Critical Review
of Council of Governments and the Federal Role (Washington, 
D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1971).
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or school districts or other special units are included in 
the consolidation proposal.^
In general, the obstacles and complications to city- 
county consolidations are many and varied. Most of them 
have to do with state restrictions over local government 
which simply do not fit the proposed new structure. Con­
stitutional requirements for county officers, tax rates, 
methods of electing officials, debt limits, and many other 
provisions have either inhibited cities and counties from 
making the consolidation effort, or have served to cause
countless problems over court litigation following its 
2adoption. In fact, city-county consolidation has been 
the most often proposed but has seldom been adopted. In 
the United States the best known recent adoptions of city- 
county consolidation have been Baton Rouge and East Baton 
Rouge (1947) , Nashville and Davidson County (1962), Jack­
sonville and Duval County (1967) , and Indianapolis and 
Marion County (1969).^
^Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, p. 297.
2Grant, "Urban Needs and State Response," p. 68.
^Ibid., p. 68. Interestingly enough the most recent 
city-county consolidation, which was approved by the 
Indiana General Assembly in 1969 for Indianapolis and 
Marion County (UNIGOV) was, in fact, a merger that was 
enacted by the state legislature without a referendum.
For an interesting as well as complete look at the prob­
lems of getting a city-county consolidation adopted as 
well as the problems of making it work, see Brett W.
Hawkins, Nashville Metro; The Politics of City-County Con­
solidation (Nashville, Tennessee; Vanderbilt University 
Press, 1966) .
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The final general reform proposal that is dealt with
here is federation. The notion of urban federation is
based on a rough analogy to the relationship between the
national government and the states. The idea is simply
that the metropolitan federation would consist )f an area-
wide government to perform those functions which transcend
municipal boundaries and of component municipalities which
would perform purely local functions.^
Federation is often proposed for the larger and the
older metropolitan areas where annexation has been found
to be politically unfeasible or undesirable, and where
city-county consolidation is inappropriate or unacceptable.
It usually is argued that metropolitan federation provides
the best of both worlds— (1) grass roots, community control,
and (2) area-wide decision-making, research utilization
and administration in those areas where the larger coimun-
2ity interest is important. Federation is then proposed as 
a compromise between the need for efficiency, economy and 
equity which allows for the functions of government to be 
integrated throughout the metropolitan area on one hand, 
and on the other, allows for keeping government as close to
1Grant, "Urban Needs and State Response," p. 71. For 
a complete description of the adoption of the workings of 
North America's two best known urban federations, see 
Kaplan, Urban Political Systems; A Functional Analysis of 
Metro Toronto ; and Edward Sofen, The Miami Metropolitan 
Experience (Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana University Press, 
1963).
2Grant, "Urban Needs and State Response," p. 71.
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the people as possible while, at the same time, maintaining 
the psychological value in retaining the community spirit 
of the smaller suburb as against the impersonality of the 
core city.^
The principal difficulties to be normally encountered 
in adopting, and making work, urban federation center 
around the problems of determining the distribution of 
powers between and among the upper and lower tiers of gov­
ernment and in establishing the formula for representation
2of the governing body for the entire metropolis. For 
example, it might be suggested that functions such as sew­
age disposal, water supply, police protection and planning 
should be area-wide, while perhaps garbage collection and 
local street maintenance would be appropriate for the lower 
tier government. Although this kind of arrangement might 
seem rational, it is, at the same time, relatively easy to 
see how the distribution could bring about controversy.
Federation in the urban context is largely an out­
growth of the perceived success achieved by Toronto with 
its federal structure created in 1953. For example, the 
Committee for Economic Development has recommended that an 
urban federal system is the best hope for the ultimate
^Adrian, State and Local Governments, p. 249.
2In subsequent chapters I shall return to this prob­
lem as it relates to the experience of the proposed region­
al governments in Ontario and dewll on it at length.
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solution of urban structural problems. The findings are 
based on and extrapolated from the Toronto experience.^
In Canada, especially in Ontario, there has been 
great interest on the part of some of the provincial gov­
ernments in allowing for, encouraging, or even imposing 
metropolitan federations. In the United States, however, 
state governments have done very little to either encour­
age or permit the establishment of metropolitan federations, 
For example, in the case of Florida and the Dade County 
(Miami) Metro, the role of the state was essentially a 
stand pat, show me attitude toward the area seeking to 
reform itself. Constitutional and legislative changes 
have been made only grudgingly and, many would say, inade­
quately, and only when the local pressures upon the state
2became great enough.
In further reference to the role of the state, it is 
clear that reorganization roads have traditionally led to 
the state capitol because that is where the ultimate power 
is located. However, Americans have traditionally divided 
intrastate matters into a simple dichotomy of state and 
local. They have insisted, generally, that the state con­
fine itself to matters that are "statewide" in impact, and 
leave to local governments those matters that are limited 
in scope. The metropolitan problem arises, in part.
^CED, Reshaping Government, p. 19.
2Grant, "Urban Needs and State Response," p. 73.
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because the metropolitan area does not fit well into that 
simple dichotomy. By reason of its constitutional posi­
tion, as well as its responsibilities in administrative 
programs, the state is in a position to bridge the gap if 
it will only take the initiative in doing so.^
According to the principle laid down in Dillon's 
Rule, the state creates and has sole authority over the 
looa.l governments within its borders. Dillon's Rule is 
as follows:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, 
and derive their powers and rights wholly from, 
the legislature. It breathes into them the breath 
of life, without which they cannot exist. As it 
creates, so may it destroy. If it may destroy, it 
may abridge and control. Unless there is some 
constitutional limitation on the right, the legis­
lature might, by a single act, if we suppose it 
capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, 
sweep from existence all the municipal corporations 
in the state and the corporation could not prevent 
it.2
Further, a city may be created with or without the consent 
of its membership, the terms of its charter may be quite 
different from what the people of the community desire, 
and, more importantly, the charter is not a contract and 
is hence subject to constant, involuntary, and sometimes
^Grant, "State Governments and Metropolitan Areas," 
pp. 405-406.
2City of Clinton vs. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River 
Railroad Company, 24 Iowa 455 (1868), p. 475; cited in 
Roscoe C. Martin, The Cities and the Federal System (New 
York: Atherton Press, 1965), pp. 29-30.
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arbitrary changes.^ Like any other corporation, the munic­
ipality derives its powers from the state and those powers 
granted to it are expressed in a charter. A charter is 
simply the fundamental law of a corporation which estab­
lished (1) the structure or the form of government, (2) the
powers that may be exercised by it, and (3) the general
2manner in which the powers granted may be exercised. The 
point of this rather pedantic exercise in the relative 
powers of the states and the localities is that the local 
governments are creatures of the states. Thus, it is in 
this area that the states presumably could make the greatest 
contribution. Yet, it is interesting to note that it is 
here that the states have done the least.^
However, in the United States, something quite like 
a federal system has grown up within the states; for while
Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, Governing 
Urban America, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1968), pp. 160-161.
^Ibid., p. 160.
^Phillip H. Hoff, Governor of Vermont, speech to the 
National Conference on Public Administration of the Ameri­
can Society for Public Administration, Miami Beach, May 21, 
1969, cited in Grant, "Urban Needs and State Response," p. 
76. This is also in opposition to the argument that the 
Ontario-Toronto experience cannot be transferred to the 
United States because of supposed greater powers of the 
Canadian provinces vis-a-vis the municipalities. For 
example, see LeBlanc and Trudeau, The Politics of States 
and Urban Communities, p. 242. Of course, the Toronto 
experience may not, in fact, be transferable to the United 
States but not necessarily for the reasons cited above.
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law calls for state supremacy, practice and tradition have 
produced a considerable measure of municipal autonomy. As 
a matter of law, the states could of course modify this in 
any way they see fit, but tradition built up over a period 
of years seems to militate against this.^ In addition, 
many of the states have moved to grant their cities cer­
tain basic rights usually through the vehicle of "home 
rule." To date, about half of the states have placed in 
their constitutions provisions giving their cities home 
rule powers over charter formation and change. Cities in
many states therefore enjoy an increased measure of auton- 
2omy. In reference to the City of Los Angeles, the authors 
of one study note that any proposal for greater consolida­
tion or integration inevitably incurs the wrath of many 
local officials. And, in addition, any public attitudes 
toward metropolitan government can be expected to be neb­
ulous and apathetic at best, or at worst, hostile. Hostile 
because the principle of home rule has been elevated to an 
ideological status and an elaborate legal structure has 
often been erected so as to protect local governments from 
unwanted integration.^
^Martin, The Cities and the Federal System, p. 32. 
^Ibid., pp. 30-31.
^Crouch and Dinerman, Southern California Metropolis, 
pp. 370-372.
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However hostile the reaction of local officials, 
some scholars believe that the states have to take the 
initiative to reform metropolitan politics. Grant believes 
that states must require— not merely authorize— the reforma­
tion of local government. In addition he believes that the 
action of state governments in the next ten or twenty years 
will determine the future of metropolitan government, which, 
in turn, may well determine the future of state government.^ 
Further, Crouch and Dinerman note that if a long existent 
but currently limited force, the state government, is em­
ployed in a purposeful manner, it can become the initiator
of coordinated action to alleviate some of the problems of
2metropolitan areas.
A friendly summary of the states' role in alleviating 
urban problems notes that the positive areas are in finan­
cial aids to large cities and the beginnings of state 
departments with explicitly urban missions.^ A more real­
istic assessment, however, is that the role of the states 
in meeting metropolitan area reorganization problems has
^Grant, "State Governments and Metropolitan Areas," 
p. 131-132.
2Crouch and Dinerman, Southern California Metropolis, 
pp. 376 and 404.
^Ira Sharkansky, The Maligned States; Policy Accom­
plishments, Problems, and Opportunities (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 150.
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been predominantly negative, grudging, road-blocking, or 
simply indifferent in its general stance.
At this point, the reader with justification might 
ask what this discussion has to do with local government 
in Ontario. The assumption made here is that many of the 
urban problems in the United States are illustrative of 
the similar problems in Ontario. Frank Smallwood has made 
a similar assumption in his study of Metropolitan London, 
England:
While obviously there are environmental dif­
ferences between the metropolitan politics of London 
and those of the American city, this very fact pro­
vided the underlying rationale for the study effort. 
It was felt that, if any common denominators could 
be found under such varying conditions, they might 
tell us something about the more general workings 
of our metropolitan political systems.^
Basic Inadequacies in Traditional Local 
Government in Ontario
The major characteristic of the existing local gov­
ernment system in Ontario is the large number of decision­
making and implementing bodies at the local level. Basic­
ally, it may be said that this has resulted in two basic 
structural weaknesses in the system. The first of these 
is that responsibilities have been completely fragmented. 
The point is simply that while the local municipality is
Frank Smallwood, Greater London: The Politics of
Metropolitan Reform (Indianapolis : The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 3-4.
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clearly the most visible form of local government, the 
degree of actual power it wields is limited. For example, 
less than half of all local expenditures are actually set 
by the municipal council— yet the municipal council tends 
to be blamed for rises in local property taxes- In many 
municipalities, water distribution is the responsibility 
of a separate public utilities commission— yet it often is 
the municipality that is blamed if the water supply is not 
satisfactory for some reason.^ The essential point is that 
there is little coordination in deciding service priorities. 
There is no agency at the local level that can decide 
whether more schools are needed, for instance. In addi­
tion, there is no mechanise to provide the overall budget-
2ary or financial planning essential to good management.
The point is simply that as long as government remains 
highly fragmented there can be no proper understanding of 
its role or activities on the part of the citizenry to 
which it is responsible. This type of situation denies 
one of the values inherent in local government in a demo­
cratic society— the value of citizen access. In other
W. Darcy McKeough, Local Government Reform: Why We
Need It, What It Means, and Our Progress So Far, a speech 
by the Honourable W. Darcy McKeough, Minister of Municipal 
Affairs (September 10, 1970), p. 3; and S. J. Clasky, Back­
ground to the Development of Regional Government in Ontario 
(mimeo.), a paper delivered to the Conference on Regional 
Government, University of Windsor (February 14, 1970) , pp. 
3-5.
^Ibid., Clasky, p. 4.
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words, when government continues to appear as a diverse 
grouping of seemingly unrelated principalities, all com­
peting among one another, and, when the taxes paid to gov­
ernment bear little relationship to the services rendered, 
the citizen is significantly hampered in attempts to par­
ticipate in and to influence government. Thus, it has 
been asserted that in Ontario local government reform is 
essential; both to ensure that the role of government is 
clearly understood by those it serves and to see that it 
remains subject to democratic control.^
The second of the basic structural weaknesses results 
from the large number of small municipal governments. In 
Ontario there are well over nine hundred municipalities. • 
These range in size from Metropolitan Toronto with over 
two million people to ninety small towns, villages, and 
townships with under two hundred people. In 1969, half of 
Ontario's municipalities had under 2,000 people and over
half of them spent less than $150,000 on municipal servi- 
2ces. The large number and relatively small size of many 
of these municipalities has placed great stress upon 
Ontario's municipal system. This system was admirably
^Report of the Ontario Economic Council, Government 
Reform in Ontario, 1970, p. 17.
2Clasky, Background to the Development of Regional 
Government in Ontario, p. 4; also see Ontario Department 
of Municipal Affairs, 1972 Municipal Directory, February 
15, 1972.
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suited to carry out the functions of local government in 
the small, scattered, rural-oriented society of the Nine­
teenth Century. However, very few of the traditional local 
units are large enough— either in population, area, or tax­
able resources— to be able to apply modern methods in tack­
ling the myriad of current and future problems. Even the 
largest cities find major problems unsolvable because of 
limitations on their geographic jurisdiction as well as 
upon their taxable resources.
The Report of the Ontario Economic Council asserts 
that local government in Ontario has been based upon sev­
eral assumptions which are no longer valid in the environ­
ment of the latter half of the Twentieth Century. These 
invalid assumptions, according to the Ontario Economic 
Council, underlying the present municipal structure include; 
first, the view that there is a very distinct cleavage of 
interest and public service requirements between rural and 
urban areas, and that rural and urban areas can be readily 
classified as rural or urban.^ Clasky feels that this is 
the most significant single assumption underlying the tra­
ditional municipal system. The assumption is that rural 
and urban communities are separate and distinct entities 
with their individual "life-styles" and consequent diver­
gent and often conflicting interests. This assumption is
^Ibid., Clasky, p. 5.
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reflected in the fact that the traditional local govern­
ment system is designed so that each type of community 
(rural or urban) can go its own way. Cities, for example, 
are not part of the county system and towns and townships 
having differing powers and structures reflecting their 
respective urban and rural origins. The argument presented 
by Clasky asserts that this distinction between rural and 
urban local government has become increasingly artificial 
in this century. The real Twentieth Century pressures of 
transportation, labor mobility, economics and communica­
tions have blurred the distinction so completely that 
desire for a high quality of municipal services and the 
desire for equality in education in all areas bring clearly 
into focus the fact that both rural and urban Ontario now 
share many of the same basic views of the role of local 
government institutions.^ The point that needs emphasis 
here, of course, is that this merging of basic rural and 
urban values has not been reflected in the municipal insti­
tutions. The second invalid assumption cited is the view 
that the political and economic "community" is small, highly 
localized and relatively self-contained. The assertion here 
is that this assumption is limited to the communication 
imperatives of the Nineteenth Century. The final basic 
invalid underlying assumption cited is that local government
^Ibid., pp. 5-6.
47
can place primary fiscal reliance upon the property tax as 
a source of revenue, and that this can be accomplished 
without endangering either the provision of local services 
or orderly development.^
While the above basic assumptions may be increas­
ingly invalid, the municipal system based upon them is 
still operative. The Ontario Economic Council asserts 
that the result of the combination of these archaic assump­
tions and of various urban growth pressures has been a num­
ber of common interrelated problems. These problems in­
clude an increasing imbalance between local service demands
and local fiscal resources as the desired level and range
2of services rises with increasing urbanization. Further, 
these assumptions have encouraged a situation where the 
size and the shape of economic interrelations and the size 
and shape needed for physical planning do not coincide with 
municipal jurisdictions. There is also an increasing imbal­
ance in size and particularly in population and resources 
among rhe various municipal units as people and economic 
activity shift from the more rural areas to a few exploding 
urban centers. These kinds of problems have led to a ten­
dency to by-pass the municipal structures ~r,d to create 
single-purpose units designed to cover more rational service
^Report of the Ontario Economic Council, Government 
Reform in Ontario, pp. 26-27.
^Ibid., pp. 26-27.
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areas which, in turn, contributes to an increasing frag­
mentation of local government responsibilities among a 
growing number of overlapping and fiscally competitive 
forms of local authority.^ It is this type of perceived 
situtation which has led the Province of Ontario to the 
conclusion that the traditional municipal structure is a 
major obstacle to an orderly and efficient pace of urban 
development.
Finally, in addition to the above problems, it must
be noted that, until recently, there has been a lack of
concerted effort by any higher level of government to take
account of the problems of local government. This has
been a problem in both the United States and in Canada.
In 1949, James W. Fesler noted that:
Not in any state will be found a point at which 
the problems of local areas are considered in a 
methodical, comprehensive fashion. In fact, the 
disorderly manner in which higher levels of gov­
ernment have handled their responsibilities toward 
the lesser areas accounts for much of the dif- _ 
ficulty in which the lesser areas find themselves.
Reform Proposals
There have been in Canada, as well as in the United 
States, a myriad of proposals for the reformation of local 
government institutions. In Ontario, most of these
^Ibid., p. 27.
2James W. Fesler, Area and Administration (University, 
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1949) , p. 127.
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proposals have emphasized a need for a system of local 
government which adequately allows for both the needs of 
centralization and decentralization, or, in other words, 
for the needs of efficient provision of services on an 
equitable basis while maintaining or increasing citizen 
access. These needs along with the example of the appar­
ently successful experience of Metropolitan Toronto has 
prompted much interest in the assumed advantages of two- 
tier local government in Ontario on a regional basis.
Over thirty years ago, Victor Jones noted the advan­
tages of federated local government. At that time, he 
pointed out that:
1. It takes account of and makes necessary con­
cessions to suburban particularism;
2. Annexation of contiguous territory becomes, 
because of the "federal" nature of the arrange­
ment, much easier than it has proven to be under 
consolidated city-county governments;
3. It has an internal flexibility which would 
allow a progressive shift of functions from 
the constituent units to the metropolitan 
government as rapidly as the people concerned 
can be persuaded of its necessity.^
In Ontario the advocates of regional government base 
their case upon the dual local government objectives of 
access and efficiency of services. It is usually argued 
that two-tier regional government will promote efficiency
^Victor Jones, Metropolitan Government (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 150-151.
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because it will be able to centralize common services at 
the level which will provide for efficiency in scale of 
operation. The assumption is that because of the central­
ization of function, many of the disadvantages now inher­
ent in a fractionalized municipal structure will disappear. 
Also because the scale of operation will be more inclusive, 
the present unevenness of standards of services provided 
will be removed. Experts can be hired to promote special­
ized services on the regional scale and thus the whole 
administration of services will be improved. And, at the 
same time, it is asserted that the lower-tier units will 
encourage, and indeed ensure, meaningful political dia­
logue between the citizenry and their local government.
Clearly then, the existing imbalance in the local 
government system in Ontario has been recognized. Most of 
those who have studied the municipal structure have con­
cluded that the system must be restructured to meet exist­
ing and future needs. And there has been some agreement 
on the utility of the concept of regional government. In 
fact, the debate about regional government has often con­
centrated on discussions about the appropriate boundaries, 
method of representation and division of functions between 
the lower tier and the regional tier, rather than upon the 
concept of regional government itself.
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The remaining portions of this study concentrate 
more specifically on the Canadian and Ontario local gov­
ernment experience. Chapter III is a general review of 
the nature of local government in the Canadian context, 
along with its relationships to other governments such as 
the various provincial governments and with the federal 
government. This review seems necessary as a prelude to 
discussion of specific attempts at reorganization because 
of a presumed lack of familiarity with the Canadian local 
government system.
CHAPTER III
CANADIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Like the United States, Canada is a largely urban 
nation. By 1956, close to 74 percent of Canada's popula­
tion lived in urban areas, according to census definition.^ 
Further, of the ten provinces and two territories, Ontario 
is the most urban with 80 percent of its population living 
in urban areas, and the Northwest Territories is the least
urban with only 40 percent of its population living in 
2urban areas. As in the United States, the realization of 
the urban nature of Canada's population is having a tremen­
dous effect upon thinking about local government— its prob­
lems and its role in an increasingly urban society.
Ontario is a huge province, particularly by United 
States' standards. Ontario includes an area of 412,282
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Yearbook, 
1970-1971 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), p. 220.
The definition of urban includes cities, towns and villages 
of 1,000 or more population. Also classed as urban were 
the urbanized fringes of these centers where the population 
of the city or town together with its urbanized fringe 
amounted to 10,000 or more and where the density of the 




square miles.^ It is the second largest Canadian province 
in terms of land area, second only to Quebec. In popula­
tion terms, Ontario is the most populous of Canada's ten 
provinces with a population of nearly seven million 
people. The greatest part of Ontario's population is 
concentrated is a narrow corridor running from Detroit, 
Michigan to Montreal, Quebec. Included in this corridor 
are Ontario's largest cities which, in order, are:
Toronto, Hamilton,^ Ottawa, London and Windsor. Other 
important regional centers outside of this concentrated 
population corridor are Sault Ste. Marie, Sudbury and 
Thunder Bay. Finally, as is true in many countries, the 
United States for example, the "metropolitan explosion" 
in recent years in Canada, and specifically in Ontario, 
has actually been a "suburban explosion." For example, 
during the 1951-1961 period, the central cities of all of 
Ontario's metropolitan areas have tended to show a slowing 
down in their pace of growth. Two central cities, Toronto 
and Windsor, even lost some city population. Meanwhile 
there has been a tremendous upsurge of population in the 
suburban areas everywhere. For example, for each addition
^Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Yearbook,
p. 36.
^Ibid., p. 212.
^Hamilton is larger than Ottawa in terms of central 
city population. However, Ottawa has the larger metropoli­
tan area population.
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to the central city population over the decade between 
1951 and 1961, three additions on the average were made 
to the suburban population.^
Origins of Local Government in Ontario
It is important to note that local government in
Ontario is primarily a development of the last century.
In the very early days of Ontario's history there was a
complete absence of any form of local government. The
affairs of what was called British North America were
being administered by a central government responsible to
2the Imperial Parliament of England. It must be remem­
bered that during this time period the successive Gover­
nors and Lieutenant-Governors of the colonies of British 
North America were schooled in the traditions of England's 
aristocracy and were taught to observe the colonial policy 
of the country from which they received their instructions. 
They were opposed to the administration of local affairs 
by any other than the central government as well as to the 
principle of self-government in any form, whether it be 
local or general.3
Yoshiko Kasahara, "A Profile of Canada's Metropolitan 
Centres," in Lionel D. Feldman and Michael D. Goldrick, eds., 
Politics and Government of Urban Canada (Toronto: Methuen,
1969), pp. 20-21.
2Romaine K. Ross, Local Government in Ontario, 2nd. 
ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book Company, Ltd., 1962), p. 3.
^Ibid., p. 3.
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The development of local government in Ontario had 
its beginning in the claims and demands of the early 
English settlers for a voice in local affairs and also in 
the petitions to the central government of the United 
Empire Loyalists and others who migrated to the colony 
during and subsequent to the American Revolution.^ It is 
not the purpose here to trace, in detail, the historical 
evolution of local government in Ontario. For the present 
purpose it is sufficient to note that the development was 
an evolutionary one beginning about 1790 and advancing in 
a progression of very small steps until about 1840. Fin­
ally in 1841, at the first session of the legislature of 
United Canada, a municipal act was passed which allowed 
local self-government. This act was very limited in 
nature and merely allowed the local authorities to retain
whatever control of local affairs which they already pos- 
2sessed. The matter of local government in Ontario was 
finally settled by the passing in 1849 of what has come 
to be known as the Baldwin Act. This Act created, as it 
says in its preamble, " . . .  one general law, for the 
erection of Municipal Corporations and the establishment 
of Regulations of Police in and for the several Counties,
^Ibid., p. 5.
2A. E. Buck, Financing Canadian Government (Chicago: 
Public Administration Service, 1949), p. 298.
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Cities, Towns, Townships and Villages in Upper Canada."^
The Baldwin Act remains the foundation of the present 
municipal system in Ontario even though amendments to the 
Act have been made nearly every year since enactment in 
order to meet the obvious needs of an ever increasing pop­
ulation and a constantly changing social order.
It also should be noted, for American readers, that 
the written basis for the Canadian constitution is the 
British North America Act which was passed by the British 
Parliament on March 20, 1867. Section 92 of the Act pro­
vided that the power to make laws respecting local matters 
be assigned exclusively to the provinces. Thus, legisla­
tion relating to municipal institutions is enacted by the
provincial legislatures only and not by the Federal Parlia- 
2ment. The Canadian system, in this respect, is somewhat 
simliar to that of the United States where local government 
comes under the jurisdiction of the states. This, of 
course, is in contrast to the English system where, because 
it is a unitary and not a federal form of government, the 
national Parliament enacts all legislation relating to 
local government.
^Ross, Local Government in Ontario, p. 12, quoted 
from the Baldwin Act of 1849), p. 298.
2Kenneth Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Govern­
ment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), p. 50.
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In Canada, the legal doctrine is that the provinces, 
having created the local governments, can confer on them 
any or every power which the province itself possesses 
under the Confederation Act.^ As a result, each province 
has proceeded to divide its territory into various terri­
torial units, referred to as municipalities or, more 
specifically, as counties, cities, towns, townships, vil­
lages, rural municipalities or municipal districts. The 
provinces have provided that these municipalities be incor­
porated, and that the powers of these corporations are to 
be exercised by elected councils. In the various provin­
cial municipal acts, the provinces have assigned to the 
various classes of municipalities the powers and the
responsibilities that they feel such municipalities should 
2possess. The structure, the organization and the powers 
of the municipalities are based on provincial statutes 
which may be general for all municipalities or special for 
each category; and even though some of the larger cities 
have their own charters, they still are subject to the gen­
eral laws applying to all municipalities within the prov­
ince .  ̂ The point is simply that the powers and
Ibid., p. 51. Clearly, then, the legal power of the 
Canadian province vis-a-vis its local sub-units is comparable 
to the legal power of the American states over their locali­
ties. However, the use of that power has differed considerably.
2 *Ibid., p. 51.
p. 228.
3Humes and Martin, The Structure of Local Governments,
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responsibilities of municipal authorities are subject to 
endless change due to provincial legislation.
Although the provinces may exercise complete control 
oveii the municipalities in both a policy and an administra­
tive sense, in the past the tendency has been for the prov­
inces to largely limit their supervision of local affairs 
to health and to financial matters. Generally, fiscal 
supervision is vested in the various provincial departments 
of municipal affairs. And it is important to note that the 
tendency in all of the provinces has been to increase 
financial control over all of the municipalities. In 
Ontario, for example, the Ontario Municipal Board, which 
must approve all capital expenditures by municipalities, 
was set up in the mid-1930's. About that same time the 
Department of Municipal Affairs was established and, among 
other powers, was given direct control over any Ontario 
municipalities in default.^ These measures, of course, 
can be traced directly to the financial difficulties that 
haunted all governments during the 1930's. The idea under­
lying the establishment of provincial departments of munic­
ipal affairs was, in addition, intended to help provide for 
the continuous study of the problems of the municipalities.
Buck, Financing Canadian Government, pp. 30 6-307.
Under the new reorganization of the Ontario government in
1972, the Department of Municipal Affairs is now part of the
new Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs.
2Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, p. 345.
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Once these departments of municipal affairs were estab­
lished, however, the scope of their activities has tended 
to increase, and this expansion has inevitably served to 
limit the unrestricted exercise of the powers of the 
municipalities.
The Nature of Local Government
In Ontario, as in all Canadian provinces, provincial
control of the local authorities in both the legal and the
constitutional sense is absolute. The legislative power
of the provincial legislatures within the municipal sphere
is exclusive and supreme. In fact, the measure of control
now being exercised by the Ontario Legislature over local
authorities is greater than any time in the history of the
province.^ It is clear, however, that if the provincial
authorities are to be able to exercise effective control
and supervision over the municipalities, the legislative
power must be supplemented by administrative agencies and
these agencies must be provided with some discretionary
powers, that is, with what essentially amounts to a dele-
2gated power of legislation. It is thus that the main fea­
ture of provincial control is a high degree of centralized 
administrative supervision of local affairs by the Ontario
^Ross, Local Government in Ontario, p. 87.
2Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, p. 344.
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Municipal Board and the Department of Municipal Affairs
in particular.
The Ontario Municipal Board (0MB) is, essentially,
a quasi-judicial body which is appointed by the Lieutenant-
Governor-in-Council. The applications dealt with by the
Board embrace a large variety of matters and include
applications in respect to defaulting municipalities,
annexations of territory, the creation or dissolution of
municipalities, the approval of restricted area by-laws,
arbitrations, the validation of municipal debentures and
the approval of municipal undertakings involving capital
expenditures.^
The basic problems presented to the Board for deci­
sion may be considered at three levels of general­
ity. At the most concrete level the Board super­
vises the regulation of the use to which an indi­
vidual may put his particular parcel of land in a 
given neighborhood; this aspect may be termed 
micro-planning. At the second or macro-planning 
level the Board is required to consider the role 
of a municipality not only as a policy-maker acting 
in the best interests of the inhabitants of the 
community over which it has jurisdiction but also 
as a political force capable of influencing the 
physical and economic environment within a regional 
context. Finally, at a civic and administrative 
level the Board is concerned with the appropriate 
distribution of power in the decision-making process 
so that government regulatory authority is exercised 
in a manner consistent with democratic responsibil­
ity. 2
^Ross, Local Government in Ontario, p. 88.
2Gerald M. Adler, Land Planning by Administrative 
Regulation; The Policies of the Ontario Municipal Board 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 3.
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Its orders are final except for the right to appeal 
on matters of law to a higher court. Under the Ontario 
Municipal Board Act (Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1960, 
chapter 274, section 94) the cabinet may also vary or 
rescind any order made by the Board, although it seldom 
does so.^ About half of the members of the Ontario Munic­
ipal Board are attorneys. The remaining members are 
planners, businessmen and accountants. The members gen­
erally see their function as simply one of making sure 
that the various local councils do not go outside their 
boundaries (especially in the financial sense) and that
the public interest, as the Board members define it, is 
2served.
Although the 0MB tries to keep a low profile it is 
often at the very center of controversy. Many local 
officials, especially those of the larger municipalities 
such as Metro Toronto, see the Board as an undemocratic 
roadblock in the way of local development. For example, 
an unsigned editorial in the Toronto Star of July 31, 1972, 
asserts that if Metropolitan Toronto is ever to have a 
qualified and responsive municipal government which can
Thomas J. Plunkett, Urban Canada and Its Government: 
A Study of Municipal Organization (Toronto: Macmillan of
Canada, 1968), p. 84.
2Mr. K. C. Andrews, Secretary of the Ontario Munici­
pal Board. Interview held at the 0MB offices in Toronto 
on July 21, 1972.
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involve ordinary people in the planning of their neighbor­
hoods and their city, then the undemocratic power of an 
appointed tribunal, the Ontario Municipal Board, will have 
to be curbed.^
On the other hand, the Board often tends to see itself
as a guardian of the public interest. For example, in a
speech to the founding convention of the Association of
Municipalities of Ontario, J. A. Kennedy, chairman of the
0MB, stated that the municipal board is often " . . .  the
ombudsman before the fact." He further stated that he
stands " . . .  four-square for people power, for citizen
2participation and for participatory democracy." The point 
simply is that there is a built-in degree of conflict 
between any control agency, such as the Ontario Municipal 
Board, and the local officials over whom control is exer­
cised.
Where provincial policy has been articulated by the 
government the Board is bound to not deviate from that 
policy in any way. However, in the many areas where no
Editorial, "A Citizen's Tribunal at Metro Level," The 
Toronto Star, July 31, 1972, p. 6. This comment was 
prompted by a decision by the 0MB ordering that more park­
land be set aside in preference to high rise development 
proposed by the City or Toronto and Metro Toronto. The 
interested reader is referred to "Toronto Gets Order to 
Double Parkland in Metro Centre" and "Most Disappointed 
Mayor Predicts Council to Appeal," in The Toronto Star,
June 23, 1972, pp. 1 and 4.
2"For Once Politicians Unnerve Kennedy," The Toronto 
Star, June 21, 1972, p. 10.
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governmental policy has been articulated the Board may 
exercise wide latitute in its decisions. It was just such 
a decision which was the catalyst which ultimately brought 
about the creation of Metro Toronto.^
In addition to those powers delegated to the Board, 
the province has also delegated to the Department of Munici­
pal Affairs powers of judicial decision of an extreme 
nature. The main work of the Department has been in pro­
viding for improved methods of municipal financing, account­
ing and auditing, improving methods of recording and pub­
lishing municipal statistics and generally affecting 
improvements in the conduct and administration of municipal 
affairs throughout the province. It is at this point that 
possible conflict between the Ontario Municipal Board and 
Municipal Affairs appears. Initially, the Board was under 
Municipal Affairs. Later it was put under the jurisdiction 
of the Attorney General. With the recent governmental 
reorganization in Ontario, the Board was made responsible 
to the Minister of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental
Affairs for about a month, then it went back to the office
2of the Attorney General. Mr. McGuire asserts that even 
though the Board members are political appointees who serve 
at pleasure, over time the Board has been able to maintain
Interview with Mr. R. M. McGuire, Vice-Chairman of 
the 0MB. Interview was held at the 0MB offices in Toronto 
on June 21, 1972.
^Ibid., June 21, 1972.
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its integrity and independence and even increase it even 
though many of the matters is considers and many of its 
decisions have been and are very controversial.^ Even 
so, it is perfectly clear that there is, and must be, a 
mutually reciprocating relationship between the Ministry 
of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs and 
the Ontario Municipal Board. Neither could effectively 
carry out its function without the cooperation of the 
other. And it is through the coordination of the efforts 
of these two governmental agencies that the central super­
vision and control of local authorities is accomplished.
With respect to the local authorities, in Ontario 
the government of each municipality is vested in a council 
or, in the case of police villages and improvement dis­
tricts, in trustees or a board of trustess. The members
of a municipal council vary, of course, in name and num-
2bers according to the type of municipality served.
In a legal sense every municipality in Ontario is a 
municipal corporation. The Provincial Legislature has the 
power to create municipal corporations and to give them 
full power to deal with all or any matters coming within
^Ibid., June 21, 1972.
2Ross, Local Government in Ontario, p. 20.
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the Legislature's own legislative jurisdiction. Thus, all 
municipal corporations in Ontario are the creatures of 
statute and all municipal powers in Ontario have their 
source in statutory grant.^
The general duties of a municipal council are broad 
in scope and cover most phases of community life. While 
the council controls and gives direction to the many legis­
lative and administrative activities coming within its 
jurisdiction, the actual operation of many of the public 
services is carried on for the most part by standing com­
mittees of the council, such as a public works committee 
of a financial committee; the committees vary in number
and in kind according to the needs of the particular 
2municipality.
Local Government Organization and Structure
With respect to the various specific structures of 
municipal government, one of the most common is the council- 
committee type and its variations. This type of local gov­
ernment structure is also often referred to as the council- 
mayor system. This is the traditional structure for munic­
ipal government in Ontario. In this form, the municipal 
council, which is elected by wards, appoints its members to 
serve on the various standing committees whose primary
^Ibid., pp. 20-21.
2Humes and Martin, The Structure of Local Governments,
pp. 228-229.
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functions are to supervise one or more departments, or one 
or more of the functions of the municipal government.
These committees consult with departmental administrators 
and report their findings and recommendations to the full 
council for action. The committees cannot act without the 
approval of the council as a whole; their role is one of 
recommendation rather than one of implementation.^ In 
addition, the mayor, who is elected at large, serves as 
an ex-officio member of each of the committees. The mayor 
has certain executive powers in addition to his chairman­
ship of the council; however, he shares his powers with 
committees of the council. Generally, the primary function 
of the mayor is to provide political leadership, to init­
iate policy recommendations, to coordinate administration
2and to carry out ceremonial functions. One Canadian 
local government authority has pointed out that under this 
system, the mayors rarely enjoy any independent powers of 
appointment. All appointments to committees, boards, 
commissions and other authorities are usually the responsi­
bility of the council. Similarly, all appointments of
^Ibid., pp. 228-229.
2Donald C. Rowat, The Canadian Municipal System, 
Essays on The Improvement of Local Government (Toronto; 
McCelland and Steward, Ltd., 1969), p. 1.
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officers and employees to the administrative departments 
are made by the council and not by the mayor.^
The critics of the council-committee (or council- 
mayor) type of municipal government concentrate their fire 
on a number of points. It often is asserted that this 
type of organization encourages a multiplicity of commit­
tees beyond what is practical. This results in a division 
of the council's activities in such a manner that it 
becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any 
single official to keep the whole municipal operation under 
review. In addition, the existence of a large number of 
committees serves to provide the council with convenient 
means to postpone decision on a controversial matter by
referring it to another committee for "further considera-
2tion and report." Another criticism refers to the problem 
that all too often committees tend to be overly concerned 
with and involved in minor details of day-to-day adminis­
tration. Clearly, complete absorption in the minor details 
of administration can easily result in the neglect of over­
all policy. Thus, for example, a committee may spend hours 
debating the selection of some minor employee rather than 
establishing a personnel policy to guide appointed officials
Thomas J. Plunkett, Municipal Organization in Canada 
(Montreal : The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Munici­
palities, 1955), pp. 12-13.
^Ibid., p. 13.
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in the selection of all similar employees.^ The point 
being made is simply that the council or the committee's 
need to be familiar with administration details is impor­
tant only insofar as it leads to a consideration of the 
policies and procedures necessary for effective administra­
tion. The council-committee system also seems to encourage 
the duplication of discussion and debate. There are, for 
example, many instances where a discussion which occurred 
in committee is again repeated and even extended during 
the regular meeting of the council. It has also been 
shown that the council-committee system often requires too 
much of the members' time, especially when we remember 
that the council member is supposedly a part-time official, 
and that, from an organizational standpoint, the council-
committee system fails to provide effective coordination
2of policy and administration. Finally, in view of the 
professional skills now required to administer modern city 
services, the council-committee system has been criticized 
not only because it provides an opportunity for elected 
councillors to interfere with day-to-day administration, 
but also because it may lead to political patronage or 
even corruption.^
^Ibid., p. 13. 
^Ibid., p. 12.
^Rowat, The Canadian Municipal System, p. 1.
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Before leaving the council-committee system, it 
should be noted that in some council-committee municipal­
ities an administrative board is appointed by the council 
and is usually composed of municipal officials such as the 
municipal clerk, engineer and treasurer. This administra­
tive board functions as an intermediate committee. That 
is, it reviews various municipal matters before they are 
forwarded to the standing committees for their study and 
recommendations.^
Another form of municipal government in Ontario, 
albeit a relatively obscure one, is the council-city 
manager form. It was first adopted in the United States 
and then imported to Canada. In the United States, these 
municipalities usually have a small council, ranging in 
size from six to ten members who usually are elected at 
large. The principal functions of the council are to 
adopt by-laws, vote appropriations and appoint the mana­
ger, who serves at its pleasure. In short, the council, 
in the manager form, has little or nothing to do with the 
supervising of administrative activities and considers 
general policy only. The mayor, usually chosen by the 
council, is only the chairman of the council and has no 
executive powers. Instead, the council appoints a
^Humes and Martin, The Structure of Local Governments,
p. 229.
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professional administrator, the city manager, as its chief 
executive officer. He prepares the budget, which he sub­
mits to the council for review and adoption, administers 
the use of funds, supervises municipal departments whose 
officials he appoints according to civil service regula­
tions, makes recommendations to council and prepares and 
submits to council whatever reports they may require.^
The manager plan in Ontario, however, differs from 
the American plan in a number of important respects; the 
elected councils are larger, councillors are usually 
elected from wards and there usually are standing commit­
tees of council. In addition, the Canadian mayor is 
always directly elected rather than chosen by council, and 
he has a much higher salary and much more power than does 
his American counterpart. The power of the Canadian mana­
ger is correspondingly less; the city council must approve 
his personnel policies and senior appointments, and depart­
ment heads report directly to council rather than indirect-
2ly through the manager.
In Canada, the council-city manager plan of munici­
pal government has had a very slow growth in comparison 
to its growth in the United States. In part, this can be 
accounted for by the fact that many of the conditions.
^Ibid., pp. 229-230.
2Rowat, The Canadian Municipal System, pp. 2-3
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such as bossism, that helped spread it in the United States 
have been largely absent in Canada. This, however, is not 
the total explanation. A number of Canadian cities have 
been successful in incorporating some of the premises of 
the plan without adopting the plan itself. For example, 
there are many instances where a single city official, or 
a group of two or three officials, have emerged as an 
effective administrative coordinating agency, although 
they have not been granted powers for acting as such. An 
example of this development can often be found in the 
office of the clerk-treasurer in many of the smaller cities. 
The clerk-treasurer's duties bring him into close contact 
with all departments and committees of council. As a 
result, the clerk-treasurer frequently acquires an over­
all knowledge of the city's problems and policies; a know­
ledge that may not be possessed by any other official or 
administrator. If he has the ability and the proper type 
of personality, it often happens that the department heads 
come to regard him as the city's principal administrative 
officer and seek his advice regarding interdepartmental 
conflicts and day-to-day administration problems. In 
addition, the council often leans heavily on such an offi­
cer for some policy guidance.^ Clerk-treasurers, and other
Plunkett, Urban Canada and Its Government, pp. 43-44; 
and Dennis A. Young, "Canadian Local Government; Some Aspects 
of the Commissioner and City Manager Forms of Administration," 
in Lionel D. Feldman and Michael D. Goldrick, eds.. Policies 
and Government of Urban Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1969),
p. 121.
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officials in a similar position, usually derive their very 
real authority and influence less from a delegation of 
formal authority than from custom, tradition and force of 
personality.
In Ontario all cities having a population over 
100,000 have a mandatory form of municipal government 
known as the Board of Control. This form of municipal 
government is also left open for adoption by the smaller 
municipalities. It should be noted, however, that there 
has been no great rush by municipalities, who have the 
option, to adopt the board of control plan. The stand­
out feature of the board of control is the plural execu­
tive embodied in the plan.
In the board of control system, the council are 
elected by wards. In addition, there is a board of con­
trol which serves as formulator of policy. The board of 
control is made up of the mayor and four controllers who 
are all elected at large, in contrast to the ward election 
of the councillors.^
Under the Municipal Act the powers and responsibili­
ties of the board of control, which are extensive, are 
specifically stated in the provincial act rather than 
being delegated by the council. Generally, the powers and 
duties of boards of control in Ontario are as follows:
Revised Statutes of Ontario, "Municipal Act of 
Ontario," (Part VII, Boards of Control), Vol. 3 (Toronto: 
Queens Printer and Publisher), p. 973.
73
1. to prepare estimates of the proposed expendi­
tures for the year;
2. to award contracts ;
3. to inspect and report to the council upon all 
municipal works being carried on or in progress;
4. to nominate to the council all heads of depart­
ments and sub-departments in case of a vacancy;
5. the board of control may dismiss or suspend any 
head of a department;
6. the council cannot appropriate or expend any 
sum not provided for by the estimates certified 
by the board of control without a two-thirds 
vote;
7. the council cannot oppose the wishes of the 
board of control without a two-thirds vote; and
8. the board may submit proposed by-laws to council. 
Point number seven above is of particular importance and 
interest. It means that, in practice, the board members 
have a commanding position in council. Recommendations 
from the board concerning the budget, the letting of ten­
ders and the appointment and dismissal of department heads 
can only be reversed by a two-thirds majority of the full 
council. Note that, in voting, the members of the board 
of control vote along with council members. As a result, 
any attempt at obtaining a two-thirds vote against the 
board of control is likely to require the solid alignment
of all aldermen in opposition to the controllers and the
2mayor.
^Plunkett, Urban Canada and its Government, p. 38. 
^Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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In reality, the board of control is an executive 
committee with much stronger formal powers and occupying a 
much more dominant position than would be the case if its 
members were selected from among the ranks of the alder­
men.^ Essentially, the board of control is central both 
to the formulation and the execution of policy. In respect 
to the execution of policy, the responsibility of the board 
of control extends throughout the whole field of adminis­
trative coordination and to the direction of departmental 
2operations.
Finally, in the board of control plan, as in the 
other more traditional forms of local government in use in 
Ontario, standing committees are an integral part of the 
council structure and close relationships exist between the 
various civic departments and the committees. However, 
those civic departments which do not come under the control 
of a standing committee come under the direct administra­
tive jurisdiction of the board of control.
The plural executive systems in both Ontario (the 
board of control) and in Quebec (the executive committee) 
could be converted without much difficulty into parlia­
mentary systems such as that used at the provincial and 
federal levels of government in Canada. This could be 
accomplished simply by requiring that the council choose 
the mayor and by allowing the mayor to choose from his own 
colleagues an executive committee which he would then be 
held collectively responsible for their actions to the city 
council just as the prime minister (or premier) and his cabi­
net are responsible to parliament. See Rowat, The Canadian 
Municipal System, pp. 3-4.
2Plunkett, Urban Canada and its Government, pp. 38-39.
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At this point it should be noted that the municipal 
system in Ontario (as well as in Quebec) is different from 
the systems in the other provinces because, from almost 
the very beginning, it has had a second tier of local gov­
ernment, the counties. Each county has a governing coun­
cil made up of representatives from the councils of the 
municipalities within the county— villages, rural parishes 
or townships and towns. The cities, however, are com­
pletely separate from the county.^
In this chapter the concern has been with a review 
of the basic structural local government arrangements in 
Ontario. In Chapter IV, following, the concern is with a 
general review of the kinds of innovation and change being 
proposed and implemented in Ontario in response to local 
government failures. These failures are basically a result 
of the fact that the cities, especially the larger ones, 
were growing so rapidly that they were spilling over their 
boundaries into surrounding jurisdictions, resulting in a 
lack of suitable authorities to govern and plan the devel­
opment of the already existent metropolitan areas.
^Rowat, The Canadian Municipal System, pp. vii-ix.
CHAPTER IV
REFORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ONTARIO:
BEGINNINGS
Much of the impetus for local government reform in 
Ontario has been a direct result of the apparent success 
of the Metropolitan Toronto experiment. Indeed, many of 
the early proposals for regional local government were 
designed with the Toronto experience in mind; if not a 
direct copy of the Toronto plan. Thus, an understanding 
of the Metro Toronto system and its origins seems impera­
tive for an understanding of the regional municipal 
movement.
Briefly, by way of background, it should be noted 
that the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto has a popu­
lation of more than 2,000,000. It is one of North Amer­
ica's most economically vital regions. Metro contains 
almost ten percent of the total population of Canada and, 
indeed, it provides approximately eleven percent of all 
Canadian employment.^ In addition, Toronto is a rapidly 
growing metropolis. It has maintained a growth rate of




over four percent, which is one of the highest growth 
rates among major continental metropolitan areas. Most 
of this development, especially since World War II, has 
taken place in three large suburban municipalities—  
Etobicoke, North York and Scarborough. In 1953, the City 
of Toronto had about fifty-seven percent of the total pop­
ulation of Metro as compared to forty-three in the sub­
urbs. By the end of the 1960's, the situation was re­
versed; the city had only thirty-six percent of the total 
population and the suburbs had sixty-four percent.
Before Metro was established the Toronto area con­
tained thirteen independent and separate municipalities. 
There was the central city (Toronto), five townships 
(York, East York, North York, Scarborough and Etobicoke), 
four towns (Leaside, Weston, Mimico and New Toronto), and 
three villages (Forest Hills, Long Branch and Swansea). 
This fragmentation of the Toronto area local government 
was merely one of the many symptoms of the typical kinds 
of problems faced by North American metropolitan areas.
In addition, there was an inadequacy of sewage and water 
facilities for many of the municipalities; individual 
jurisdictions were often unable to finance major projects 
and programs; there was a general inability to develop 
area wide public transportaion systems; and regional
TABLE 4.1











City of Toronto 674,284 665,502 671,699 (878) 413
Suburban municipalities 248,249 507,054 1,202,906 25,881 46,390
Metro area 922,534 1,172,556 1,874,605 25,003 46,803
Per
1943








City of Toronto 73.1 56.7 35.8 (.1) . 9
Suburban municipalities 26.9 43.3 64.2 104.3 135.2
Metro area 100.0 100.0 100.0 27.1 59.9
Source: Thomas J. Plunkett, "Structural Reform of Local Government in Canada,'




planning was both impossible and nonexistent.^ In short, 
it was clear that for the effective functioning of local 
government in the metropolitan area a new and different 
form of governmental organization would be required.
Because of the problems and the disparities that 
existed within the metropolitan area, some of the local 
jurisdictions involved became concerned enough to call for 
some radical changes. Opinion was divided, along geogra­
phy, into three groups— the City of Toronto; the outlying, 
rapidly growing suburbs; and the inlying, fully developed 
suburbs. The first two groups, the City of Toronto and 
the outlying suburbs, were generally dissatisfied with the 
status quo, whereas the inlying suburbs wanted to maintain 
it. 2
The initial step towards solving the complex govern­
mental problems of the Toronto area was taken in 1947 when 
the town of Mimico petitioned the Ontario Municipal Board 
asking for the creation of an area for the joint adminis­
tration of education, fire and police protection, health, 
welfare, planning, sewage disposal, public utilities, 
public transportation and major highways. The remaining 
functions— whatever they might be— would be retained by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
In Search of Balance— Canada's Intergovernmental Experience, 
Report M-68 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1971), pp. 84-85.
2Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 45-46.
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local councils. The metropolitan area would be adminis­
tered, in terms of the above functions, by a board of man­
agement whose members would be directly elected through­
out the area. Ultimately the Mimico proposal was rejected. 
However, some of its principles were later incorporated 
into the plan that was finally adopted.^
Three years later, in 1950 , the City of Toronto went 
to the Ontario Municipal Board with a proposal to com­
pletely amalgamate all thirteen municipalities in the 
metropolitan region. Toronto was supported in this appli­
cation by Mimico, but strong resistance to the plan imme­
diately developed in the other suburbs and the application 
2was denied.
As was noted above, some of the inlying suburbs 
responded to this Toronto application by becoming intran­
sigent supporters of the status quo, while the outlying 
suburbs pressed ahead with a bid for a joint service area. 
This proposed joint service area was to include the twelve 
suburban municipalities and would have permitted the sub­
urbs to pool certain facilities and to cooperate in the 
provision of services. This proposal was sent to the
John G. Grumm, Metropolitan Area Government: The
Toronto Experience (Lawrence, Kansas: Governmental Research
Center, The University of Kansas, 1959), p. 6 .
^Ibid., p. 7.
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Ontario Municipal Board. Concurrently, the City of 
Toronto sent a counter-application to the Ontario Board 
asking for permission to annex all of the inlying suburbs.^ 
Before spelling out the decision of the Ontario 
Municipal Board on this matter, we should reiterate spe­
cifically what the Ontario Municipal Board is and the role 
that is plays in local government. Briefly, the Ontario 
Municipal Board is a quasi-judicial institution which has 
wide-ranging jurisdiction over the municipal governments 
in the province. Ontario municipalities are not incorpor­
ated under individual charters, and none have sovereign, 
home rule rights that cannot be infringed upon by the pro­
vince. The Board exercises its authority over the munici­
palities by having final approval over most major actions 
by city councils, such as the adoption of master plans, 
the issuance of bonds and changes in jurisdiction. Gen­
erally, it can be said that local matters that might be 
submitted to a vote of the people in the United States are
submitted to the Ontario Municipal Board for approval in 
2Ontario. While in this case the Board had the authority 
to order amalgamation or a joint service area, its author­
ity was unclear as to approving any other solution. After 
almost two years of taking evidence and deliberating, the
^Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 46.
2Grumm, Metropolitan Area Government, pp. 7-8.
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Ontario Municipal Board handed down its decision on Janu­
ary 20, 1953. This landmark decision, known as the Gumming 
Report, rejected both the joint service and the amalgama­
tion proposals. It then took the unprecedented step of 
proposing to the Provincial Parliament its own plan for a 
metropolitan area government. In essence, the Gumming 
Report advocated a federation of the thirteen municipali­
ties, each retaining its local autonomy while giving over 
to the metropolitan government the responsibility for 
major regional services and other matters of common, or 
areawide, concern.^
It now was up to the Provincial Cabinet whether to 
secure legislative enactment of this plan. Briefly, the 
question facing the Ontario Cabinet was whether a federa­
tion plan should be imposed on the Toronto area when none 
of the municipalities concerned had requested this plan.
In fact, most of the municipalities in the area opposed 
the Ontario Municipal Board plan: the City because it
felt that the proposal did not go far enough; the suburbs
2because the proposal went too far. The final decision 
to approve the Ontario Municipal Board plan was made by 
the Premier, Leslie Frost. Apparently the notion of
^Ibid., pp. 7-8; and CED, Reshaping Government in 
Metropolitan Areas, p. 73.
2Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 47-49.
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federalism at the metropolitan level appealed to Frost as
a workable compromise which seemed to strike a middle
ground between suburban demands of "no change" and the
City's demand for "total amalgamation."^ As a result, the
Provincial Government threw its full support behind the
proposal for a federal metropolitan government. On April
15, 1953, the Ontario Legislative Assembly passed "Bill
80" or the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act. The
first urban federation in North America, then, came into
2being officially as of January 1, 1954. It is important 
to note that the "imposition" of metropolitan government 
on the Toronto area was unprecedented even in Canada.
And clearly no American state government has been willing 
to approve a reorganization of governments in a metropoli­
tan area unless the proposal was first requested and 
actively supported by the municipalities involved. In 
many cases in the United States, the states have required 
that metropolitan reform be approved by the voters in a 
metropolitan-wide referendum before the state will even 
consider adding its assent. However, in the Toronto area, 
Ontario officials never seriously considered a referendum. 
Nor did they grant the municipalities concerned an
^Ibid., p. 40.
2CED, Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas,
p. 73.
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unofficial veto power over the proposed metropolitan reforms. 
Instead, they simply imposed a full-blown metropolitan-wide 
structure.
In terms of structure, the Metropolitan Council in 
Metro Toronto was to be composed of twenty-four members 
(exclusive of the Metro Chairman), including the twelve 
suburban reeves, or mayors, and twelve officials from the 
Toronto City Council. All twenty-four members of the 
Metro Council were to serve ex-officio; that is, there was 
to be no direct election to Metro Council. The council 
was to elect a Metro Chairman who could or could not be a 
member of the council prior to his election. If the chair­
man was named from within the council he had to resign his 
seat on the council and his municipal office. The chairman 
presides at meetings and may vote in council only in the 
case of a tie; but he is a regular voting member of all 
standing committees.^
The Executive Committee of the Metro Council initi­
ates most policy proposals and prepares the Metro budget.
The Committee consists of seven members, three suburbanites 
and three city officials, in addition to the Metro Chairman.
Harold Kaplan, "The Policy-Making Process in Metro 
Toronto," in Lionel D. Feldman and Michael D. Goldrick, 
eds.. Politics and Government or Urban Canada (Toronto: 
Methuen, 1969), p. 196.
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The Executive Committee seems to have taken up a role sim­
ilar to that of a Board of Control.^
Powers over certain functions were given exclusively
to the new Metropolitan government. These included the
assessment of property, construction and maintenance of
expressways and the development of regional ports. Powers
pertaining primarily to local matters, such as street
lighting and community projects, were reserved for the
local municipalities. Under the original arrangement,
almost every metropolitan service, such as roads, water
supply, sewage disposal, parks and traffic, were shared
concerns, with the metropolitan government concentrating
on the area-wide needs and the individual municipalities
2on their own requirements.
After ten years of operation, an evaluation of 
Metro seemed in order. Accordingly, in April, 1963, Prime 
Minister Roberts of Ontario appointed a one-man Royal Com­
mission, under the chairmanship of H. Carl Goldenburg, to 
provide an assessment and an evaluation of all aspects of 
the Toronto M&tropolitan Federation. In June of 1965, the 
Goldenburg Commission issued its findings and recommenda­
tions. The essential recommendations were that the metro­
politan system of government be retained and that the
^Ibid. , p. 141.
2CED, Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas,
p. 74.
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thirteen municipalities be consolidated into four cities.^ 
Accordingly, and after much discussion and amendment, the 
Metropolitan Toronto Amendment Act of 1966 (Bill 81) had 
the effect of creating a new metropolitan government by 
consolidating the thirteen municipalities into five bor­
oughs and one city; the Borough of East York (East York 
and Leaside), the Borough of North York (North York), the 
Borough of Etobicoke (Etobicoke, New Toronto, Long Branch 
and Mimico), the Borough of Scarborough (Scarborough), the
Borough of York (York and Weston) and the City of Toronto
2(Toronto, Forest Hill and Swansea).
In addition. Bill 81 provided for changes in the 
Metropolitan Council. It was changed to a thirty-three 
member body including the Chairman and is, with the excep­
tion of the Chairman, elected on a representative popula­
tion basis. East York now has two members; York, three; 
Etobicoke, four; Scarborough, five; North York, six; and 
Toronto, twelve. Thus, the city-suburban split on council 
was altered from twelve to twelve to a twenty to twelve 
division in favor of the suburbs. In addition, the Execu­
tive Committee now consists of the Metropolitan Chairman,
^Goldenburg, H. Carl, Report of the Royal Commission 
on Metropolitan Toronto (The Goldenburg Report), June, 1965,
p. 78.
CED, Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas,
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the six local municipal mayors, and the two senior control­
lers and two aldermen from the City of Toronto Council.
Thus the city-suburban split on the Executive Committee 
remained at five to five.
Bill 81, further, changed the distribution of 
responsibilities between the two governmental tiers. 
Briefly, Bill 81 added to the powers possessed solely by 
the Metro level. These include such functions as the 
Canadian National Exhibition (CNE), emergency ambulance 
service, public welfare, education and waste disposal.
Table 4.2 helps us to see the distribution of responsibili­
ties between the two levels of government. This display 
gives the responsibilities before the Goldenburg Report, 
the recommendations of the Goldenburg Report, and, finally, 
the changes that were implemented via Bill 81.
In sum, the most notable achievement of Metro has 
been in the field of public works— in the construction of 
new schools, roads and highways, subways and water and 
sewage facilities. Metro has also helped to alleviate 
critical service shortages in the suburban areas. On the 
other side of the ledger, however, Metro's accomplishments 
in the field of housing, welfare and other "soft" services 
has been much less glittering.^
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Services not included in these columns indicate that no change was recommended or 
.enacted.
A local school tax levy may exceed the Metro levy by up to 1.5 mills for elementary 
and 1.0 mills for secondary school purposes.
*Adapted from "News Brief,” Bureau of Municipal Research, August, 1966, 4103.
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Metropolitan Toronto remained the only regional 
local government in Ontario for about fifteen years. But 
its undeniable achievements, as well as the obvious advan­
tages of area-wide taxing and centralized capital financing, 
were closely observed by the Ontario Government with the 
idea of applying the Toronto experience in other parts of 
the province.
The Ontario Committee on Taxation
During February of 1963 the Ontario Committee on Tax­
ation began its study of revenue systems in the province 
and in August of 1967 issued its report. Concomitant with 
the four and one-half year period of its study there was 
a great deal of local government reform discussion in 
Ontario. In addition, during this period a reorganization 
of the local school structure was completed (in 1964) and 
resulted in the abolition of some 1,500 rural schools and 
culminated in a system of county wide school systems 
throughout Ontario. In 1965, a Provincial Legislative Com­
mittee (the Becket Committee) recommended that the entire 
province be divided into larger, regional governments.^
In addition, in 1966, Prime Minister Roberts introduced
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
In Search of Balance— Canada's Intergovernmental Exper­
ience, p. 87.
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Design for Development Phase I.^ In presenting Design for 
Development, however, the Prime Minister was careful to 
emphasize that his statement was concerned with regional 
development rather than with regional government. However, 
he did say that independently of this economic regional dev­
elopment plan, studies were then (1966) being conducted 
which could lead to recommendations for adjustment in local 
structure.
It was against this background then that the Ontario 
Committee on Taxation issued its report in August of 1967. 
This report launched immediately into a discussion of local 
government structural reform. This excursion into local 
government reform was based on the committee's belief that 
efficiency in raising property tax revenue requires assess­
ment and collection on a regional basis; that equity in 
local finance could not be achieved under the present frac­
tionated system of municipal institutions; and, finally,
that municipal capacity to use non-property taxes was cir-
2cumscribed by limited territorial jurisdiction.
As a result, the Ontario Committee on Taxation called 
for the establishment of regional local government and
See Design for Development, Statement by the Prime 
Minister of the Province of Ontario on Regional Develop­
ment, April 5, 1966.
2Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
In Search of Balance— Canada's Intergovernmental Exper­
ience, p. 87.
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immediately proceeded to spell out five criteria for the 
establishment of these regional local governments through­
out the province. The criteria presented by the Committee 
were as follows; 1 .) community criterion— governmental 
regions should possess to a reasonable degree a combina­
tion of historical, geographical, economic and sociologi­
cal characteristics such that some sense of community 
already exists and shows promise of further development 
subsequent to the creation of the region; 2 .) balance 
criterion— a region should be structured so that diverse 
interests are reasonably balanced and give promise of 
remaining so in the forseeable future; 3.) financial cri­
terion— every region should have an adequate tax base, 
such that it will have the capacity to achieve substan­
tial service equalization through its own tax resources, 
thereby reducing and simplifying the provincial task of 
evening out local fiscal inequities; 4.) functional cri­
terion— every region should be constituted so that it has 
the ability to perform those functions that confer region- 
wide benefits with the greatest possible efficiency in 
terms of economies of scale, specialization and the appli­
cation of modern technology; and finally 5.) cooperation 
criterion— regions should be so delineated and their gov­
ernments so organized that the cooperative discharge of
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certain functions can readily become an integral part of 
their overall responsibility.^
As work progressed in the field of regional economic 
development, and partly because of the Report of the Ontar­
io Committee on Taxation, it became increasingly apparent 
to the Ontario Government that economic development and 
the strengthening of local government could no longer be 
successfully separated. As a result the government issued 
Design for Development Phase II in the form of statements 
by Prime Minister John Roberts and Minister of Municipal 
Affairs W. Darcy McKeough, which for the first time 
announced the government's policy of establishing regional 
local government. Parenthetically, it should be noted 
that these statements were issued at a time when ten areas 
were already under study and when the study of Ottawa- 
Carleton was already completed and, in fact, when the 
Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton was slated to 
come into being on January 1, 1969.
In his statement in Design for Development Phase II 
Prime Minister Roberts indicated that the provincial gov­
ernment was moving into the field of local government
The Ontario Committee on Taxation, "The Territorial 
Extent of Local Government," in Lionel D. Feldman and 
Michael D. Goldrick (eds.). Politics and Government of 
Urban Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1966), p. 258; reprinted
from The Ontario Committee on Taxation, "Reconciling 
Structure with Finance," Report (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
1967), Vol. II, Chapter 23, pp. 495-550.
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because regional governments are necessary to strengthen 
both local government and local economic development. He 
also indicated that Design for Development Phase I had 
shown that there was a degree of acceptance by the public 
and local officials of regional activities and regional 
planning, as opposed to purely local or parochial activi­
ties and planning.^ Robarts further indicated in his 
statement that the Ontario Government accepted the five 
criteria for regional government suggested by the Ontario 
Committee on Taxation (balance, community, financial, 
functional, and cooperative) and in addition the govern­
ment would add three additional criteria: 1 .) community
participation, where possible, in the formation of regional 
governments; 2 .) an attempt to have new regional bound­
aries usable by other institutions; and 3.) the proposal 
that, in cases where there are to be two tiers of govern­
ment within a region, the smaller units should be designed
2using the same criteria used at the regional level. 
Finally, Robarts indicated that regional governments would 
be established on the basis of priority or need.^ The
Design for Development Phase II, Statement by the 
Honourable John Robarts, Prime Minister of Ontario, Novem­
ber 28, 1968, pp. 1 and 7-8.
2Ibid., pp. 8-9; these eight criteria will be des­
cribed and discussed in more specific detail subsequently.
^Ibid., p. 9.
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basic idea was that not all areas of the province were in 
immediate need of regional government and that the govern­
ment could, as a result, concentrate its initial activi­
ties in areas where local government was obviously not 
adequate to meet existing needs.
The accompanying statement by the Minister of Munic­
ipal Affairs, W. Darcy McKeough, went into some detail as 
to the specific program of the province for the implementa­
tion of regional governments. McKeough thus spelled out 
some of the criteria and characteristics deemed important. 
In terms of the size of the proposed new regional govern­
ments, for example, McKeough noted that in order to 
facilitate service experience indicates that there should 
be a minimum regional population of from 150,000 to 
200,000. The idea is that this minimum population is 
a necessity for the efficient provision of most local 
services. He also notes, however, that access becomes 
virtually impossible in many of the rural and northern 
areas if rigid adherence to these minimum population 
estimates is demanded. Clearly these areas would be 
so large that individual access to the regional decision­
making structures would be impossible, and, to this 
extent, regional governments would show variation in pop­
ulation and size.^ Along these same lines it is also
Design for Development Phase II, Statement by the 
Honourable W. Darcy McKeough, Minister of Municipal Affairs, 
December 2, 1968, p. 3.
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suggested that the minimum population of local municipali­
ties in a two-tiered region should be from 8,000 to 
10,000.1
In trying to determine the definition of an appro­
priate regional complex, the government faced some hard 
decisions. For instance, it had to decide whether the 
sharp distinction between urban and rural areas tradi­
tional in Ontario should be maintained or whether there 
should be an attempt to combine rural and urban within a 
single region. The government resolved this question by 
proposing that regional government be viewed in terms of 
the urban-centered region. That is, regions should include 
both the major urban centers and the surrounding areas 
which share social, economic and physical services. The 
province was thus asserting that the old, traditional dis­
tinction between urban and rural interests was in the pro­
cess of breaking down. McKeough, in fact, pointed out 
that in earlier times when transportation was primitive 
and economic activity was on a small scale Ontario could 
be thought of as a series of small, self-contained commun­
ities divided into two easily identifiable societies— the 
city and the country; each with its own, and separate, 
values and aims. However, he continued, now all of 
Ontario is one society where some live in big communities
^Ibid., p. 3.
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and others live in towns, villages or rural areas. And 
the aims of the people— the education they seek for their 
children and the services they expect from their govern­
ments, i.e., the quality of life they strive for— is not 
so different regardless of the type of community they 
call home. There also is a common sharing of services, 
not only at the municipal level, but also in terms of 
hospitals, schools, commercial services, employment and a 
variety of other services. Because of this emerging com­
munity of interest, the shape of regional governments will 
need to cover both the urban area and its rural hinter­
land, both of which are mutually interdependent.^
Another important question is the question as to the
internal structure of the proposed regional municipali- 
2ties. The paramount question in this regard, of course, 
is whether the regional governments should have one-tier 
or two-tier structures. One-tier regional government sim­
ply means that a region will have its municipal services 
administered by one municipality covering the entire 
region. Two-tier regional government, on the other hand, 
would divide municipal functional responsibilities between 
two levels of local government— a regional municipality
^Ibid., p. 5.
2The following discussion of types of municipal 
internal structure is adapted from Ibid., p. 4-5.
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and a group of smaller local municipalities. The Munici­
pality of Metropolitan Toronto is a good example of a two- 
tier structure. McKeough made it clear that the provincial 
government would make its judgment regarding one or two- 
tier structures on a regional basis following a detailed 
study and consultation in each area. McKeough, in addi­
tion, proposed several paramount factors to be taken into 
account in making the decision. One factor to be taken 
into account, for example, is the size of the proposed 
region. Clearly, a very large region may require lower- 
tier municipalities in order to retain a proper degree of 
accessibility. Another factor is the population distri­
bution within the proposed region. If there are several 
independent centers of population concentration within a 
proposed region, then a two-tier structure would be in 
prospect. A third factor concerns the availability and 
distribution of fiscal resources. This factor may very 
well determine whether it is feasible to expect finan­
cially viable lower-tier units. A fourth factor is the 
physical and the social geography of the region. Factors 
such as a group of hills, a lake, a river, or cultural and 
linguistic differences within a region may well lead to a 
decision to have two tiers in order to help in the effec­
tive provision of services and to help preserve existing 
social communities within the region. In sum, these
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contributing factors and their respective biases make it 
reasonably clear that the government leans heavily to two- 
tier structures.
The final question relating to internal structure 
is, if there are to be two-tier systems, how is the total 
package of municipal functions to be distributed between 
the regional and the local municipalities? McKeough made 
it clear that the government leans toward acceptance of 
the distribution of functions recommended by the Ontario 
Committee on Taxation. Basically, this implies that a 
metropolitan area must cope with far more comprehensive 
planning and have more concern for urban renewal than do 
the lower-tiers. The metropolitan region should also have 
responsibility in the domains of arterial roads, traffic 
control, parking and mass transit. The metropolitan 
region might perform the policing function in its entirety, 
as in Metro Toronto, and it might also have comprehensive 
duties with regard to fire protection as in Metropolitan 
London, England. Whereas the other regions will probably 
have limited involvement, the metropolitan region should be 
responsible for water supply, sewage treatment and storm 
drainage including, at the least, trunk distribution and 
collection systems. There is also a strong case for inte­
grating most and perhaps all aspects of primary and second­
ary education at the metropolitan level. Finally, the 
provision of library services might be made subject to
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different degrees of coordination, even to the extent of 
full metropolitan responsibility.^ This question of divi­
sion of functions probably holds the key to the success or 
failure of any two-tier scheme. If a two-tier structure 
is to effectively deal with not only major projects and 
overall coordination and planning, but also with matters 
of loal interest and concern, then the division of 
responsibilities between these levels must clearly provide
for both overall efficiency and the greatest possible citi- 
2zen access.
With the general recommendations of the Ontario 
Committee on Taxation in mind, and irrespective of spe­
cific regional areas, McKeough felt that there are several 
functions which need to be under paramount or complete 
jurisdiction of the regional tier.^ Clearly, for example, 
in order to insure uniformity of the tax base, property 
assessment should be a function of the regional tier 
because it is from the regional level that assessment can 
be administered most efficiently and equitably. Further, 
tax billing and tax collection are closely tied to
^The Ontario Committee on Taxation, "The Territorial 
Extent of Local Government," p. 260.
2The Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government 
Review Commission, 1969 (The Steele Commission), Report and 
Recommendations, November, 1969, pp. 89-133.
^Design for Development Phase II, Statement by W. 
Darcy McKeough, pp. 5-8.
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assessment in a procedural sense and should also be tied 
to the regional level. Another function that should be a 
regional responsibility is capital borrowing. This must 
be a regional responsibility for several reasons, includ­
ing the desirability of pooling credit and the need for 
long range capital planning on a regional basis. This 
leads to the question of planning. Mr. McKeough felt that 
there should be a division of responsibility for the pre­
paration and the implementation of planning policy within 
the region.^ This division would assign to the regional 
municipality the responsibility for the broad, overall 
physical and economic framework for regional growth and 
for planning of those regional facilities under its direct 
jurisdiction. Within this broad framework, then, the 
lower-tier municipalities would be assigned responsibility 
for the preparation of more geographically specific and 
detailed plans. The local plans would be consistent with 
and complementary to the development policies and plans 
of the regional municipality which, in turn, would be con­
sistent with and complementary to the development policies 
expressed in the regional program of the province.
The functions of police and fire protection, on the 
other hand, are ones which logically could be either a 
local function or could be shared between the local and the
^Ibid., p. 6.
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regional level. However, in accordance with the recom­
mendations of the Ontario Committee on Taxation, the 
province has expressed a preference for a regional 
basis for police protection.^
Arterial roads and related traffic, in contrast, 
are designed to provide service to the entire region 
and as such must be part of the regional function accord­
ing to McKeough. The question of the assignment of 
responsibility for public transit, however, could very 
well vary. For example, planning for public transit must 
clearly be integrated with planning for the entire region. 
To this extent, then, the regional level must be involved 
in the transit function. However, the actual operation 
of a transit system, depending upon local conditions, 
could be either a regional or a local function.
Functions such as sewage and garbage collection and 
disposal could lend themselves to a sharing of responsi­
bilities between the tiers. For example, the lower-tier 
municipalities are appropriate for the initial collection 
of sewage and garbage, while the upper-tier municipality 
is more suited to provide the necessary large centralized 
disposal facilities and sewage treatment plants. The 
attendant function of water intake, purification and pri­
mary trunk distribution are clearly large-scale operations
^Ibid., p. 6.
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which should be at the regional level. Secondary water 
distribution, however, could conceivably be a function of 
lower-tier municipalities.
Those functions relating to the health and welfare 
of the citizenry have already been somewhat regionalized 
through Regional Health Units, County Welfare Units, and 
District Welfare Administration Boards.^ This regionali­
zation has taken place because these functions require a 
large population base in order to provide the complex, 
specialized services entailed. Thus, health and welfare 
should be regional government functions. In addition, to 
the extent that various municipalities participate in the 
planning and financing of hospitals, this also should be a 
regional function.
Finally, the government feels that parks and other 
environmental concerns should be shared functions.
Outside of the above functions, according to 
McKeough, all other powers should go to the lower tiers of 
the regional municipalities.
It is interesting to note that recommendations of 
the various local government reviews do not necessarily 
follow these guidelines in their entirety. Most of the 
reviews, however, adhere closely to the general guidelines 
Table 4.3 is a display of recommendations from the Steele
^Ibid., p. 7.
TABLE 4.3*
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM REVIEW BY STEELE COMMISSION
METROPOLITAN (Upper-tier) BOROUGH (Lower-tier)
Area-Wide Planning Local Planning
Capital Financing Fire Protection
Public Transportation Local Distribution of Water
Waterworks, supply and trunks Local Sewers
Sewage works and lang draingage Local Roads
Garbage Disposal Sites Garbage Collection
Police Recreation
Metropolitan Parks Electrical Energy
Health and Welfare Building Permits
Libraries Tax Billing and Collecting
Licensing (of a regional nature) Local Traffic Control
Industrial Promotion Local Parks
Emergency Measures Organization Local Licensing
Urban Renewal All other municipal responsibil­
ities not specifically allo­
cated
ow
♦Adapted from the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government Review, 
Report and Recommendations, November 1969, pp. 133-134.
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Commission's review of the major industrial area around 
and including Hamilton and is fairly typical of many of 
the local government reviews.
The province, in Design for Development Phase II, was 
also very careful to set out some general guidelines for 
representation in the proposed new regional municipalities. 
The Minister of Municipal Affairs made it clear that 
representation by population can be the only acceptable 
principle of representation, while at the same time taking 
into account the problem of giving adequate representation 
to rural ridings^ which may have much less representation 
than do urban ridings. In other words, the province is 
not ruling out the possibility of some representation of 
units rather than on a strict population basis. Still, 
McKeough does put heavy emphasis upon representation by 
population. ". . . I must emphasize that in our Regional 
Government system we will place a high priority on a sys­
tem of representation giving all residents a reasonably
2equal voice in regional decisions."
Another important, yet difficult, aspect of represent­
ation concerns the special problems posed by a two-tier




regional system. There are two basic methods that can be 
used for selecting members of the Regional Council. 
Representatives may be directly elected to the Regional 
Council, or they may be indirectly elected by becoming 
elected members of lower-tier units and then being desig­
nated to sit on the Regional Council.
As an example, the recommendations of the Steele 
Commission for the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth area 
calls for a Metropolitan Council composed solely of 
representative members of the lower-tier units. In other 
words, the members of the Metropolitan Council would gain 
that position by virtue of indirect election. The ration­
ale of the Steele Commission in making this recommendation 
was that any direct election, either in whole or in part, 
on a type of ward or area basis would likely create fric­
tion between the two tiers of government.^ It can be 
clearly observed that these proposals have the effect of 
watering down the stated principle of representation by 
population. The reason is simply that the Steele Commis­
sion was of the opinion that if any one municipality, such 
as the City of Hamilton, were to dominate the Metropolitan 
Council then the entire system would soon prove to be un­
workable. As a result, and despite the fact that the City
^The Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government 
Review Commission, p. 136.
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of Hamilton had approximately sixty-two percent of the 
proposed metropolitan population, it was recommended that 
Hamilton receive only fifty-two percent of the representa­
tion on the Metropolitan Council.^ Table 4.4 displays the 
representation recommendations of the Steele Commission 
for the proposed Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth regional 
municipality. In this example the fear of the province 
of domination of a regional municipality by a single popu­
lous center can be observed. Rural ridings were given 
somewhat more representation than would be allowed them 
if there was strict adherence to the principle of 
representation by population. This is clearly resultant 
from the concern that the rural and suburban municipali­
ties have "adequate" representation vis-a-vis the urban 
center.
The question of representation has been, and will 
probably continue to be, one which will cause a great deal 
of controversy. The Minister of Municipal Affairs has 
said that there is no easy answer as to which system will 
work most effectively and equitable in all cases. The ans­
wer can only come with experience with systems embodying
different kinds of representation as a means to see which
2form does in fact work better.
^Ibid., pp. 137-138.
2Design for Development Phase II, Statement by W. 
Darcy McKeough, p. 8.
TABLE 4.4*
PROPOSED COUNCIL REPRESENTATION FOR THE PROPOSED 






City of Hamilton 291,000 13
City of Burlington 76,000 4
Borough of Dundas-Ancaster 31,000 2
Borough of Grimsby-Stoney 
Creek 40,000 3
Borough of North Wentworth 19,000 1
Borough of South Wentworth 12,500 _1
plus Chairman
24
for a total of 25
o
♦Adapted from the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government Review, 
Report and Recommendations, November 1969, p. 138.
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How does Ontario plan to accomplish the implementa­
tion of its regional local government program? For exam­
ple, how does the province react to the recommendation of 
the Ontario Committee on Taxation that local government 
reform be comprehensive rather than piecemeal?
In contrast to the recommendation of the Ontario 
Committee on Taxation, the province does not propose the 
uniform and immediate establishment of regional government 
at the same time throughout the province. Mr. McKeough 
has articulated three reasons why the province does not 
propose to tie itself down to a fixed target date for com­
prehensive reform.^ First, the province feels that not all 
areas in Ontario are in equal need of immediate regional 
government. The critical areas are those in which the 
local government institutions are not able to respond to 
existing or anticipated changes and where this lack of 
responsiveness is inherent in the structure and therefore 
beyond the influence of any one municipality acting alone. 
McKeough noted that the symptoms of this critical stage 
usually take the form of increasing fiscal difficulties,
a retardation of necessary growth, or a decline in the
2level of municipal services. In general these areas tend 




Ontario. Regional government, then, will be established 
on a problem area priority basis, concentrating on those 
areas where the need for change is the greatest. In addi­
tion, the province does not yet have sufficient trained 
and experienced personnel to immediately cover the entir­
ety of Ontario. As a result, the personnel which are 
available will concentrate their efforts in those areas 
of greatest need. Third, the province is trying to gain 
the meaningful involvement of the local communities in 
implementation. In fact, the province will allow, in some 
cases, delays in the implementation process in order to 
give local opinion time to form and express itself. This, 
of course, will allow the government to back off if the 
regional government program in a particular area becomes, 
for one reason or another, a political hot potato. The 
Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government Review is 
an excellent case in point. This review called for the 
inclusion of Burlington into the proposed Metropolitan 
Municipality of Hamilton. This became a very controversial 
issue then it became clear that the residents of Burlington 
wanted to be included in the Peel-Halton area because of 
their fear that they were going to have to pay for the 
badly needed urban renewal in Hamilton. Partly as a result 
of the Burlington opposition, the province backed off and 
let the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Review slide into 
obscurity.
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The province, then, has proposed a four-stage pro­
cess for the implementation of regional government.^ The 
initial stage calls for consultation and discussion be­
tween the province and the various municipalities within 
a proposed region. This may take the form of a joint 
study, a series of joint meetings, or a locally or a pro- 
vincially directed study. In many respects this is simi­
lar to, and concomitant with, the local government review 
concept. The second stage involves the preparation of a 
specific proposal by the province which will be formally 
presented to the municipalities in the region by the Min­
ister of Municipal Affairs. Stage three will see the dev­
elopment of a final proposal and draft legislation based 
upon reactions to the proposals in the second stage. The 
final stage, of course, is the presentation of legisla­
tion to the Legislative Assembly, its passage, and estab­
lishment of the regional government.
The process of encouraging the establishment of 
regional governments in Ontario is only part, although 
possibly the most important part, of the provinces' plans 
for local government reform. The government is, in addi­
tion, encouraging the consolidation of existing municipal 
units. This is an important facet of the reform program
^Ibid., p. 10.
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when we realize that most local municipalities are, at 
present, far too small to be viable units of local govern­
ment even at the lower-tier level of a regional govern­
ment. As a first step in this regard, the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs has ordered a continuing inquiry into 
the structure, organization and methods of operation of 
all Ontario municipalities. Further, Section 25a of the 
Municipal Act has been invoked. This, in essence, means 
that all proposed changes in municipal boundaries, such 
as annexations of amalgamations which are normally applied 
for by application to the Ontario Municipal Board, will 
now be referred to the Department of Municipal Affairs 
for study. The Department will examine each proposal to 
see if it is in general agreement with the province's 
regional program and if it would result in the creation of 
more viable municipal units. Only when Municipal Affairs 
is satisfied on these grounds will these applications pro­
ceed through the Ontario Municipal Board.^ The reason for 
this procedure is the assumption that the creation of more 
viable units will simplify some of the problems faced in 
the creation of new regional two-tier units. This will 
further cause greater uniformity in population among lower- 
tier units, and this in turn will make it easier to create 
equitable representation at the regional level.
^Ibid., p. 16.
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Finally, regional local reform in govenment is but 
one prong of a three pronged provincial thrust in the 
municipal reform field. The other major thrusts concern 
the reform of local taxation and reform of provincial aid 
to local governments.
The cornerstone for the reform of local taxation is 
a reform of local property assessment throughout the pro­
vince. Ontario has transferred the administration of tax 
assessment from the municipalities to the province. This 
reform became effective on July 1, 1969, in some cases 
and on January 1, 1970, in the remainder.^ The purpose 
of these reforms is to establish uniform standards to 
replace the traditional patchwork of differences and incon­
sistencies. Assessment thus can be placed on a basis 
which is more equitable to all taxpayers. This can be
accomplished by assessing all property at market value and
2by maintaining this market value assessment over time.
In terms of provincial aid to local governments, the 
province has raised the average level of provincial support 
for elementary and secondary education from forty-five per­
cent to sixty percent and by improving upon the system of
W. Darcy McKeough, Municipalities ; Where the Action 
Is, An address by the Honourable W. Darcy McKeough, Minister 
of Municipal Affairs, to the Empire Club of Canada, Toronto: 
March 21, 1969, pp. 2-3.
^Ibid., p. 3.
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unconditional grants to local jurisdictions. It is, how­
ever, important to be aware that overall reform of the 
present subsidy system depends in large measure on reforms 
in assessment and in municipal structure.^ In other words, 
these three thrusts of change must go forward simultaneous­
ly-
In sum, we have to this point discussed some of the 
problems that have faced local government institutions in 
Ontario. It has been asserted that the problems of lack 
of citizen access and inadequacies in local government 
service provision has been both the cause and the result 
of these problems. At the top of the list is the problem 
of size— in terms of geographic jurisdiction, population 
and financial resources. Clearly the concept of regional 
government has been primarily concerned with the allevia­
tion of this problem. Those established regional munici­
palities have been set up with the intention of increasing 
size for the more efficient provision of services while, 
at the same time, maintaining and increasing citizen 
access via two-tier municipal structures. The question 
that cannot yet be answered, of course, is whether this
For a more thorough discussion of Canadian Intergov­
ernmental Relations, see: Ronald M. Burns, "Intergovern­
mental Relations in Canada," Public Administration Review, 
XXX (January/February, 1973), pp. 14-22.
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increased jurisdiction will, in the long run, solve the 
primary problem of governmental fragmentation without 
causing other problems concerning urban-rural antagonisms. 
This analysis would lead one to believe that urban-rural 
antagonisms will prove to be the most fissionable factor 
in the new regional municipalities. This is the problem, 
alluded to above, of the rural areas' fear that they may 
have to pay for, through increased taxes, what they per­
ceive to be purely urban problems, such as urban renewal. 
This is the problem that the province, to date, has not 
really faced up to other than to downplay the antagonisms 
when they have risen in proposed regional areas. The pro­
vince must be aware that the rationalization of municipal 
jurisdiction will not immediately, or necessarily, solve 
all problems and they must realize that it may create new 
and different problems and inequities. The government's 
view that the traditional assumption of a distinct cleav­
age between rural and urban communities is no longer 
valid must be open to question. The government merely 
asserts that this is an invalid assumption and this asser­
tion has not been backed up by empirical observation.
Even a superficial observation of Ontario leads one to 
suspect that there are, contrary to government assertions, 
different urban and rural "life-styles" and divergent and 
often conflicting interests.
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In terms of access, the government has relied 
heavily on the assumption that the centralization of func­
tion plus two-tier regional governments will insure that 
the regional governments will be responsible to local 
needs, thus insuring citizen access. This assumption is 
also liable to serious criticism. In particular, the 
rural, northern areas of Ontario present a very serious 
obstacle in this regard. Access, as well as simple com­
munication, in these areas is questionable at best (in 
the Summer) and virtually non-existent during the rest of 
the year. Clearly, serious problems will be encountered 
when the government seeks to extend its regional govern­
ment proposals into the frontier areas north of a line 
from Sudbury to northern Lake Superior. The government 
probably, at least tacitly, recognizes this problem as it 
has concentrated most of its efforts in the more urban 
areas.
CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY 1: THE HAMILTON
METROPOLITAN AREA
In the initial chapter of this study it was noted 
that adaptation is conceived of as the ability of an 
individual or an organization to reallocate or recommit 
a part of its resources to new uses without destroying 
the organization as a whole. And, at the same time that 
that change, or adaptation, takes place within the system 
it must be able to integrate these changes if it is to 
survive.^ Clearly, these two needs may, at times, be in 
direct conflict with each other and a "tension" between 
them is the obvious result of that conflict. Problem 
solving (adaptation), because it requires some rearrang­
ing of internal relations, expectations and rewards, 
induces a certain cimount of stress into the system and 
thereby may threaten the integration of the system. The 
implication is simply that a system may court failure 
because it overemphasizes one of these needs at the 
expense of the other. In short, a successful system 
usually endeavors to strike a series of temporary balances
^See page 8 above.
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between the two needs. This case study of the efforts at 
local government reform in the Hamilton Metropolitan Area 
can be best analyzed in terms of this mutual tension 
between adaptive and integrative needs. In this case 
study this tension can best be observed in the "recalcit­
rance" evidenced by the local officials in the area under 
consideration. Finally, in the process of analyzing and 
describing the system's (province's) reaction to these 
evidences of "tension" and "recalcitrance" it will become 
clear that this is a continuing process of adjustment to 
the environment. This case study, however, is concerned 
with only a part of that continuous process of adjustment. 
In short, this chapter is concerned with an initial deci­
sion that there was a need for local government reform 
(adaptation) in the area; the resulting formal proposals 
for change; the strong adverse reactions to these propos­
als from certain segments within the proposed region; the 
reaction of the province; and finally new and different 
proposals for reform.
Characteristics of the Hamilton Metropolitan Area
Clearly, the most significant natural features of 
this area of Ontario are the Niagara Escarpment, Burling­
ton Bay, Lake Ontario, and the flat plain lying between 
the escarpment and the lake. The area is located at the 
extreme western end of Lake Ontario and is located about
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forty-fives miles from both Toronto and Buffalo, New 
York. The Niagara Escarpment extends from the northern 
boundary of Burlington around the Town of Dundas and then 
eastward through the Township of Ancestor, the City of 
Hamilton, the Township of Saltfleet and the Township of 
North Grimsby. The escarpment reaches to a height of 
300 to 350 feet and the escarpment's distance from the 
shoreline of Lake Ontario varies from about five miles in 
parts of Hamilton to only about one mile on the western 
edge of Grimsby. The area lying below the escarpment, 
that is, toward Lake Ontario, is primarily flat plain and 
has been very extensively urbanized.^
Hamilton constitutes the major population and indus­
trial center of the area. Hamilton has, in fact, been 
described as "the Pittsburg of Canada." Appropriately 
enough, the hardhat has been the symbol of the City of 
Hamilton for quite some time. The major industrial area 
of Hamilton and of the whole area under review is located 
along the south side of Hamilton Harbor for an east-west 
distance of about four miles.
One of Hamilton's major problems is a lack of fur­
ther available industrial and serviced residential lands 
within its present boundaries. However, there is an 
extensive supply of potential residential lands above
^Canada Yearbook, 1970-1971, p. 224.
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the escarpment, but due to a lack of available sewer 
services these lands are not at this time available for 
development. In sum, with the exception of the southerly 
part of the city above the escarpment there is very little 
residential or industrial land remaining to be developed 
within the boundaries of Hamilton.^
The Town of Burlington exists in a situation which 
is very different from Hamilton's. In Burlington, popula­
tion growth and industrial development have been concen­
trated in a relatively small area, and there remains a 
large area to be developed below and to the southeast of 
the escarpment. It should be noted that the urbanized 
portion of Burlington is largely residential.
The other towns in the area are mostly residential 
communities and are at various stages of development.
Most projections for this area envisage very sub­
stantial future urbanization. For instance, the Metro­
politan Toronto and Regional Transportation Study pro­
jected that the population of the "Hamilton Sector," 
including Hamilton, Burlington and most of Wentworth County,
an area with a population of 470,000 in 1968, would increase
2to 990,000 by the year 2000. Population projections of
Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government 
Review, Data Book of Basic Information, June, 1968, Map 1; 
and The Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government 
Review, Report and Recommendations, p. 6.
2Report and Recommendations, p. 9.
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this sort are usually not very reliable but they do, at 
least, give some indication of the magnitude of growth 
anticipated for the area.
In summary, we can say that the area is clearly 
metropolitan in its characteristics. There is a large 
central city, Hamilton, with about sixty-two per cent of 
the population and sixty-six per cent of the assessment 
in the area. In addition, Hamilton provides the major 
industrial base of the area and also fills the role of 
the commercial and financial center. Burlington, Dundas, 
Stoney Creek, Waterdown and parts of Saltfleet and Ancaster 
are municipalities which surround Hamilton and which depend 
on Hamilton for the employment of a high proportion of 
their residents. These municipalities also utilize many 
of the specialized services and facilities provided by the 
City and are, in some instances, dependent upon Hamilton 
for the extension of municipal services, particularly 
water supply and sewage disposal. Beyond this urban and 
suburban core are the rural townships of Binbrook, Glan- 
ford, Beverly and East and West Flamborough.
The Need for Reform
Briefly, it should be noted that the City of Hamilton 
is presently separated from the county and functions as a 
separate city. As a result, those municipalities still
121
under the jurisdiction of Wentworth County have found it 
difficult to carry out effective planning and coordina­
tion of services because of the necessity of working 
around Hamilton. Clearly, there is no ability to apply 
broad strategies to the whole area because the local 
authority is badly fragmented. In addition, assessment 
is not being shared and there is no central body at the 
local level which is responsible for decisions about 
services. In short, effective local government for the 
entire area becomes impossible when the approval of fif­
teen separate jurisdictions must be obtained.^ Clearly 
there are a number of important functions which can be 
more effectively provided on an areawide basis. However, 
the present situation features fragmentation and over­
lapping with a total of fifteen municipal governments and 
seventy appointed special purpose boards and commissions 
exercising one kind of jurisdiction or another. There is 
simply no body in a position to take an overall approach 
to the governing of the area.
According to the province's 1973 report on the area, 
whichever alternative they favor, municipal leaders and 
residents familiar with the problems of the City and 
surrounding county are virtually unanimous in agreeing
Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental 
Affairs, Proposals for Local Government Reform in the Area 
West of Metropolitan Toronto, January, 1973, p. 12.
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that some form of new local government arrangements are
badly needed.^ The Steele Commission noted that whether
in water supply, sewage disposal, transportation and
traffic control, housing, parks or industrial development,
the underlying assumption is that an enlarged municipal
jurisdiction will be able to more effectively discharge
its responsibilities by planning and controlling the
2future development area. In terms of our framework, the 
environment is changing and the administration of local 
government must adapt to this changing environment if it 
is to be able to effectively govern.
Early Attempts at Reform and the Steele Commission
With the increasing realization of the need for 
reform of local government arrangements came some early 
local initiatives in that direction. For example, in 
1962, the City of Hamilton convened a meeting of many of 
the nearby communities for the express purpose of dis­
cussing and becoming familiar with the notion of a region­
al or metropolitan government for the area. At the same 
time, Hamilton was seeking the support of the adjoining 
municipalities in a locally directed local government 
study project. The meeting failed, however, to produce
^Ibid., p. 39.
2Report and Recommendations, p. 16.
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agreement on common objectives or approach and the matter
was essentially shelved for the next several years.^
Four years later in the wake of the Ottawa-Carleton,
Peel-Halton and Niagara Region reports a new attempt was
made by Hamilton at reaching agreement with its neighbors
to initiate a local government study. This time, after
informal meetings of elected municipal officials and after
informal discussions, resolutions calling for such a study
were enacted by Hamilton, Burlington and Wentworth County.
This development was instrumental in moving the provincial
Minister of Municipal Affairs to initiate a commission to
2study this area.
On August 29, 1967, the Minister of Municipal Affairs,
J. W. Spooner, issued a letter establishing a commission
for a Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth local government
review. He appointed a commission consisting of Mr. Donald
R. Steele, Q. C. as Chief Commissioner and E. A. Jarrett
and Brian W. Morison as Assistant Commissioners, to inquire
into and report upon:
A. The structure, organization, financing and
methods of operation of all municipalities and 
their local boards in the region composed of 
the County of Wentworth and the Town of Burling­
ton, including the City of Hamilton and the 




B. The anticipated future development of the region 
which may require a revision and improvement
in the present system of local government, 
future changes in boundaries and planned exten­
sion of services.
C. A review of the economic, social, geographic 
and cultural factors of the proposed region and 
their effect upon the interrelationship of the 
municipalities and the people therein.
D. An analysis of the financial effect of a region­
al government.
E. Any other matter relating to the structure of 
local government in the area.l
Clearly, the province gave the Commission the power to
review and make recommendations of a wide ranging nature
concerning the past, present and future arrangements of
local government in the Hamilton, Burlington and Wentworth
County area.
The new Commission immediately set about its work 
and decided to obtain basic information from the municipal­
ities and a questionnaire was sent out for this purpose.
In addition, during the course of its study the Commission 
conducted interviews with the heads of municipalities in 
the area and with other interested persons. From this 
basic information the Commission compiled the text of 
basic information (Review Area Data Book, published in 
June of 1968) and then held public hearings in order to
Ibid., from the letter to the Commission from the 
Minister of Municipal Affairs setting out the terms of 
reference of the Commission.
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allow an opportunity for interested parties to appear and 
make representations. Letters were sent to organizations 
and associations which had indicated their interest and 
public notices were issued in the press prior to the hear­
ings. These hearings were held in the Town Hall of Burl­
ington, the Hamilton City Hall and the Wentworth County 
Court House.^
At this juncture it is of interest to note that 
while the Commission's study was in process the Ontario 
Committee on Taxation came out with its recommendations 
on regional government. In addition, during the same time 
span, legislation was introduced establishing the regional 
municipality of Niagara and the Minister of Municipal 
Affairs issued his recommendations for the Peel-Halton 
area and established a policy relating to general guide­
lines on regional development.
The final report of the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth 
Local Government Commission (The Steele Commission) was 
finally issued in November of 1969, a little more than two 
years after the inception of the Commission.
In the course of the Steele Commission's review of 
the area, it was noted that there had been three ways in 
which adaptation has been attempted in the past. First,
^Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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there had been a series of annexations and amalgamations 
in the past. For example, over a period of time portions 
of Barton Township were annexed to Hamilton, culminating 
in 1960 when Barton Township was finally totally amalga­
mated with the City.l As is true in many North American 
urban areas these boundary adjustments were essentially 
in response to an overspill of development from the core 
city.
A second device of piecemeal adaptation, again common 
to most urban areas, has been the proliferation of various 
inter-municipal special purpose bodies, responsible for 
the provision of a particular function over an area wider 
than a single municipality. The Hamilton-Wentworth Subur­
ban Roads Commission, the Hamilton-Wentworth Planning 
Board, the Hamilton-Wentworth Health unit, the Conserva­
tion Authorities are examples of this type of special pur- 
pose bodies. While these special purpose authorities 
may permit the administration of certain specific functions 
over larger areas, the independence of their authority 
often makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the var­
ious councils to coordinate the total municipal activities 
into an integrated whole. In short, extensive reliance on
^Data Book of Basic Information, pp. 1-6. 
Report and Recommendations, pp. 18-19.
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special purpose authorities only serves to increase the 
problems of fragmented administration.
Finally, the inter-local agreement has been the 
third device which has been used in the review area as a 
piecemeal adaptation. Several municipalities, for example, 
have agreements involving the provision of services such 
as water, sewers, roads, fire protection and garbage 
collection.
The problem with these adaptations is that they are 
merely ad hoc in nature and in no way serve to integrate 
the total metropolitan area. Further, they often do just 
the opposite. By creating more and more competing juris­
dictions they often serve to make any integrated long 
range planning and overall coordination of activities 
virtually impossible.
The Steele Commission; Recommendations
In its attempt to define the region for purposes of 
a regional government, the Commission looked for the 
following characteristics: 1. a discernable community of
interest; 2. an area appropriate for planning and for the 
effective provision of major services; and 3. an area 
which would allow for a strong, stable financial base.^ 
These characteristics, of course, embody basically the
^Ibid., p. 22.
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principles as those of the Ontario Committee on Taxation 
and the Minister of Municipal Affairs.^ Of these three 
characteristics the first one, that is the "community of 
interest criterion," was perceived by the Commission as 
the one which would be the focal point of any controversy 
which might arise because of their recommendations. 
Accordingly, the Commissioners were very careful to spell 
out the factors they used, both formally and informally, 
to measure community of interest. In view of the Burling­
ton crisis, which will subsequently be analyzed in depth, 
it seems useful to mention these factors at this point.
The first factor which the Commission used to mea­
sure community of interest revolved around the geography 
of the area. Within this general category they gave 
particular attention to factors such as time-travel pat­
terns which are important in the determination of where 
people live vis-a-vis where they work. A second factor 
surveyed by the Commission was the patterns of newspaper 
circulation and telephone calls within the area. These 
factors were deemed important as measures of the strengths 
and extent of influence from the urban core. The Commis­
sion also put a great deal of weight upon social and cul­
tural ties as measured by the place of residence of the 
members and the leadership of various social, fraternal
^See Chapter IV,
129
and cultural organizations within the area. Another 
extremely important factor, according to the Commission, 
would be the degree of economic interdependence in the 
area. As measures of this factor, they relied to some 
degree upon traffic surveys showing origin, destination 
and purpose of trips as well as upon shopping patterns. 
However, the Commission felt that the distribution of 
employment was the most important measure of economic 
interdependence. The Commission generally took the posi­
tion that where it is compatible with other criteria it 
was important that people should work and live in the 
same local jurisdiction. Clearly, any substantial devia­
tion from that optimal situation makes an equitable shar­
ing of resources and costs difficult and further inhibits 
proper planning.^ Finally, the community of interest in 
the review area which evolved from an analysis of the 
above factors was weighed against, and modified by, the 
other main criteria which included the appropriateness of 
the area for effective planning, the provision of services 
to the public, the financial base of the area and the 
existing municipal structure.
Based upon the above considerations the Commission 
made the following recommendations for the outer bound­
aries of a new Regional Municipality of Hamilton. The
^Report aid Recommendations, pp. 25-26.
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municipality proposed included the City of Hamilton, the 
County of Wentworth, the Town of Grimsby, the Township of 
North Grimsby and the urbanized portion of the Town of 
Burlington.^
Clearly, the most controversial and emotional 
boundary question which faced the Commission was whether 
or not Burlington should form a part of the proposed new 
regional municipality. It should be noted at the outset 
that the Burlington Council and most of the people and 
organizations from within Burlington who made representa­
tions to the Commission did so in opposition to the inclu­
sion of Burlington. It also should be noted that Burling­
ton was included in the terms of reference of the earlier 
Peel-Halton Local Government Review, and this review 
finally recommended its inclusion in a Peel-Halton region. 
However, this review specifically noted that the case for 
including Burlington in Peel-Halton was in no way conclu­
sive. ̂
Burlington's official opposition at being included 
in the Hamilton Regional Municipality was based upon
The included portion of Burlington is that part 
south of a line extending from the Burlington-Oakville 
Municipal boundary westerly along the 5th sideroad to 
Walker's Line and there northerly along Walker's Line to 
the north limit of lot 7 and then west to the Burlington- 
East Flamborough Municipal boundary. Ibid., p. 27.
2Peel-Halton Local Government Review, pp. 83-85.
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several factors. In general, Burlington argued that its 
opposition to inclusion in the Hamilton region was based 
upon its self sufficiency and confidence in past achieve­
ments, its effective administration and its growth poten­
tial as well as its ability to control and channel that 
growth.
More specifically, Burlington argued that the 
plight of downtown Hamilton with its traffic congesion, 
crime and general deterioration was not a problem of 
Burlington. It was argued that many of the citizens of 
Burlington had left the City as residents as they had 
become disenchanted with the City and wanted to avoid the 
dangers to general health and the inconvenience caused by 
noise and congestion.^ This argument does much to high­
light one of the basic reasons for Burlington's growth 
and their reaction to inclusion with the core city and is, 
as well, typical of many suburbs near every city of any 
size in both the United States and Canada. This is a part 
of the urban crisis that is facing most North American 
major cities. The problem is due largely to the fact 
that often the suburban communities, while making use of 
the high level of services of the central city, at the 
same time refuse to share in the responsibilities for the 
maintenance of the urban core.
^Report and Recommendations, p. 29.
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The submissions from the Burlington area also 
expressed a very strong fear that Hamilton, because of 
its comparatively large population, would politically 
dominate any organized local government. This concern, 
of course, was also expressed by the other interested 
suburban municipalities. The Commission, however, took 
the position that in an operating Regional Municipality, 
councillors dealing with metropolitan wide problems will 
act according to Metropolitan considerations rather than 
to purely local ones.^
Burlington spokesmen contended that, in reference 
to the question of social and economic ties to Hamilton, 
there was little recent evidence that such ties were sig­
nificant. They pointed out that much of the statistical 
data in this connection was based upon the Metropolitan 
Toronto and Region Transportation Study and the Burlington 
Planning Study and that these studies were compiled in 
1963 and 1964 and were therefore quite dated. The argu­
ment ran that while Burlington might have been at one 
time a dormitory suburb of Hamilton, they had since become 
increasingly self-sufficient economically. They further 
argued that to the extent that Burlington looked beyond 
its own municipal boundaries their orientation was increas­
ingly to the east toward Oakville and Toronto rather than
^Ibid., p. 30.
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to Hamilton. In short they evidenced a fear that the Com­
mission might devise a restructured local government for 
the rest of the twentieth century on the basis of evidence 
which was several years old and, in their opinion, no 
longer valid.^ Concomitantly, in an odd bit of reason­
ing, the Burlington spokesmen maintained that even if 
there were social and economic ties with Hamilton, these 
were of no importance for the devising of local govern­
mental boundaries. The argument was that if such ties 
had developed in the past without the two communities 
being part of the same governmental structure, they could 
continue to do so in the future.
Finally, in a recurring theme in Burlington's pre­
sentations, they expressed a desire to associate with 
communities with similar characteristics and similar prob­
lems. They were very careful to point out their similar­
ity with Oakville to the point of implying that "likeness" 
should be a criterion for amalgamating communities into 
larger government units, a criterion that would probably 
cause some interesting situations if applied to the pro­
vince's regional government program. Concomitantly, they 
went to great pains to stress their differences with the 
city of Hamilton and asserted that, whatever their past
^Ibid., p. 31.
2For instance see Ibid., p. 31.
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connections with Hamilton, any problems Hamilton now faced 
were not their concern. Finally, Burlington emphasized 
their historic association and close ties with Halton 
County of which they are a part. They noted the number 
of Halton based organizations in which they participated 
and stressed the areas of education, health and hospitals 
as three areas which would possibly be seriously disrupted 
if Burlington were removed from Halton County.^
The arguments of Burlington residents notwithstand­
ing, the Commission felt that Burlington was tied to 
Hamilton in many ways. In fact, in the view of the Com­
mission, the available evidence clearly indicated that 
Burlington residents extensively participate in a larger 
area centered upon Hamilton. They felt that, over a wide 
range of social and economic activities, Burlington and 
Hamilton interact freely as if there were no municipal 
boundaries between them.^
The greatest problem that faced the Commission in 
trying to make a determination in regard to the Burling­
ton problem was that the orientation of Burlington, as it 
was alleged during the public hearings, was simply not 
borne out by the available evidence. In fact, evidence
Submission of the Town of Burlington, received by 
the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local Government Review. 
No page number.
2Report and Recommendations, p. 35.
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was never brought forward to substantiate the alleged 
ties between Burlington and Oakville. In spite of the 
supposed common interest and common problems of the two 
communities it is interesting to note that an Oakville 
proposal for a merger of the two towns in 1968 was strong­
ly opposed by a vote of nine to two by the Burlington Town 
Council.^
Clearly there are links between Burlington and 
Hamilton and these run the gamut from social and economic 
to geographic. For example, Burlington Bay and the escarp­
ment are both unifying natural features. The future dev­
elopment of the Bay— an item of extreme importance to 
both Burlington and Hamilton— clearly calls for a single 
municipal voice in place of the presently divided juris­
diction. Control over the Bay, which receives the efflu­
ent from the sewage disposal plants of Burlington, Dundas 
and Waterdown as well as of Hamilton and the waste of
many industrial plants, is a matter of vital concern to
2the whole region.
In defense of its contention that Burlington should 
be included within the Hamilton region the Commission 
cited a fairly large body of evidence linking the two from 
a myriad of sources including some of their own research.
^The Hamilton Spectator, October 17, 1968. 
2Report and Recommendations, p. 33.
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The Commission found that the memberships of many of 
Burlington's service clubs include significant numbers who 
live and/or work in Hamilton, with far fewer from Oakville 
and to the east generally.^ It was also noted that many 
of the "community leaders" of the entire review area live 
in Burlington. For example, one study found that more 
than sixty leaders of the City of Hamilton, in both the 
private and the public sectors (roughly ninety per cent
Oof the total) were residents of Burlington. In addition, 
of the members of the Town Countil of Burlington, three 
councillors were employed in Hamilton, six in Toronto and 
two in Burlington. Further, residents of Burlington 
represent about one-third of the members of the Hamilton 
Rotary, Kinsmen and Kiwanis clubs. About ninety per cent 
of the real estate firms in Burlington are members of the 
Hamilton Real Estate Board, twenty Burlington lawyers (the 
majority) belong to the Hamilton Law Association and forty- 
one Burlington doctors belong to the Hamilton Medical 
Association.^
The Commission further noted that in terms of news­
paper circulation and telephone calls, a Dominion Bureau
^Ibid., pp. 35-36.
2A Report to the Hamilton Economic Development Com­
mission, "Commercial Development in Hamilton," Arthur B. 
Little, Inc., October, 1968. No page number.
^Report and Recommendations, p. 37.
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of Statistics domicile survey (1966) indicated that 96.3 
per cent of Burlington homes subscribed to the Hamilton 
Spectator. And, according to the Spectator in the Spring 
of 1969, between 18,000 and 20,000 copies of the paper 
were sold daily in Burlington.^ In addition, according 
to the Review Area Data Book, of the total telephone calls 
by Burlington to other communities in the surrounding area 
93.7 per cent were within the area, 80.6 per cent of these 
were to Hamilton and only 6.3 per cent of these to Oak­
ville.^
In terms of evidence linking Hamilton and Burling­
ton economically the above mentioned Toronto and Region 
Transportation Study found that about forty per cent of 
Burlington residents worked in Hamilton. And, according 
to the Burlington Traffic Planning Study, forty-eight per 
cent of Burlington residents worked in Hamilton.^ In 
support of its case, the Commission also cited evidence 
contained in Vernon * s Directory. The Vernon's Directory 
information is obtained annually by the process of exten­
sive door-to-door interviews. The number of people sur­
veyed in Burlington (population about 70,000), 13,351 in 
1964 and 18,575 in 1969, indicates the comprehensive
^Cited in Ibid., p. 37.
2Data Book of Basic Information, Table C-6. 
^Cited in Report and Recommendations, p. 39.
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nature of the data. The relevant conclusions are summar- 
rized in Table 5.1 below. In other words, if Burlington 
were to become part of a Peel-Halton Regional Municipal­
ity only a bit more than fifty per cent of its residents 
would find their employment within the government bound­
aries. If, however, Burlington were to become a part of 
a Hamilton Regional Municipality about eighty per cent of 
Burlington's residents would be employed internally. In 
sum, whatever the validity of place of work— place of 
living patterns— they do show that at least a part of 
Burlington's economic orientation is clearly toward 
Hamilton.
It is important to be aware, in light of the argu­
ments put forward by the Burlington spokesmen, that no 
community in this heavily urbanized part of southern 
Ontario with almost continuous development between Gshawa 
and Hamilton can exist in isolation. The Commission 
clearly feels that Burlington is oriented to an area 
centered upon Hamilton and that Burlington's prospects 
for growth are strongest within this area. They found 
that the people of Burlington, in their everyday activi­
ties, gave ample evidence of the existence of a larger 
community including both Burlington and Hamilton. And, 
finally, they found that there is little evidence to show 
any significant community of interest between Burlington 
and Oakville or with the rest of the Peel-Halton area.
TABLE 5.1
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OF BURLINGTON RESIDENTS*
IN 1964 AND 1969
1964 1969
Burlington 38. 0% 37.9%
Elsewhere in Hamilton 
Metropolitan Area 46.7% 41.9%
Total Employed in Hamilton 
Metropolitan Area 84.7% 79.8%
Employed outside the Hamilton
Metropolitan Area (including 
the Ford plant at Oakville) 15. 3% 20.2%
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0%




As a result of these findings, the Steele Commission made 
a very strong recommendation that Burlington be included 
in the proposed Regional Municipality of Hamilton.^
Recommended Structure; Proposed Regional 
Municipality of Hamilton
In the process of casting around for a viable struc­
ture for the proposed new local government the Commission 
immediately ran into a problem of whether to follow the 
Toronto model and recommend a two-tier structure or to 
depart from the past and recommend a one-tier structure.
In other words, they could recommend a two-tier local 
government with an upper tier having jurisdiction over 
the metropolitan area for a specified number of functions 
and a lower tier of units exercising the remaining powers 
within their boundaries; or, they could recommend that the 
fourteen jurisdictions involved be amalgamated to form one 
government, exercising all municipal responsibilities in 
the area.
In regard to this question most of the submissions 
to the Commission from Hamilton were in favor of an amal­
gamation of the whole or most of the area into a single 
municipality. If this were to come into being, of course, 
the new municipality could be easily dominated by Hamil­
ton and, for this reason, Hamilton's suggestions were
^Ibid., pp. 48-49.
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suspect at best. On the other hand, most of the sub­
missions from the County area generally advocated one 
regional municipality; however in most cases they also 
called for a two-level form of government in order to 
somewhat ensure, or maintain, a degree of local autonomy. 
And, of course, most of the submissions from the Burling­
ton area stressed that Burlington was self-sufficient and 
could rely upon itself without any region.^
In general, those who were in favor of an amalga­
mated form of government relied on the rationale that 
greater economy and efficiency of operation would result 
from that sort of system. They also stressed that the 
whole concept of regional government demanded that it be 
empowered to deal with a wide range of functions to the 
point that there would be insufficient functions left for 
any lower-tier governments to administer; or, at least,
not enough to justify the additional cost of a second
2tier of local government. Again, it should be emphasized 
that the most persistent proponents of the one-tier option 
were the City of Hamilton and the Hamilton Council of 
Labour.
Those making submissions supporting the two-tier 




grass-roots, representative aspect of local self-government 
and its traditional role in Ontario. Concomitantly, they 
expressed concern about possible loss of identity and the 
probable remoteness of the citizen from the focus of power 
within larger units of government. Further, they argued 
that a two-tier system would better maintain a political 
balance with the proposed new regional municipality.^
In making its final recommendations the Steele Com­
mission opted for the two-tier structure. Generally this 
decision was rationalized on the basis of the diverse 
nature of the area, the intensity of local feelings, the 
problem of providing for, at least, a rough political 
balance and the sheer volume of work necessary to provide 
government to such a large area. More specifically, the 
Commission felt that the two-tier system offered the best 
opportunity for reconciling the twin problems of municipal 
government— efficiency and access. They felt that the 
larger administrative unit would provide a greater chance 
for overall efficiency; however the large size, number of 
people and volume of business would mean that the elected 
council of a one-tier municipality would have difficulty 
in providing a hearing to persons wishing to express 
aspects of local concern. They felt that local issues and
In other words, they were expressing a fear that the
City of Hamilton would totally dominate any one-tier gov­
ernment. See Ibid., p. 71.
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local functions could be more readily dealt with by a 
lower tier council who would be more likely to have exten­
sive knowledge of local conditions.^
In addition, the Commission took the position that 
the two level system of government would provide the ma­
chinery for different decisions to be made and different 
levels of service to be provided in various areas of the 
region to best meet the needs of the desires of each 
local area. The argument here is simply that it is essen­
tial to be able to satisfy the varied service require­
ments of the separate urban, suburban and rural areas.
Even though taxation areas, such as urban service areas, 
can be carved out within a one level governmental area in 
an attempt to restrict taxation for urban services to 
urban and urbanizing areas, the decisions as to what 
services shall be provided at what cost would still be 
determined by the total metropolitan area. It was the 
Commission's position that the decision as to the level of 
local services is better decided by a council elected from 
the local area in question. At the same time, assuming 
the existence of lower tier municipal units, the strictly 




apt to receive greater attention than would be likely 
under a one-tier metropolitan governmental structure.
Finally, in reference to Burlington, a two-tier 
structure would allow Burlington to retain control over 
matters of local concern and yet still form part of the 
overall metropolitan government. Concomitantly, the 
inclusion of Burlington helps offset the population pre­
dominance of Hamilton and brings the area considerably 
closer to some semblance of political balance.
Having recommended that the proposed new Municipal­
ity of Metropolitan Hamilton have a two-tier structure 
the question becomes one as to the number and composition 
of the lower-tier units. In response to this question the 
Commission recommended that there should be six lower-tier 
municipalities consisting of two Cities and four Boroughs. 
The Commission did not try to combine rural and urban 
areas, rather they tried to make their decisions on the 
basis of units which would be able to provide services 
effectively while providing for maximum access. At the 
same time, the Commission clearly tried to create lower- 
tier units which would disrupt historic ties as little as 
possible. The recommended lower-tier units are as 
follows :
The City of Hamilton. For Hamilton the Commission recom­
mended that it retain its present boundaries and retain 
its present City status.
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The City of Burlington. Because of the expressed desire 
of the Town of Burlington to be a City and because of 
Burlington's present size and future potential, the Com­
mission recommended that Burlington be designated a city 
in the recommended metropolitan structure. Also, the 
effect of granting City status to Burlington would be to 
remove it from participation in the government of Halton 
County and Burlington would not be subject to the general 
tax levy of that County.
Borough of Grimsby-Stoney Creek. The Commission recom­
mended that the Townships of Saltfleet, North Grimsby, a 
small portion of the Township of Binbrook, the Town of 
Stoney Creek and the Town of Grimsby should be combined 
to form the Borough of Grimsby-Stoney Creek.
Borough of Dundas-Ancaster. This borough was to be the 
result of an amalgamation of the Town of Dundas, the urban 
part of the Township of Ancaster along with the urban por­
tion of the Township of West Flamborough.
Borough of North Wentworth. This borough was to be a com­
bination of the Townships of East Flamborough, Beverly, 
the remaining part of West Flamborough and the Village of 
Waterdown. With the exception of Waterdown, all of these 
municipalities are outside of the urban service area and 
can only be characterized as farm and non-farm rural. 
Borough of South Wentworth. This borough would consist of 
the Township of Binbrook, Glanford and the rural portion
,  RECOMMENDED BOROUGH
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of the Township of Ancaster. As with the proposed Bor­
ough of North Wentworth, South Wentworth would be essen­
tially rural in character.^ The population of these 
recommended lower-tier units, as of 1968, would have 
been as follows;
TABLE 5.2
POPULATION OF RECOMMENDED LOWER TIER UNITS 





The City of Hamilton 291,000
The City of Burlington 76,000
Borough of Dundas-Ancaster 31,000
Borough of Grimsby-Stoney Creek 40,000
Borough of North Wentworth 19,000
Borough of South Wentworth 12,500
*Source: Report and Recommendations, p. 88.
Another question is raised immediately with the 
recommendation of a two-tier local government structure. 
This question addresses itself to the division of powers 
between the two tiers of government. This, of course, is 
nearly identical to the division of powers problem
^Ibid., pp. 73-78 and 185-186.
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encountered in a federal system at the national or inter­
national level. Decisions as to the division of powers 
in any two-tier system is probably the most important key 
to the ultimate success or failure of the venture.
Briefly, the Commission, in making its recommenda­
tions as to the division of powers, was mainly interested 
in giving the Metropolitan Council powers over areas of 
concern which would be of metropolitan wide concern or 
import. On the other hand, they tried to reserve those 
problems of a more local, or restricted nature, to the 
lower tier councils.
In summary fashion, the Commission's recommenda­
tions with respect to allocations of responsibilities are 
displayed in Table 5.3.
In terms of structure, the question that yet remains 
to be discussed is the question of the internal organiza­
tion of the Metropolitan Council and its relationship to 
the various lower tier councils.
The initial, and most serious and controversial, 
question regarding the proposed Metropolitan Council was 
whether its members should be directly elected or whether 
they should represent the lower-tier municipalities by 
virtue of having first been elected to the council of a 
lower-tier municipality. The possibilities in this 
regard are many. For example, should the members of the 
Metropolitan Council be composed of persons directly
TABLE 5.3 
PROPOSED DIVISION OF POWERS*
Metropolitan (Upper Tier) Borough (Lower Tier)
Planning (defined in a very broad Local Planning
sense) Fire Protection
Capital Financing Local Distribution of Water
Transportation Local Sewers
Waterworks (supply and trunk lines) Garbage Collection
Sewage Works and Land Drainage Recreation
Garbage Disposal Sites Electrical Energy
Police Building Permits
Metropolitan Parks Tax Billing and Collecting
Health and Welfare Local Traffic Control
Licensing (Metropolitan) Local Parks
Building Coles Local Licensing
Industrial Promotion
Emergency Measures Organization All other Municipal Responsibilities
Urban Renewal not otherwise specifically
Libraries allocated
*Source: Report and Recommendations, pp. 89-134, listed pp. 133-134
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elected to it by the electorate at large, or be composed 
of members of lower-tier councils by virtue of one for­
mula or another, or perhaps some combination of both of 
these methods?
In its recommendations the Commission took the posi­
tion that the membership of the Metropolitan Council 
should be solely composed of representative members of 
the lower-tier councils.^ They felt that it was too 
expensive to elect the Council on a Metropolitan wide 
basis and that any direct election, either in whole or in 
part, on a ward or area basis would likely create fric­
tion between the two levels of government rather than the 
necessary cooperation. The Commission, then, recommended 
that the holders of pre-determined positions on the local 
council shall by virtue of their office become members of 
the Metropolitan Council. The specifics of this arrange­
ment will be spelled out directly.
With the recommended method of representation deter­
mined, the problem was then to determine the size of the 
proposed Metropolitan Council and the number of represen­
tations which should be allocated to each lower-tier 
municipality. The Commission asserted a belief that the 
number of representatives from each municipality should be 
decided primarily on the basis of population. However,
^Ibid., pp. 135-136,
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at the same time, the Commission expressed the opinion 
that if any one municipality such as the City of Hamilton 
were to dominate the Metropolitan Council, the entire 
system would probably be unworkable.^ This, of course, 
presented a conflict in that Hamilton had approximately 
sixty-two per cent of the population in the recommended 
metropolitan area. The Commission resolved this conflict 
by recommending that Hamilton should have more than fifty 
per cent of the Metropolitan Council representatives 
while, at the same time, recommending that adequate pro­
tection be given to the other local municipalities on 
major expenditure matters. Table 5.4 below shows the 
Commission's recommendations for the numbers of represen­
tatives and composition of the Metropolitan Council.
For sake of example. Table 5.5 indicates the pos­
sible ways the Commission gave for selecting the Metro­
politan Councillors.
In a move that stems directly from the Metropolitan 
Toronto experience, the Commission further recommended 
that there should be an independent chairman,of the Metro­
politan Council. It was recommended that the first chair­
man be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council and 
that, after the initial stage, the Chairman should be 
elected by a two-thirds majority vote of members of the
^Ibid., p. 138.
TABLE 5 . 4
COMPOSITION OF METROPOLITAN COUNCIL 
BY LOWER TIER MUNICIPALITIES*
Municipality 1968 Population Number of 
Representatives
City of Hamilton 291,000 13
City of Burlington 76,000 4
Borough of Dundas-Ancaster 31,000 2
Borough of Grimsby-Stoney Creek 40,000 3
Borough of North Wentworth 19,000 1
Borough of South Wentworth 12,500 _1
Total 24
plus a Metropolitan Chairman
uiM
*Source: Report and Recommendations, p. 138.
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TABLE 5.5
METHOD OF SELECTING METROPOLITAN COUNCILLORS*
Municipality Lower Tier Office Number Total





each ward 8 13




Executive Committee 3 4
Borough of Dundas- 
Ancaster
Mayor 
Senior Alderman or 
Alderman elected
1
by Council 1 2
Borough of Grimsby- 
Stoney-Creek
Mayor 
Senior Alderman or 
Alderman elected
1
by Council 2 3
Borough of North 
Wentworth
Mayor 1 1




*Source: Report and Recommendations, p. 139.
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Metropolitan Council rather than by direct election of 
the people. If the Chairman happens to hold office in a 
local council or the Metropolitan Council, he would be 
required to resign that position.^
Basically, the role of the Metropolitan Chairman 
is seen as both a chairman of meetings of elected repre­
sentatives and also as an administrator whose duty it is 
to see that the wishes of such representatives be carried 
out. Also the Chairman would not have a vote on the 
Metropolitan Council except in the case of a tie vote in 
council. Finally, in this sort of two level system it is 
important that the Chairman be a person who enjoys the 
confidence, goodwill and cooperation of a substantial 
majority of the members of the Metropolitan Council as
well as a person who can bridge any gap between the Metro-
2politan Council and the various local municipalities.
In another recommendation which again closely fol­
lows the Metropolitan Toronto lead, the Commission recom­
mended the establishment of an Executive Committee of the 
Metropolitan Council. The recommendation was that the 
Metropolitan Council elect the Executive Committee from 
among its membership with the Metropolitan Chairman being
^Ibid., p. 141.
2por an excellent discussion of the role of the 
Metropolitan Chairman in the Metropolitan experience see 
Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 55-64.
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the chairman of the committee. Further, they recommended 
that the Metropolitan Council should be required to elect 
two representatives from Hamilton, one from Burlington 
and one from the balance of the area to the Executive 
Committee.^
It was conceived that all major appropriations or 
expenditures and the adoption of the Official Plan, if 
not recommended by the Executive Committee, would not be 
made without a two-thirds vote of the Metropolitan Coun­
cil. The point here is to ensure that there be a general 
unanimity among the representatives of the various parts 
of the metropolitan area in any major appropriation,
2expenditure or transaction of the Metropolitan Council.
Although it will be analyzed in depth at the end of 
this chapter, it seems appropriate at this juncture to 
provide the reader with some notion as to the response to 
the Steele Commission's recommendations for the Regional 
Municipality of Hamilton.
Even though Grimsby had asked to be included in the 
Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth review, they rejected the 
findings of the Commission saying that its proper place
^Report and Recommendations, pp. 142-143.
2Ibid., p. 143. The notion of an Executive Committee 
seems to stem, at least in part, from the tradition of a 
Board of Control in the Ontario experience. See Chapter III.
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lay with the then new Niagara Region to the south. Burl­
ington, predictably, objected to being part of a Hamilton- 
centered region, maintaining that its interests lay 
increasingly with the municipalities to the east. In any 
local government reform it clearly wanted to be included 
with the municipalities of Halton County. There were, 
of course, other less significant objections but the above 
were the ones which engendered the greatest degree of 
metropolitan and local controversy.
Due to the intensity of the opposition to the recom­
mendations of the Steele Commission, especially from the 
Burlington area, the Ontario government felt a necessity 
to back off from the report with the result that regional 
government for the Hamilton-centered region was held in a 
sort of limbo for the next three and one-half years. 
However, the government felt it important that local gov­
ernment reform be implemented in the area and during 1972 
was busy preparing a new, but less detailed, proposal for 
the region. These new proposals were made public at a 
meeting in Hamilton on the night of January 23, 1974.
Proposals for the Hamilton Centered Region: 1973
As noted above, the government made its proposals for 
regional government for the Hamilton-centered region at a
^Proposals for Local Government Reform in the Area
West of Metropolitan Toronto, p. 11.
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meeting of local officials in Hamilton on January 23,
1973. Arthur Meen, the legislative assistant to Ontario 
Treasurer John White, spelled out the proposals to an 
often hostile audience in the auditorium of Mohawk 
College.^
Instead of the expected single proposal for region­
al government in the Hamilton-centered area, the Ontario 
government asked local leaders and residents to consider, 
by the end of March, two alternatives; 1. a compact, 
single-tier regional municipality, which in the govern­
ment's opinion, would allow for certain advantages in 
electoral arrangements, in fiscal arrangements and in the 
administration of municipal services, or 2. a two-tier 
regional municipality, slightly larger than the single-
2tier would be and consisting of five area municipalities.
Meen said that the Ontario government favors the 
single-tier system as " . . . the best way of achiving 
the clear lines of authority and the good accountability 
that are among our objectives in reforming local govern­
ment,"^ Meen, however, did concede that the two-tier 
alternative would probably provide a greater flexibility
^Toronto Star, "Ontario Plans 3 Regional Governments," 
January 24, 1973, p. 4.
2Proposals for Local Government Reform in the Area 
West of Metropolitan Toronto, p. 38.
^"Ontario Plans 3 Regional Governments," p. 4.
158
for any possible future expansion of the region. He also 
stated that he, personally, liked both options. At that 
juncture a member of his audience shouted: " . . .  that's
what I call leadership."^
At this point it should be noted that if a one-level 
system is adopted for the Hamilton-centered region, it 
would make Hamilton unique among Ontario's new regional 
governments. All eleven regional governments either in 
existence or proposed by the Ontario government so far 
have two levels of government. This proposal is the gov­
ernment's first real break from the precedent of Metro­
politan Toronto.
Ontario's proposal for a single-tier government for 
the Hamilton-centered region comprises the areas of the 
City of Hamilton, Stoney Creek, Saltfleet Township, 
Binbrook and Glanford Townships, Dundas and eastern 
Ancaster Township, the southeast corner of Beverly Town­
ship below Rockton and the part of West Flamborough Town-
2ship around Bullock's Corners and Greensville. Burling- 
town is notable by its exclusion from this proposed 
region.
According to the Ontario government, one advantage 
that seems important in the single-tier is that it would
^Ibid., p. 4.
2Proposals for Local Government Reform in the Area
West of Metropolitan Toronto, p. 41.
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provide clear lines of authority and good accountability—  
two factors that are basic objectives in the reform of 
local government. The government also expressed a belief 
that the single-tier would also provide certain advan­
tages in fiscal arrangements and the administration of 
municipal services in a way that would provide a better 
fit to the peculiar circumstances of Hamilton-Wentworth's 
geography, population distribution and social patterns.^ 
Meen also asserted that the interests of the sub­
urbs of Hamilton coincide better with the interests of 
adjacent areas of the City than they do with each other
and that these interests would be better served by a 
2single-tier.
Although the Ontario government prefers the single­
tier option, it is not unaware of the attendant disad­
vantages as well as the advantages. For example, when a 
single-tier system is applied to a fairly large area, as 
this one would be, there is always a chance that the 
regional government may become somewhat remote from local 
concerns. There is always the fear that a regional coun­
cil in attempting to take a regional view would not be
A. K. Meen, Remarks by Mr. A. K. Meen, MPP, Parlia­
mentary Assistant to the Honourable John White, Treasurer 
of Ontario and Minister of Economics and Intergovernmental 
Affairs, to the Ancaster Progressive Conservative Associa­
tion, Ancaster, Ontario, February 22, 19 73, p. 7.
^Ibid., p. 7.
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able, or would be unwilling, to respond as it should to 
issues affecting only one part or another of the region­
al area. This problem is enlarged when it is added to 
the fact that some of the smaller areas in a one-tier 
system might feel grossly under-represented in compari­
son to the City.^ In addition, one-tier implies a com­
mon level of service throughout the region. Clearly this 
could pose problems if some local areas wanted one level 
of service and some areas another. In such circumstances 
some areas might feel that their taxes were going into 
services from which they were receiving little or no bene­
fit. This is a problem that would seem likely to come up 
in this proposed region as it includes both heavily urban­
ized areas along with suburban areas and, finally, essen­
tially rural areas.
At present, Hamilton has eight wards with two alder­
men to each ward. The Ontario single-tier proposal calls 
for the creation of three additional wards in the parts 
of Wentworth being included with Hamilton. They would 
also have two aldermen each for a council of twenty-two 
members, including a chairman to be elected from among 
their own number (in other words, the Chairman would not 
be the neutral, appointed, outside force such as in Metro­
politan Toronto and as was the proposed Metropolitan
^Ibid., p. 8.
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Chairman in the recommendations of the Steele Commission.)^ 
The most often mentioned proposal for the three new wards 
is that one include Stoney Creek and Saltfleet; the sec­
ond to include Binbrook-Glanford and the part of Ancaster 
Township near the Mount Hope Airport; and finally, the 
third additional ward could include the Town of Dundas 
plus parts of West Flamborough, Beverly and Ancaster 
Township. However, it should be noted at this point that
the Ontario government is pretty flexible on the exact
2makeup of these three additional wards.
Because this single-tier alternative really entails 
little more than the addition of three additional wards 
to Hamilton, it immediately raises the question of whe­
ther there should be any change in the present form of 
Hamilton municipal government. The Ontario government, in 
this regard, argues that the Board of Control, now part of 
Hamilton's administration, should be dissolved for two 
basic reasons. First, it is felt that the method of 
selecting the Board of Control would be unfair to voters 
outside of the present City of Hamilton. This is simply 
because the balance of population is so heavily in favor 
of the City that any candidate popular within Hamilton 
could win a seat on the Board of Control without gathering
^Proposals for Local Government Reform in the Area 
West of Metropolitan Toronto, p. 43.
^Ibid., p. 43.
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so much as one vote from what is now Wentworth County.
The possible result, of course, is that voters outside 
of the present city could find themselves governed by a 
board of control for which no one in Wentworth had 
voted. The second reason is because the present system, 
which amounts to the election of two councils, confuses 
accountability. The Board of Control has certain statu­
tory powers over budgets and contracts, and these powers 
are hard to upset. In some situations, the board becomes 
essentially a council within a countil, making the alder­
men seem redundant.^ In sum, then, the council under the 
single-tier alternative would be one of twenty-two mem­
bers, elected on a ward basis with an internally elected 
chairman.
It was noted earlier that the Ontario Government’s 
1973 proposals suggested two possible alternatives for 
local government reform in the Hamilton-centered region. 
One alternative was the single-tier region discussed above. 
The second alternative was the more traditional, in the 
Ontario reform experience, two-tier approach.
Essentially the two-tier alternative offered by the 
province proposed an area broader than that of the single­
tier area. The region would include all of Hamilton and
^Ibid., p. 45. See also Chapter III.
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Wentworth except the Village of Waterdown and the Township 
of East Flamborough.^ Again, as in the single-tier alter­
native, the Town of Burlington is notable by its absence. 
Essentially, the government’s idea is that if a two-tier 
region is created, it should be made up of five area 
municipalities embracing the existing nine.2 Thus, in 
the two-tier system, Hamilton-Wentworth's five area munic­
ipalities would be:
1. Hamilton, retaining its present boundaries;
2. Saltfleet-Stoney Creek, amalgamated to form a 
new municipality;
3. Binbrook and Glanford, amalgamated;
4. Dundas and Ancaster, amalgamated;
5. Beverly and West Flamborough, amalgamated.^
In this proposed two-tier system the Regional Coun­
cil would have twenty-four members, plus an independent 
or neutral chairman in the Metropolitan Toronto tradition. 
Of the twenty-four councillors on the Regional Council, 
Hamilton would have sixteen and the other area municipal­
ities would each have two. As in the original Steele Com­
mission recommendations, the regional councillors would, by
^Ibid., p. 46,
2Actually there are eleven municipalities in Went­
worth now, but two of them would, under the new proposals, 
become part of the Halton region.
^Proposals for Local Government Reform in the Area
West of Metropolitan Toronto, p. 48.
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some formula, become regional councillors by virtue of
election to the councils of local area municipalities.
This is a condition the government feels is necessary in
order to avoid harmful alienation between the Regional
Government and its area municipalities.^
According to the Ontario government, one important
advantage of the two-tier system would be the region's
ability to respond more readily to any proposals that
might be made to have neighboring areas become part of
Hamilton-Wentworth. Clearly, such proposals would be
less feasible in the single-tier system because it would
2likely be strongly oriented to the urban core. Another 
obvious point which must be in favor of the two-tier 
option is that it is working reasonably well in other 
regions, and their experience would be invaluable to new 
two-tier regions.
Another advantage of the two-tier system lies in 
the areas of taxation and service provision. The funda­
mental principle of the two-tier system is, of course, 
the sharing of responsibilities between the Regional Coun­
cil and the area councils. Planning policy, police pro­
tection, arterial roads and other items of regional-wide 
concern are commonly powers accorded to the Regional
^"Remarks by Mr. A. K. Meen," p. 6.
2Proposals for Local Government Reform in the Area
West of Metropolitan Toronto, pp. 46-47.
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Council, while other concerns best managed at the more 
local level, such as sidewalks, local roads and garbage 
collection, become the responsibility of the various area 
municipalities. The point is simply that, with such an 
arrangement, it becomes far easier to provide different 
levels of service in the various areas and to levy taxes 
accordingly.
Some advocates of the two-tier setup also see merit 
in retaining the identity of some lower-tier municipal­
ities within the system, even though certain amalgama­
tions would have occurred. In short, many people feel 
more comfortable if they have a mayor and a council who 
they feel are throughly informed and deeply concerned 
about issues which may be largely or entirely local in 
nature.^
In making these proposals for a two-tier system for 
the Hamilton-centered region, the government went to great 
lengths to assert that on the question of electing coun­
cils and on the question of division of functions they 
would be as flexible as possible. For example, on the 
question of division of functions they seemed prepared to 
argue the logic of making certain functions regional, but
asserted that they were prepared to listen and act upon
2any counter-arguments.
^"Remarks by A. K. Meen,” p. 10. 
2For example, see Ibid., p. 14.
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On the question of division of responsibilities, 
the government made specific proposals as to what they 
considered the most workable division. Their proposals 
really differ very little from what has been typical in 
other two-tier regions.^
In terms of planning and the preparation of offi­
cial plans it was recommended that the Regional Council 
have the responsibilities of a planning board. This is 
because it is important for planning jurisdictions and 
political jurisdictions to coincide. In addition, the 
Regional Council would be required to prepare a regional 
plan within a specified time after the incorporation of 
the regional municipality. The various area municipal­
ities would be designated as subsidiary planning areas, 
and each would be responsible for preparing a detailed 
plan within the framework of the regional plan.
Authority to borrow capital would rest exclusively 
with the Regional Council. The notion here is that by 
serving as the borrowing agent for its area municipal­
ities as well as for itself, a region would be more 
likely to obtain preferential rates in the market. At 
the same time, it would better be able to keep borrowing 
in line with the region's other long range policies.
The following discussion of proposed division of 
responsibilities is from Proposals for Local Government 
Reform in the Area West of Metropolitan Toronto, pp. 29- 
37.
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Also, because the promotion and the regulation of indus­
trial development is closely related to the planning of 
land use, the region should also handle this function.
In addition the conservation authorities now operating 
would continue to function but municipal appointments to 
them would be made by the Regional Council.
The government proposed that the responsibility of 
licensing should be divided between the region and the 
area municipalities. This recommendation again is simi­
lar to that of the earlier Steele Commission. The divi­
sion of licensing should be on the basis of activities 
that are strictly local should be licensed as such and 
others, broader in character, would call for regional 
licensing.
As is common in other regions, police protection 
would be a regional responsibility. This arrangement 
seems to most equitably spread the cost, provide the 
greatest flexibility in the use of manpower, and the 
larger base makes it more practical for the police force 
to make extensive use of specialists.
It was also proposed that welfare be a regional 
responsibility so as to now put too much pressure on the 
urban core city. It was also suggested that the Regional 
Council make the municipal appointments to the Boards of 
Health.
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In terms of the problem of transportation, the 
Ontario government proposed that public transit be made 
a regional responsibility at the option of the Regional 
Council. Over the last few years the Ontario government 
has been placing increasing emphasis upon public transit 
as a means of both reducing traffic congestion and pro­
tecting the environment from pollution. The province 
feels that if each region were to have its own unified 
public transit system, local transportation would be more 
efficient and each region would then be better able to 
integrate their systems with each other and with the pro­
vince ' s .
Although local streets are to be the responsibility 
of area municipalities, regional roads (initially the 
county road system) will be handled by the region, which 
could also designate other roads as regional and could 
build major new arteries after consultation with the Min­
ister of Transportation and Communications. In addition, 
the regional government, having responsibility for traffic 
control and public transit, should have ultimate responsi­
bility for the associated problems of parking. However, 
they may share this responsibility with the area munici­
palities if it seems appropriate.
The regional municipality will also have the respons­
ibility for water and sewer services as well as in carrying
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on existing arrangements or making new ones with the 
Ministry of the Environment. The reasoning behind this 
proposal is simply the assertion that a unified arrange­
ment would strengthen each region's planning ability and 
simplify administrative procedures. More specifically, 
it would serve to enable the region to cope more readily 
with heavy growth.
In turning to those responsibilities which might be 
best relegated to the local area municipalities, the pro­
vince asserted that many of these are either more local 
in nature or services which might be better, and with 
more flexibility, administered locally.
For example, unlike policing, the government asserts 
that fire protection is a function that seems to operate 
best when administered locally. However, the region would 
be empowered to appoint a fire-coordinator to prepare and 
take charge of an emergency plan for area fire departments.
On the question of tax collection, the government 
proposed to have the area municipalities handle the duties 
of tax collection as they do in other regions. However, 
on this question the government has emphasized that they 
are open to further discussion.
On the question of the provision of hydro^ for the 
region the question is up in the air at the moment.
For those readers who may not be familiar with the 
Canadian experience it should be noted that the term "hydro" 
refers to "electricity."
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Apparently, the Onterio government is now studying the 
Report of the Task Force Hydro, which deals with the 
status of the various municipal hydro commissions. From 
this study may come a general statement of government 
policy on the relationship of hydro commissions to region­
al governments. Until then the government recommends that 
the existing hydro commissions continue in the distribu­
tion of electric power.
As is the case in the other regions, the government 
recommended that the local area municipalities have the 
responsibility of garbage collection and that the region­
al municipality be responsible for the provision of dis­
posal sites.
In addition, the government proposed to make parks 
and recreation a local responsibility. However, the 
region would probably be also empowered to establish its 
own regional parks.
Land drainage, in general, would be a local area 
municipality responsibility, but the region would have 
control on storm drains on regional roads. As well, it 
was proposed that the region be able to designate any 
trunk storm sewers or trunk drains as regional, take 
them over, and operate them.
It was further proposed that zoning be a responsi­
bility of the area municipalities. They would, however.
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have to proceed in accordance with official plans. Minor 
zoning variances could be permitted by committees of 
adjustment of all municipalities. Severances would be 
adjudicated by a regional land division committee.
Finally, area councils would have primary responsi­
bility for subdivisions and uniform agreements with sub­
dividers. Where regional services or responsibilities 
were involved, the region would be able to enter into 
subdivision agreements with area municipalities or with 
individuals.
In summary, the government's 1973 recommendations 
for division of responsibilities in a two-tier setup 
actually differ very little from those made in 1969 by 
the report of the Steele Commission or from the division 
that exists in Metropolitan Toronto and the other two- 
tier regional municipalities in existence. The only real 
departure from the recommendations of the Steele Commis­
sion concerns the land drainage function— hardly an issue 
to raise any great deal of controversy!
The reactions to the 1973 Ontario government pro­
posals for local government reform in the areas to the 
west of Metropolitan Toronto were unmistakably hostile. 
According to a newspaper account of the meeting where the 
government made public their proposals;
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When Davis was introduced, some of the 
audience hissed and booed, but they were drowned 
out by polite applause.
There were few complaints as Meen spelled 
out the proposals for Peel and Halton, but objec­
tions rose to a roar when he reached the plans for 
Hamilton and Wentworth.
As Meen gave details of proposed new munici­
pal boundaries, there were shouts of "Go home," 
and "Leave use alone."
Members of the public who were refused entry 
to the auditorium marched in the lobby carrying 
signs directed at Davis proclaiming: "Nobody
likes a dictator."
Dozens of local politicians in Wentworth 
were wearing lapel stickers saying: "I want a
say in my future I"
These were in reference to earlier com­
plaints that the province had not consulted local 
officials about the regional plans.1
In short, when the regional government proposals for 
Hamilton and Wentworth were unveiled the municipal poli­
ticians sitting in the audience booed, jeered and gen­
erally made their displeasure known.
The reactions took many forms but those from Hamil­
ton were unified in their condemnation of the proposals. 
The mayor of Hamilton, Victor Copps, said that the pro­
posals posed " . . .  a serious threat to the whole future 
2of Hamilton." Copps said the Burlington should be in­
cluded in any Hamilton regional government because the 
two cities are closely related. Copps was particularly
^Toronto Star, "Ontario Plans 3 Regional Govern­
ments," January 24, 1973, p. 4.
2Quoted in the Toronto Star, "Regional Government: 
No Wonder the Politicians Protest," an editorial comment 
by Ian Urquhart, January 23, 1973, p. 18.
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upset because the province had proposed joining Burling­
ton with Oakville in the Halton region. He further vowed 
to lead opposition in Hamilton to the plan.^ In addition,
Hamilton Controller Anne Jones said that Hamilton had been
2. sold down the river" by the provincial government.
In Wentworth County Ancaster Reeve Art Bowes called 
the regional government proposal " . . .  totally unaccept­
able" and Saltfleet Reeve Gordon Dean said, " . . .  it 
stinks."^
Members of the Provincial Legislature from the 
Hamilton and Wentworth area also expressed concern. For 
example, Ian Dean, the New Democratic Party House Leader 
and member for Wentworth said that the wishes of the public 
were ignored by the government in drawing up the proposal. 
Dean said, "I don't think the public wants to be part of 
a super city, I think the government is on the wrong 
t r a c k , O n t a r i o  Liberal Leader Robert Nixon, whose riding 
of Brant borders on the west of the proposed Hamilton 
region, said the proposal should be shelved until plans
^Toronto Star, "Hamilton Region Politicians Say Plan 
'Stinks, Unacceptable'," January 24, 1973, p. 4.
^Ibid., p. 4.
^"Regional Government: No Wonder the Politicians
Protest," p. 18.
4"Hamilton Region Politicians Say Plan 'Stinks, 
Unacceptable'," p. 4.
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for a regional government in Brant are ready. He indi­
cated that, in his opinion, the plans for the two regions 
should be coordinated. Even Progressive Conservative 
member Don Ewen from Wentworth North said he was disa- 
pointed at the government proposals. Specifically, he 
questioned the exclusion of Burlington from the Hamilton 
region. In summary, most of the displeasure voiced at 
the proposals revolved around three points. First, there 
was the unhappiness, especially on the part of Hamilton, 
that the Town of Burlington was not included in the Hamil­
ton region and was instead included in the Halton region. 
Second, the smaller municipalities were very concerned 
with the single-tier proposal; they seemed to fear that it 
might mean a "super-city" which would completely over­
shadow their municipalities. Third, there was a general 
concern that the citizens and officials of the affected 
areas were not consulted by the government in regard to 
the drawing up of these proposals.
Hamilton Region; Adaptation and Integration
This chapter has gone into some detail about the 
background to reform of local government in what has been 




for local government reform in this area has been thor­
oughly documented; in fact this need has not really been 
at issue in the region. The initial proposals for local 
government reform, those of the Steele Commission, were 
made public in 1969. These proposals called for a two- 
tier system of government for the region and, signifi­
cantly, asserted that the Town of Burlington should be 
included in any Hamilton-centered regional government. 
Generally, it was this assertion which threatened to 
scuttle the regional government program for this area.
The reason simply was that the proposal raised a storm of 
protest from the residents and the officials of Burling­
ton. This Burlington protest was brought to a head when 
a well-publicized plebiscite on the issue was held in 
Burlington in 1969. After a strong campaign against the 
proposals by almost every Burlington interest and politi­
cal group the election was held and eighty-eight per cent 
of the Burlington voters opposed joining into any region 
with Hamilton.^ Clearly, the residents of Burlington 
were refusing to play along with the Steele Commission's 
proposals.
In short, the net result of this severe opposition 
to the Steele Commission recommendations from Burlington
^"Regional Government: No Wonder the Politicians
Protest," p. 18.
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was a hands off policy from Queen's Park. The government 
did not draw up legislation on these recommendations and 
by their inaction on the report generally made it clear 
that they wished the Steele Commission report would just 
quietly go away. This total inaction on the part of 
Queen’s Park was to last for a little over three years.
The provincial government was next heard from with 
its 1973 proposals for three separate regions in the area 
west of Metropolitan Toronto. Possibly the most important 
recommendation of these proposals was the one calling for 
the inclusion of Burlington into the Halton region. The 
background to this recommendation, then, seems in order 
at this point.
In 1965, the Plunkett Report was issued with recom­
mendations for regional government in the Peel-Halton area. 
This is the area which is along the shores of Lake Ontario 
squeezed in between Metropolitan Toronto on the east and 
Hamilton to the west. Commissioner Thomas J. Plunkett 
recommended dividing the area into two separate one-tier 
municipalities. One was to be an urban municipality across 
the southern Mississauga-Oakville-Burlington corridor; the 
second, a rural municipality covering the more rural parts 
of Peel and Halton counties.^ Many local leaders and
^Proposals for Local Government Reform in the Area
West of Metropolitan Toronto, p. 9.
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residents in these areas rejected the Plunkett recommenda­
tions and so they were never carried out.
In 1969 a provincial proposal was offered by the 
Minister of Municipal Affairs as an alternative to the 
Plunkett recommendations. Under this newer proposal, Peel- 
Halton would have become a two-tier region composed of 
seven area municipalities, including, tentatively, the 
Town of Burlington. This proposal met with somewhat more 
acceptance but not enough in the opinion of the govern­
ment. As a result, the proposal was withdrawn.^
With the 1973 provincial proposals for the area west 
of Metropolitan Toronto, it was proposed that there be a 
two-tiered region embracing all of Halton County, includ­
ing Burlington, except for a small portion of eastern 
Oakville, plus the Village of Waterdown and the Township
2of East Flamborough which is now part of Wentworth County. 
Clearly, the government was reacting to the controversy 
coming from the Steele Commission recommendations concern­
ing Burlington and had become persuaded of the impracti- 
bility of including Burlington in a Hamilton-centered 
region. The government then took the position that the 
proposal to include Burlington in the Regional Municipality 




regional municipality in Hamilton-Wentworth. Specifically, 
the argument was that with Burlington excluded from Hamil­
ton-Wentworth, a single-tier system would be the best way 
of offsetting the imbalance in voting that would occur in 
a two-tier system.^
The decision to exclude Burlington from the Hamilton- 
centered region was received very well, of course, in 
Burlington. Burlington Mayor George Harrington said that 
he was very pleased with the proposal for a Halton area
2regional government that would join his city with Oakville. 
Clearly, the reaction in Hamilton was not as positive. 
Municipal leaders and others in Hamilton believe very 
strongly that in any form of restructured local governments 
to which they might become a party Burlington must be 
included. The government, however, takes the position 
that Halton wants Burlington to be part of the Halton 
region, and Burlington wants to be part of the Halton 
region, and thus Hamilton stands alone in its desires. 
Further, it is the position that the wishes of all three
^Ibid., pp. 40-41.
2"Hamilton Region Politicians Say Plan 'Stinks, 
Unacceptable',", p. 4.
^A. K. Meen, "My Role in Regional Government," An 
address by A. K. Meen, QC, MPP York East and Parliamentary 
Assistant to the Treasurer of Ontario and Minister of 
Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs, to the Leaside 
Lions Club, February 12, 1973, p. 6.
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are important and must be taken fully into account. But 
there is another important point as well, i.e. , the ques­
tion of how workable any proposed arrangement would be.
In the eyes of the Ontario government the Halton region 
will be workable only if Burlington is a part of it. It 
is their contention that every regional government needs 
a balanced combination of urban and rural communities, 
and this can only be obtained in Halton with the inclusion 
of Burlington.^
In reference to the single-tier proposal for the
Hamilton-centered region, the government is aware that to
many people, especially to the smaller communities, this
merely sounds like an enlarged city and this raises the
corresponding fear of the loss of their identity. The
government really has no coherent argument to offset this
fear, outside of the contention that a region has features
2that a city doesn't necessarily have.
In summary it seems that the 1973 Ontario government 
proposals for the Hamilton-centered region were largely in 
reaction to Burlington's severe displeasure with the 1969 
Steele Commission's recommendations. By proposing, in 
1973, that Burlington be included in the Halton region the 
government was adapting to the probable lack of integra­
tion within the region if Burlington was included. However,
^"Remarks by A. K. Meen," pp. 12-13
^Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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in making this change they created other serious problems. 
Without Burlington the population of the Hamilton-centered 
region becomes seriously imbalanced, thus prompting the 
suggestion for a single-tier region which, in turn, causes 
important new fears of amalgamation into Hamilton on the 
part of the smaller communities in the region. This, 
clearly, is a situation where the Province has tried to 
adapt to the situation only to find itself creating fur­
ther problems. An observer of the situation cannot help 
having the feeling that the province has, in this situa­
tion, been too willing to adapt to the whims of the munic­
ipalities to the point that it has only succeeded in 
increasing the criticism.
The following case study, Oshawa, will illustrate 
what happened when the province, instead of imposing 
reform, tried to allow the local communities to make their 
own recommendations.
CHAPTER VI 
CASE STUDY 2: OSHAWA
Introduction
In several earlier portions of this study it has 
been noted, at some length, that in Ontario, as in many 
states of the United States, the urban landscape is dotted 
with a wide variety of municipalities varying widely in 
the necessary fiscal capacity to finance educational and 
municipal services. As is the case in the United States, 
local government in Ontario is the focal point for the 
delivery of most domestic public services. A wide variety 
of general purpose governments and a host of dependent and 
independent single-purpose boards and commissions are 
engaged in the attempted performance of the usual local 
governmental functions. Ontario has been concerned that 
urban development in that province might take on all of 
the worst characteristics of similar development in the 
United States. Of particular concern has been the fear 
that public service disparities would result from inter­
community competition for property tax bases along with
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the badly planned strip development nature characteristic 
of this kind of urban development.^
The area with which this chapter deals is a rapidly 
developing region along the Lake Ontario shoreline immedi­
ately east of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto.
As such, it is part of the highly urbanized portion of 
Ontario running from the Detroit, Michigan area to 
Montreal. In addition, this area is experiencing increas­
ing urbanizing pressures from the spillover of people and 
industry from nearby Metropolitan Toronto. The principal 
municipality in the "east of Metro" region is the City of
Oshawa. Oshawa is a rapidly growing city and has virtu-
2ally doubled its population in the last twenty years.
Because of the location of this region and because 
of its great growth potential it is extremely important to 
have careful planning and to allow for greenbelts in order 
to prevent the rise of a continuous urban zone between 
Oshawa on the east and Hamilton on the west. As early as 
1955, Jacob Spelt noted that:
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
In Search of Balance— Canada's Intergovernmental Experience, 
September, 1971, p. 83.
2Canada Yearbook, 1970-1971, p. 224. For example, 
Oshawa grew from a population of 41,545 in 1951 to a 
population of 78,082 in 1966.
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. . . .  in order to reach a balanced urban pattern 
in the region, still another deliberate act of man 
will be needed. Only a regional plan, focused on 
a controlled growth of Toronto, with an accompany­
ing development of satellite towns and a general 
programme of decentralization, will lead to the 
most desirable climax settlement of the region.1
In addition, the Provincial plan for the Toronto 
Centred Region envisages that the region immediately east 
of Metropolitan Toronto will be the most rapidly urban­
izing part of Ontario. There are presently proposals for 
a new international airport and a new town of 200,000 
people in this area. These developments, along with the 
expected growth of southwest Pickering, the expansion of 
Oshawa, the development of Port Hope-Cobourg as a large 
city and the concomitant need for maintenance of the rural
lands and greenbelts between the various urban centers are
2just a few of the challenges facing the region.
In short, this region directly east of Metropolitan 
Toronto has to be an extremely important cog in any attempt 
to provide regional local government in the urban portion 
of Ontario.
Jacob Spelt, Urban Development in South-Central 
Ontario (Toronto: McClelland and Steward, Ltd., 1972).
(First published in 1955 by Koninklyke Van Gorcum and Co., 
Assen, Netherlands), p. 246.
2Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovern­
mental Affairs, Proposal for Local Government Reform in the 
Area East of Metro, December, 1972, p. 53.
186
OAPADS
During the initial years of local government 
reviews in Ontario, most were commissioned by the pro­
vincial government and were headed by outside people—  
often academic people such as Plunkett, Hardy and Fyfe.
The situation as it developed in Oshawa was unique.
Briefly, the citizens of the Oshawa area felt that it was 
imperative to have the study conducted locally by people 
familiar with the area. The provincial government agreed 
with that proposal and the study was conducted on a local 
basis and was financed by the province. In short, the 
role of the Department of Municipal Affairs in the study 
was merely to (1) go through the various reports criti­
cally; (2) receive submissions from local groups;
(3) hold hearings and talk to local people; and (4) sub­
mit to the Minister a critique of the report's recommended 
]_actions. This study was named the Oshawa Area Planning 
and Development Study (OAPADS).
In the process of conducting the OAPADS study sem­
inars and public hearings were held for the purpose of 
establishing some sort of dialogue between the study organ­
ization and the residents of the area. The purported
Interview with Mr. Gardiner Church, Senior Studies 
Officer, Urban and Regional Planning Division, Municipal 
Organization Branch, Ministry of Treasury, Economics and 
Intergovernmental Affairs, June 26, 1972.
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purpose of these meetings was to establish a two-way com­
munication process. These meetings were intended to allow 
for explanations of the current findings and recommenda­
tions by the study organization as well as questions, 
suggestions, recommendations and debate by those persons 
attending the meetings.^ The intention was to establish 
a system providing for input by local citizens and citizen 
groups in a locally generated study.
There are a total of twenty-nine different munici­
palities within the OAPADS basic study area. There are 
eighteen townships, six villages, four towns and one city. 
Additionally, within the basic study area there are five 
police villages (In a police village, a three man board of 
turstees looks after local matters). The municipalities 
involved range in physical size from 478 acres (Pickering 
Village) to 75,664 acres (Mariposa). Most were incorpor­
ated around the middle of the last century although the
Village of Pickering did not come into being until 1953,
2and the Town of Ajax not until 1955.
Oshawa Area Planning and Development Study (OAPADS), 
A Preliminary Statement on Development and Regional Govern­
ment Alternatives, Kates, Peat, Marwick & Co., no date, 
pp. 5-6.
2Oshawa Area Planning and Development Study (OAPADS), 
Preliminary Evaluation of Development and Regional Govern­
ment Alternatives, Discussion Paper Three, Volume One, Kates, 
Peat, Marwick & Co., August, 1970, p. vii-7.
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There is no part of the OAPADS basic study area 
that is not organized in one way or another into local 
government jurisdictions. The several municipalities in 
Ontario County, exclusive of Oshawa which left the County 
structure in 1924 when it became a city, are represented 
on the County Council by their reeves and deputy reeves. 
There are thirty-one representatives making up the County 
Council. Additionally, the six study area municipalities 
in Durham County have eleven representatives on a county 
council of forty-two.^
The size of the various municipal counci Is ranges 
from five in most townships to seventeen in the City of 
Oshawa. In addition, the City of Oshawa is also the only 
municipality large enough to have a Board of Control.
If the total number of local jurisdictions in the 
area, including boards and commissions and the like, are 
tallied there are more than 130 local government bodies 
of one sort of another. This confusing myriad of local 
government jurisdictions clearly must frustrate the citizen 
trying to gain access to the structure and, in addition, 
it is difficult to see how such a structure can be expected 
to deliver domestic services efficiently. In the smaller 
municipalities, especially, general local government admin­
istration is carried out by clerks, treasurers, tax
^Ibid., pp. vii-9.
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collectors and purchasing agents. In many of the munici­
palities all of these functions are carried out by one 
person, who often also acts in the role of welfare admin­
istrator, recreation director and in other capacities 
that are carried out by separate individuals in the larger 
municipalities.^
The OAPADS study was intended to cover a variety of 
relevant components. First, in reference to economic 
base, the study was to appraise the basic likely future 
economy of the area in relation to the larger economy of 
which it is a part. In addition, the study was to pro­
duce estimates of future population, jobs and related 
economic indicators as a basis for planning the next 
thirty years of development. In terms of land use, as a 
second component, the study was to translate regional 
growth into physical development alternatives and evaluate 
these alternatives against social and planning goals. Fur­
ther, the study was to recommend a physical development 
plan best suited to the needs and life style of the area 
residents. Third, in terms of transportation problems, 
the study was to identify the costs and benefits of pro­
viding various kinds and levels of transportation services 
for the various possible alternative development plans and 
to plan a transportation system to serve and help shape
^Ibid., pp. viii-23 and vii-28.
191
the ultimately implemented development plan. In terms of 
municipal services, with special reference to water and 
sewers, the study was charged with the task of identifi­
cation of the servicing costs of the alternative develop­
ment plans and to ultimately plan a trunk services system 
to serve the selected development plan. Fifth, the study 
was to compare and evaluate tax revenues and the tax base 
of the various existing municipalities within the study 
area, to forecast and identify future tax revenues and to 
ensure that costs and revenues will balance as much as 
possible over the thirty year growth period. Finally, 
the study was charged with the task of identifying and 
evaluating the present local government functions. In 
addition, the study was to establish boundaries for the 
new regional government area, to establish the best system 
of reorganized local government to best suit the needs of 
the present and future population of the region. The 
study was also to set up a program for the implementation 
of a new government structure.^ Clearly, then, the 
regional local government study and proposals were but 
one component of a multi-faceted study which included the 
whole range of local government, planning and development 
problems.
^OAPADS, A Preliminary Statement on Development and 
Regional Government Alternatives, p. 3.
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Between January 1970 and February 1971, OAPADS pro­
duced a whole host of study material and reports. In 
terms of the question of regional government, the study 
produced four discussion papers and a regional government 
report. The Regional Government Report, authored by Mr.
Don Paterson, recommended a two-tier region consisting of 
the County of Ontario plus the two most westerly townships 
of Durham. However, the involved municipalities were 
unable to agree on any aspects of the OAPADS regional pro­
posals and, as a result, on May 12, 1971, the Executive 
Committee voted to terminate the study. As a direct 
result, the involved local governments admitted the fail­
ure of OAPADS and thus failed to take the initiative in 
the formulation of regional government structure and aban­
doned the field to the province.^
With the termination of OAPADS the provincial gov­
ernment became more actively involved in the reform of 
local government in the area. By December 1, 1971, the 
Minister of Municipal Affairs had received twenty-two 
briefs on the Paterson report and the government was 
actively involved in making and evaluating alternative 
proposals for the future of local government east of Metro­
politan Toronto.
^Proposal For Local Government Reform in an Area East
of Metro, pp. 4-5.
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The OAPADS study and the municipal reform program 
in general prompted the United Counties of Northumberland 
and Durham^ to review their local government structure.
The United Counties commissioned P. L. Beeckmans of Munic­
ipal Planning Consultants to prepare a program of munici­
pal reform for that area. This report was submitted and 
accepted by the United Counties in May of 1970. Both the 
OAPADS study and the United Counties' study drew heavily 
on local participation and direction and thus provide a 
large amount of background data that is sensitive to the 
local viewpoint. However, a further variable was added 
when the Federal Government announced its decision to 
locate a new international airport in Pickering and the 
Ontario Government, in a complementary action, decided to 
use the opportunity to create a new community in North 
Pickering. Clearly, these new developments added a new 
dimension to the reform of local government in the area 
as they occurred after the OAPADS and United Counties' 
studies were completed. In short, these new developments 
forced some rethinking of the assumptions made about this
^The United Counties are directly east of Ontario 
County which includes the Oshawa area.
2Charles S. MacNaughton, Proposal for Local Govern­
ment in an Area East of Metro Toronto, Statement by the 
Honourable Charles S. MacNaughton, Treasurer of Ontario, 
Eastdale Collegiate Institute, Oshawa, Ontario, December 
18, 1972, pp. 3-4.
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whole area and its role in relation to the neighboring 
regions.
It has been noted that the Oshawa Area Planning and 
Development Study was halted by a termination resolution 
of the Executive Committee on May 12, 1971. This resolu­
tion calling for the end of OAPADS came about one month 
in advance of the scheduled regional government report. 
However, the report, which was already in progress, was 
considered to reflect a great deal of valuable effort.
As a result, the report was issued and distributed without 
endorsement by the Study Organization in June of 1971.
The aforementioned regional government report of 
June, 1971, made the basic recommendation of a two-tier 
system of regional government similar to that in opera­
tion in many of the regions currently in operation. Spe­
cifically, the proposal was that the relationship between 
the tiers be entirely that of a federation for all func­
tions. In other words, each tier should be given by legis­
lation the right to exercise certain powers, with neither 
tier being entirely subordinate to the other.^ Thus, this
Oshawa Area Planning and Development Study (OAPADS), 
Regional Government Report. Paterson Planning and Research 
Limited and Kates, Peat, Marwick & Co.; Murray V. Jones and 
Associates Limited; Gore and Storrie Limited; and Totten 
Sims Hubicki Associates Limited, June, 1971, pp. 21-22.
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recommendation envisages a federal relationship where each 
tier has certain, separate legislatively mandated powers.
In terms of boundary proposals, the Regional Gov­
ernment Report (Paterson Report) proposed the following:
(1) The North boundary of the proposed Oshawa-centered 
region contain all of Ontario County north including Rama 
and Mara plus the township of Cartwright; (2) The East 
boundary of the proposed region should follow the present 
boundary of Darlington Township. This, of course, excluded 
Port Hope and Cobourg. Port Hope and Cobourg were excluded 
from the proposed Oshawa-centered region on the assumption 
that they would in time be the center of a separate region; 
(3) The West boundary would follow the center line of the 
Rouge River from Lake Ontario to the fork, then follow the 
center line of the east branch of the Rouge northward to 
its intersection with the center line of proposed highway 
407, and then easterly along that line to its intersection 
with the boundary of the counties of York and Ontario.^
In terms of the internal boundaries, i.e., boundaries 
of the area municipalities, the report was faced with a 
great deal of difficulty which was to be expected. However, 
the report did endeavor to make recommendations concerning 
the boundaries of the lower-tier municipalities.
^OAPADS, Regional Government Report, pp. 9-20.
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In its initial recommendations concerning the area 
municipalities, the report noted the discussion of the 
possibility of the amalgamation of Oshawa and Whitby to 
be the central city of the region. However, Paterson 
recommended that Oshawa and Whitby not be amalgamated 
either presently or at any time in the future. The 
rationale was simply that the amalgamation of Oshawa and 
Whitby would create an area municipality of such great 
size as to possibly serve as a barrier to regional balance. 
In short, a municipality of that size would tend to 
destroy the possibility of an internally balanced region. 
As a result, it was recommended that Whitby be an area 
municipality and further that the boundaries of Whitby 
remain as they are presently constituted.^ However, an 
amalgamation of Oshawa and East Whitby was recommended.
The Paterson Report thus recommended that the area munic­
ipality centered on Oshawa extend to the eastern boundary 
of Whitby on the east, to the northern boundary of the 
basic study area on the north, and to the line between 
lots 26 and 27 in the present Township of Darlington on 
the east. This area municipality would be called Oshawa- 
East Whitby. Further, the report called for city status 
for Oshawa-East Whitby. All other area municipalities 
were envisaged to have town status.
^Ibid., pp. 27 and 29.
^Ibid., pp. 27-28 and 33.
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Following a request in a joint submission to OAPADS 
from Bowmanville and Darlington, it was recommended that 
Bowmanville and the part of Darlington lying east of the 
proposed Oshawa-East Whitby municipality be merged into a 
single area municipality. This municipality would be 
known as Bowmanville-Darlington. In addition, the report 
envisaged that another single area municipality be estab­
lished inclusive of the area comprising the present munic­
ipalities of Beaverton, Thorah, Cannington and Brock.^
Paterson then recommended that the area between the 
Town of Whitby and the western boundary of the region, to 
the north limit of the basic study area, be divided into 
two separate area municipalities. For purposes of descrip­
tion, these two municipalities would respectively be
referred to as Pickering West and Ajax-Pickering Village-
2Pickering East.
In reference to the more rural areas in the northern 
portion of the proposed region, Paterson recommended that 
a total of three area municipalities be carved out of the 
area. The report then noted that these northern municipal­
ities be composed as follows: (1) Uxbridge Town, Uxbridge




(3) Mara, Rama.^ Map 2 illustrates the proposed boundaries 
of the various area municipalities in addition to the pro­
posed regional boundaries.
In sum, these proposals would serve to create five 
urban-oriented area municipalities fronting on Lake Ontario 
and four essentially rural municipalities in the northern 
reaches of the proposed region. In addition, the Pater­
son Report noted the possibility of the creation of a 
tenth area municipality at a later date comprising the 
future urban center of Brooklin. However, it was also 
noted that the municipality of Mara-Rama may in the future 
either decide or be asked to join another region, thus 
dropping the area municipalities to a total of nine. 
Finally, the possibility of the addition of Newcastle and 
Clarke as an additional municipality in the future was 
noted.^
If it is to be assumed that the above regional and 
area municipality boundaries are the ones which will ulti­
mately be implemented, then the question arises as to the 
representation schemes which will need to be implemented. 
The size of both the regional council and the area munici­
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size and composition of the various area municipality 
representation on the regional council. The question also 
arises as to the methods of election to both the regional 
and the area municipalities. In addition, questions re­
lating to the weight, for purposes of representation, 
given to part-time cottage populations and those relating 
to whether representation on the regional council should 
be on the basis of population or on the basis of geograph­
ical area must be determined.
In terms of the problem of the weight given to rural 
areas, the Paterson Report noted that in those areas that 
are essentially agricultural, the extremely low density 
does require some over-representation of population if the 
amount of territory to be served by one representative is 
to be kept within reasonable limits.^ Accordingly, when 
devising a recommended scheme of representation, this fac­
tor must be taken into account even if in so doing the 
principle of representation by population is somewhat 
diluted.
The question of population representation also
becomes an important issue in respect to the relative
2weight that should be given to "cottage population."
^OAPADS, Regional Government Report, p. 39.
2The term "cottage population" in Ontario refers to 
those people who are either retired, tourists or part-time 
residents of the resort areas. The proposed area has a 
relatively large influx of this type of resident.
TABLE 6.1
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE RECOM'^IENDED REGION
Area Municipality 1969 1976 1991 2001
No. % No. % No. » No. «
Oshawa-East Whitby P 92,900 42.8 112,500 41.8 195,000 37.7 235,000 31.6
Pickering West* P 23,100 10.7 29,100 10.8 60,400 11.7 87,400 10.8
Ajax-Pickering 
Village- 
Pickering East P 17,200 7.9 28,100 10.4 60,000 11.6 84,000 10.4
Whitby P 25,000 11.5 35,300 13.1 82,000 15.8 117,000 14.5
Brooklin P — — — -- — — 104,000 12.9
Bowmanville-
Darlington P 15,500 7.2 16,000 5.9 58,000 11.2 89,000 11.0
Uxbridge-

























































216,900 100.0 269,400 100.0 517,500 100.0 807,400 100. 0
Sources: permanent and 1969 cottage population figures, OAPADS Economie Base component;
1976-1991-2001 cottage population figures, OAPADS Regional Government component.
•Including the portions of Scarborough and Markham east of the East Rouge River and south 
of proposed Highway 407. 





There are several considerations which must be taken into 
account in this regard. In support of giving full weight 
to cottage population in determining representation is the 
fact that this is the traditional county practice. In 
addition, the fact that cottages pay full taxes on their 
cottage properties, the trend of an increasing number of 
them utilizing their cottages on a year-round basis and 
perhaps to retire to them, and the increasing concern of 
many cottagers with the need to control pollution and pro­
tect the environment all lend support to full weight. The 
argument against giving the cottagers full weight in 
representation is based on the allegation that they typi­
cally do not have the same stake in the community as do 
permanent residents. An additional argument against full 
weight, of course, is the fear that in certain areas their 
number may be such as to completely dominate the permanent 
population. In Muskoka, for example, this factor is of 
overriding concern because in three of the six area munici­
palities under the new District Government, the ratio of 
cottagers to permanent residents is already more than five 
to one and is increasing. In additon, for the District as 
a whole the ratio now exceeds two to one and within the 
next twenty-five years is expected to approach three to 
one.^ This problem, of course, is not of such a magnitude
^Muskoka District Local Government Review, Research 
Report, August, 1968, p. 35.
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in the proposed Oshawa-centered region. Only three of
the nine proposed municipalities have cottage populations.
In two of these, the cottagers are outnumbered by ratios
of about two or three to one and their proportion is
expected to drop still lower in the future. In the third
affected municipality, Mara-Rama, the cottagers outnumber
permanent residents by less than three to one and this
situation is expected to remain static.^ As a result, the
Paterson Report took the position that the proposal to
give cottage population only half weight in determining
representation, which was considered essential in Muskoka,
would be inappropriate in the Oshawa-centered region
where the cottage population, now only seven per cent of
the regional total, is expected to drop to less than three
per cent by the end of the century. Accordingly, the
study made the recommendation that full weight be accorded
to the cottage population in determining representation
2within the proposed region.
In terms of council structure in the area munici-
rpalities the OAPADS study took the position this is pro­
perly a concern of the area municipalities themselves and 
that it is neither desirable nor necessary for the legis­
lation establishing the regional government to impose a
^OAPADS, Regional Government Report, pp. 38-39. 
^Ibid., p. 39.
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council structure on each area municipality, as long as 
regional councillors are chosen in the recommended manner. 
However, the study did take note of the fact that, while 
each area council should be left free to determine its 
own structure, an initial structure for the first area 
councils will have to be determined in order to elect 
them. Thus, the study made the recommendation that for 
the election of the initial area municipality councils 
the Minister of Municipal Affairs establish the size and 
the composition of each council except that of Whitby, 
which may remain as presently constituted. Thereafter, 
each area council should determine any desirable changes 
to this initial structure and take the normal steps 
required to bring them about before the subsequent elec­
tion.^
In terms of the optimum council size, the study took 
the general position that a council should be large enough 
to provide a reasonable ratio of population per represent­
ative and to handle the council work load, yet small enough 
so as not to be unwieldy. Clearly, then, these criteria, 
general as they may be, seem to dictate a smaller size for 
a lower-tier council than for the regional council. How­
ever, this still leaves the specific size of the area 
councils to be determined, except for the Town of Whitby,
^Ibid., p. 41.
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which will continue to elect by wards while the others 
will, at least initially, elect at large. Thus, the 
study suggested that for each of the area municipalities 
within the basic study area (the southern tier of munici­
palities) , the size of the largest council which previ­
ously had jurisdiction in each be used for the initial 
election; and for each of the other municipalities, a 
council size of seven be adopted for the initial election. 
This scheme, then, would result in initial area councils 
of the following sizes
1. Oshawa-East Whitby 17












In terms of the question of the scheme for represen­
tation of the area municipalities a whole host of possible 
alternatives were put forward and studied. The most seri­
ous concern with most of the schemes which adequately rep­
resented local interests were that they often called for a 
regional council that would be both too large and too 
unwieldy. Most of these schemes called for a regional
'Ibid. , pp. 40-41.
TABLE 6.2
COMPARISON OF REGIONAL COUNCILS HAVING 30 AND 32 
REPRESENTATIVES PLUS THE CHAIRNiAN
Area Municipality











Oshawa-East Whitby 11 36.5 41.8 12 37. 5
Pickering West 3 10.0 10.8 3 9.5
Ajax-Pickering Village- 
Pickering Easu 3 10.0 10.4 3 9 . 5
Whitby 3 10.0 13.1 4 12 . 5
Bowmanville-Darlington 2 6.7 5.9 2 6.2
Uxbridge-Uxbridge-Scott 2 6.7 3.7 2 6.2
Port Perry-Reach- 
Scugog-Cartwright 2 6.7 5.8 2 6.2
Beaverton-Thorah-
Cannington-Brock 2 6.7 3.5 2 6.2














council of thirty or thirty-two councillors. The study 
group felt, however, that more decisive and effective 
regional government would be more likely with a smaller 
council. With this stricture in mind, the study group 
concentrated their efforts to the devising of a scheme 
with a fewer number of representatives. Finally, the 
alternatives were narrowed down to a single scheme which 
called for eighteen regional councillors plus the Regional 
Chairman.^ The Paterson Report, then, recommended that 
the proposed Regional Council be composed of the Regional 
Chairman and eighteen representatives from the various 
area municipalities as follows:
TABLE 6.3
AREA MUNICIPALITY REPRESENTATION 













Source: OAPADS, Regional Government Report, p. 45.
^Ibid., p. 43.
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In the process of studying this proposal the study group 
made a study showing the adjustments necessary for pro­
jected future population shifts and changes. (See 
Table 6.4).
Further, following the precedents of the other 
regional Municipalities, it was proposed that the Regional 
Chairman should be appointed initially by the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs and, thereafter, elected by the Regional 
Council. In addition, it was recommended that the Regional 
Chairman should not have a vote except in case of a tie 
vote; the other members of the Regional Council should 
each have one vote only, and a majority vote of the coun­
cillors present at a council meeting should be necessary 
to carry any resolution or other measure.
Finally, it was suggested that in order to fulfill 
a quorum for Regional Council meetings, there should be a 
majority of Council members representing a majority of the 
area present. This simply means that the quorum will con­
sist of at least ten council members representing at least 
five of the area municipalities.^
In terms of the immediate question of elections, it 
was recommended that for the elections for the first 
regional and area councils, the Minister of Municipal
^Ibid., p. 45.
TABLE 6.4
COMPOSITION OF A REGIONAL COUNCIL OF 18 REPRESENTATIVES 
PLUS THE CHAIRMAN, SHOWING FUTURE ADJUSTMENT 
TO THE FORECAST 1991 POPULATION BY 
ADDING 2 MORE REPRESENTATIVES
Area Municipality














Oshawa-East Whitby 7 38. 7 41.8 7 35.0 37.7
Pickering West 2 11.1 10.8 2 10.0 11.7
Ajax-Pickering 
Village- 
Pickering East 2 11.1 10.4 2 10.0 11. e
Whitby 2 11.1 13.1 3 15.0 15. 8
Bowmanville-
Darlington 1 5.6 5.9 2 10.0 11.2
Uxhridge-Uxbridge-
Scptt 1 5.6 3.7 1 5.0 2.7
Port Perry-Reach- 
Scugog-Cartwright 1 5.6 5.8 1 5.0 3.7
Beaverton-Thorah- 
Cannington-Brock 1 5.6 3.5 1 5.0 2.2
Mara-Rama 1 5.6 5.0 1 5.0 3.4










Affairs should fix the time and places for both nomina­
tion and polling procedures, provide for the preparation 
of voter's lists and the appointment of returning offi­
cers and bear the expenses of the local municipalities 
for the elections. However, for subsequent elections, 
the various area councils should be responsible for all 
of the above matters except the nomination and election 
dates, which should be established by the Regional Act 
as the first Monday in December for election and the sec­
ond Monday of November for the nomination date.^
Concerning the problem of method of election, in 
Discussion Paper Three it was proposed that election to 
the Regional Council should be indirect, that is, with
one or more members of each area municipality council
2comprising the membership of the Regional Council. This 
proposal gained a great deal of acceptance throughout the 
OAPADS hearings. The main advantage of such indirect 
election compared to separate and direct election of the 
Regional Council is that it tends to insure coordination 
of the two tiers of government and helps prevent the 
development of serious splits between the two tiers. Even
1OAPADS, Regional Government Report, p. 37.
2Oshawa Area Planning and Development Study (OAPADS), 
Preliminary Evaluation of Development and Regional Govern­
ment Alternatives, Discussion Paper Three, Volume One, 
August, 1970, p. x-42.
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for the casual observer it is relatively easy to discern 
one possible reason for widespread support of this sort 
of indirect election. Indirect election appeals to a 
number of those people who fear the whole concept of 
regional local government. The principle of indirect 
election to a regional council may well serve to somewhat 
allay these fears as the members will be selected totally 
from local councillors with local constituencies and thus 
with an orientation which is likely to be more local than 
regional.
However, the OAPADS study group expressed the opin­
ion that in order to emphasize the importance of the 
Regional Council, the ballot form and other election 
material should refer to the election of a Regional Coun­
cillor who will serve concomitantly as a member of the 
Area Council, rather than electing an Area Councillor who 
would also serve on the Regional Council. Accordingly, 
the final recommenation of the study group in this regard 
was to the effect that each member of the Regional Council, 
except the Regional Chairman, be elected at large within an 
area municipality, to sit not only on the Regional Council 
but also on the Area Council of that municipality. In 
addition, the Head or Mayor of each Area Council should 
always be a Regional Councillor. Finally, other members 
of an Area Council who do not sit on the Regional Council
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may be elected either by ward or at large within the Area 
Municipality.^
The related question of the term of election was 
one which brought on a host of proposals. Some prefer­
ence was indicated for a two year term at the public hear­
ings. However, the proposal put forward in Discussion
2Paper Three was for a three year term. The final recom­
mendation of the study group alluded to the notion that 
the term should be long enough to provide the opportunity 
for councils to design and implement meaningful programs 
during their term in office. As a result, the recommenda­
tion was in line with Discussion Paper Three calling for 
a three year term that was considered to be significantly 
more conducive to continuity. The three year term in 
office was to be adopted for all elected positions in the 
region, with a common election date for all elected 
bodies.^
It has been previously noted, in Chapter V, that 
where a two-tier governmental structure is contemplated, 
the question as to the division of functions between the
^OAPADS, Regional Government Report, p. 34.
2OAPADS, Discussion Paper Three, pp. x, 42-43. 
^OAPADS, Regional Government Report, p. 35.
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two tiers can be extremely controversial. The controversy 
can range from questions as to which tier gets which 
responsibilities to questions relating to local needs or 
desires for service levels different from that of the 
remainder of the regional municipality. Regardless, the 
intent of any such allocation of functions must be on the 
basis of the level deemed most appropriate for handling 
it, while bearing in mind the nature of the need to be 
met by each function, whether it is area wide or local in 
nature, the resources required to carry it out and the 
amount of local contact needed to perform it effectively.
Before discussing the proposed division of functions 
it seems that some discussion of urban service areas and 
the contracting for services is in order. First, it 
should be noted that the principle of the urban service 
area is now well established in Ontario. The notion of 
the urban service area is based on the empirical need for 
different levels of service in various areas of a region. 
In the case of the proposed Oshawa-centered region it is 
considered that such areas will be essential to the satis­
factory performance of government at both levels. As a 
result, the Paterson Report recommended that the legisla­
tion establishing regional government require both the 
Regional and the various Area Councils to establish urban 
service areas where they are appropriate for both regional 
and local services which are potentially of different
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benefit to different parts of the area, so that the tax 
levies in support of such services will reflect these 
differences. The study group further recommended that 
such service areas should be set up in time for the ini­
tial tax levies under the new system of government and 
that the involved councils make an annual review of these 
designated areas. In addition, the establishment of these 
urban service areas should not require approval by the 
Ontario Municipal Board when established or revised. How­
ever, provision should be made to the effect that any 
ratepayer should have the right to appeal any of the pro­
visions of such a service area to the Ontario Municipal 
Board.^
The provision of these urban service areas, for 
example, allows regional services to be provided either 
in part or not at all to any area municipality so that 
what might be called sub-regional service areas may be 
developed for certain services. This, then, could permit 
certain services to be provided in part or in all to the 
urbanized southern portion of the proposed region, but 
possibly not supplied to the rural northern portion of the 
proposed region with only those receiving the direct bene­
fits being required to bear the cost. In addition, a given 
service could be provided at several different levels, each
^Ibid., p. 48.
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for a different area. In such cases, then, there would 
be gradations of the service levels and graduated mill 
rates for support of the service.^
In addition to the provision of urban service areas 
the Paterson Report noted that an additional component of 
flexibility can be added to the system of regional govern­
ment by permitting any of the councils within the region 
to contract for the provision of one or more services with 
one or more other councils within the system or with the 
province. As a result, it was recommended that the legis­
lation establishing the regional government permit such
contracting of services subject to approval of each such
2contract by the Regional Council.
The Paterson study group was extremely careful and 
precise in the development of a division of powers scheme. 
The following discussion of some of the more important 
functions emphasizes the reasons and rationale for the 
stated recommendations. This discussion is followed by a 
graphic presentation of the recommended allocation of 
functions.
In respect to the extremely important question of 
capital borrowing, the study group took the position and 




sole authority for debenture borrowing for purposes of 
the regional corporation, the area municipalities, and 
of any of the regional or local boards and commissions, 
including the public board of education. In addition, 
it was recommended that the debentures so issued should 
be joint and the obligation of the regional corporation 
and the Area Municipalities, but the payment of debt 
charges on them should be the responsibility of the coun­
cils, boards and commissions on whose behalf they were 
incurred according to the division of functions.^
In respect to the problem of physical systems or 
facilities, such as roads, water, sewer systems and parks 
and how they are to be divided between the Regional and 
Area Municipality governments, the Regional Council should
have the responsibility of determining by by-law those
2facilities which the regional government will assume.
This, clearly, is sort of a "supremacy clause" for the 
areas where the two tiers have concurrent powers in regard 
to physical services. In other words, if a road needs 
repairing and both tiers have road repair powers, it is 
the regional government which will decide if it is a local 
or a regional matter. For example, the regional govern­
ment is proposed to perform functions relating to "regional
^Ibid., pp. 71-72.
2 OAPADS, Regional Government Report, p. 53.
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roads." This clause, then, clearly implies that it is 
the Regional Council which will make the decision as to 
whether a particular road should be designated a "regional 
road."
It should be noted that the study group felt that 
in some cases certain services might not be provided by 
the region to a particular area. As a result, it was fur­
ther recommended that police protection, trunk sewer lines 
and treatment plants, water purification and wholesale 
water distribution should be regional responsibilities.
At the same time, however, it was felt that in that por­
tion of the region lying to the rural north, the Ontario 
Provincial Police should continue to police the territory 
presently under its jurisdiction unless the Regional Coun­
cil requests otherwise, and where any of these services is 
presently provided by a local government the Area Council 
which takes over should be permitted to continue to pro­
vide them itself if it wishes to do so.^
The public transportation function was one which 
presented a problem in the allocation of functions. The 
most important problem in this regard concerns the diverse 
nature of the proposed region, i.e., the fact that the 
region is characteristically urban in the southern portion 
and characteristically rural in the northern portion. As
^Ibid., p. 53.
218
a direct result of the problem, the study group made the 
recommendation that the public transportation function be 
invested in the regional government. It was noted, how­
ever, that it was not the intention of the study group 
that the region should provide this service outside of 
the urban portions of the southernmost part of the pro­
posed region.^ In addition, the regional role would 
include advising the province on the licensing of any 
private carriers intending to pick up or drop off passen­
gers with the proposed region.
Finally, in regard to the important function of 
planning, the study group tried to divide this function 
between the regional and the area municipalities with the 
region having an overall responsibility for planning and 
the area municipalities having jurisdiction over purely 
local planning matters. However, in regard to the plagu­
ing problem of lot severance consents the recommenation 
was that this function be invested exclusively to the 
regional level. The study group made public a twofold 
reason for this recommendation. First, under the Provin­
cial Planning Act, the Regional Council is required to 
appoint a Regional Land Division Committee to deal with 
lot severance consents in those area municipalities with­
out approved official plans. At this point it should be
^Ibid., p. 54.
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noted that most of the northern portion of the proposed 
region is without officially approved plans. Second, 
since this regional machinery is required, and since uni­
form policies and procedures for handling consent applica­
tions are essential to an effective regional planning pro­
gram, it is felt by the study group that advantage should 
be taken of this opportunity by making the Regional Land 
Division Committee responsible for all lot severance con­
sents and for a policy relating to all such consents.^
The following table. Table 6.5, is a graphic pre­
sentation of the recommended scheme for the allocation of 
functions between the two tiers. In this table the sym­
bol 'A' is used to designate an Area Municipality function 
and the symbol 'R' to designate a Regional Municipality 
function and, finally, an 'A' and an 'R' together indicate 
a function to be performed by both levels of government 
concurrently.
Finally, the Paterson study group felt a need to 
make recommendations concerning the most suitable arrange­
ments under a regional local government setup for the 
handling of a number of functions which are presently 
administered by independent boards and commissions or for
^Ibid., p. 49.
TABLE 6.5
RECOMMENDED DIVISION OF MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS
A = Area Municipality Function R = Regional Municipality Function
Administration
council agenda, minutes, etc. A R









financial planning and budget
preparation A R
capital borrowing R
approval of public education
capital budgets R
taxation of property (including 





collection of fines A R
grants to organizations A R
Health
public health services R
hospital planning and
financial support R
emergency ambulance services A




regional official plan R
local official plans A
exemptions from part lot control A 
subdivision approvals and agree­
ments A R
zoning by-laws A R
zoning adjustments A
lot severance consents R
provision of planning staff ser­











Industrial and Tourist Promotion A R
Pollution Control, Sanitation,
Water Supply
trunk sanitary sewers and treat­
ment plants R
local sanitary sewers A
sewer and water system standards
and inspections R




Mental Hospitals Act 
Sanatoria for Consumptives Act 
War Veterans Burial Act 
cemeteries
Social and Family Services
general welfare administration
child welfare
homes for the aged
rest homes
day nurseries
homemakers and nurses services 
grants to homes for retarded 
persons 
Juvenile Delinquents Act





local community centers, arenas, 
rinks, pools, museums 





























garbage disposal A R
water purification and whole­
sale distribution R
water retail distribution and
billing A
approval of construction and 
maintenance of local sewer 




sidewalks on local roads A
sidewalks on regional roads R
street lighting A
control of access to regional
roads R
traffic signals R
other traffic control devices A R
control of traffic and parking
on regional roads R
area traffic by-laws A R
approval of local road closings R
public transportation R
seaports and airports R





Source: OAPADS, Regional Government Report, p. 47.
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functions which have been recommended as suitable for 
board or commission operation in the future.
In the past it has been considered that the crea­
tion of separate boards and commissions has the advantage 
of specialization, as well as the advantage of keeping 
matters under their jurisdiction out of the political 
arena. It is, however, questionable whether they do, in 
fact, keep their functions out of the political arena, 
and,further, they tend to confuse access to local govern­
ment decision making and thus tend to weaken local gov­
ernment on the whole. In short, the specialized opera­
tion of these semi-independent boards and commissions 
tends to remove the function from the direction of the 
general purpose council which is elected to coordinate 
and determine the priorities of the various programs. In 
addition, it often is argued that a function removed from 
politics is a function at least one step removed from 
democratic control.^ This argument, then, leads to the 
assertion that if local government is to be strengthened 
and made more responsible and responsive, it is essential 
that functions typically handled by separate boards and 
commissions be returned to council control.
In Ontario and in the Oshawa-centered region under 
consideration some boards and commissions are separately
^See, for example, Adrian and Press, Governing Urban 
America, pp. 269-271.
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elected, such as the various Boards of Education and the 
Public Utilities Commissions.^ Others are appointed 
either by the Municipal Council, the Provincial govern­
ment, or a combination of both. Some of these appointed
bodies have members of the appointing council on them
2while others have none.
The alternatives to the presently constituted sys­
tem of boards and commissions were seen by the OAPADS 
group as essentially three in number; (1) the function 
could conceivably be made a direct responsibility of the 
council as a whole; (2) the functions of boards and com­
missions could be placed under a council committee com­
posed entirely of councillors; or (3) they may be placed 
under a council committee on which the majority of the 
voting members were councillors, but which also has 
appointed citizen members.^ Obviously, then, the study 
group is recommending that where it is feasible, those 
functions which are presently handled by separate boards 
or commissions should be returned to council control. 
Beyond this stricture it was felt that each council in­
volved should be left free to determine what use, if any.
J. Stefan Dupre, "International Relations and the 
Metropolitan Area," in Feldman and Goldrick (eds.). Politics 
and Government of Urban Canada, p. 187.
2OAPADS, Regional Government Report, p. 54.
^Ibid., pp. 54-55.
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it will need to make of council committees in discharging 
responsibility for these functions.^
In the case of Boards of Education, however, it 
clearly was not considered feasible to transfer juris­
diction over education from the Boards. What the OAPADS 
group did recommend was that with the advent of the pro­
posed regional government, the Ontario County Public and 
Separate Boards of Education should have their areas of 
jurisdiction brought into line with the boundaries of the 
proposed region, their membership adjusted accordingly, 
their electoral districts brought into line with the area 
municipalities, and their respective terms of office made 
to coincide with the established terms of office of the 
regional and area councils. Finally, the study group also 
made the recommendation that the legislation establishing 
the regional government should also provide for an educa­
tion liaison committee to be comprised of the Chairman of 
the Regional Council and the Chairman of both the Public 
and Separate Boards of Education for the new region as 
well as two or more senior staff officials from each body 
as may be agreed upon. The function of this liaison com­
mittee would be to coordinate education policies between 





The recommendations that have been detailed above 
were never implemented. In fact, they were, at best, 
still-born. As was noted at the outset, the Oshawa Area 
Planning and Development Study was officially terminated 
in May of 1971. These recommendations, however, were not 
issued until a month later. In fact, the final regional 
government report was issued and distributed without the 
official endorsement of the Study Organization or of the 
governmental authorities which had participated in the 
study.
Before detailing the death of OAPADS, it seems wise 
to, at least, allude to the method of implementation of 
the proposals as envisaged by the Regional Government 
Report. The report envisaged an implementation procedure 
which would follow in logical procession from the presen­
tation of the recommendations. First, there would be a 
period of consideration and debate on the substance of 
the recommendations by the Executive Administrator and the 
Executive Committee. This step would conclude with incor­
poration into the plan of any revisions agreed upon by 
the Executive. Next would be the submission of the report 
to the Minister of Municipal Affairs who, in turn, would 
provide for public distribution for it and request public 
reaction by a specified date. The third step would be an 
announcement by the Minister of the main details of the 
legislation which he intends to introduce, followed by the
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introduction of the legislation, debate, possible amend­
ment and, finally, enactment. The fourth step would, of 
course, be the election of the Regional and Area Councils. 
Next would come the preparatory phase, i.e., the hiring 
of staff, organization of the various departments, the 
division of assets and liabilities and so on. The final 
step would be the inception of the new system of regional 
local government for the Oshawa-centered area. Initially, 
the hope was to have the new system of government start 
operation on January 1, 1972. However, a number of events 
occurred which made this date seem rather unrealistic, so 
the Paterson study group recommended a starting date of 
January 1, 1973.^
These plans for ultimate implementation of the OAPADS 
recommendations were, however, not to be fulfilled. The 
whole framework of the OAPADS organization had started 
falling apart. The makeup of the OAPADS organization was 
in large part held together only by their fear that if 
they did not make the regional government recommendations 
the province would impose their own. As a result, when 
agreement over the ultimate conclusions had to be reached, 
it was not possible to take the step. In short, the study 
came to an end when the Executive Committee of the Study 
Commissioners could not reach any semblance of agreement
^Ibid., p. 79.
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on ultimate conclusions.^ Perhaps it was too big a 
political step to take for the local government officials 
who were aware, not only of the substantial local opposi­
tion to regional government, but also of the fact that it 
would mean either the end of their jobs or, at least, a 
diminished role for their local elected offices. What­
ever the case, the demise of the Oshawa Planning and Dev­
elopment Study had the effect of taking the initiative 
out of the hands of local authorities and placing it 
squarely in the hands of the provincial government.
Clearly it was deemed to be easier and safer to dump the 
problem into the hands of the Province, let it make the 
difficult decisions and then criticize and "view with 
horror" from the sidelines. The above may well be too 
strong a conclusion as to why OAPADS fell apart; however, 
it is a conclusion that is difficult to avoid. At any 
rate, the demise of OAPADS has meant that the Department 
of Municipal Affairs had to take the problem into consider­
ation and make an attempt to come up with recommendations
for an Oshawa-centered region based, to some degree, on
2the data accumulated by OAPADS. The provincial study 
and their recommendations for the Oshawa-centered area are 
the topics of the following portions of this chapter.
^Interview with Mr. Gardiner Church, June 26, 1972. 
^Ibid.
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Regional Local Government: East of Metro
The first portion of this chapter has noted that 
the Oshawa Area Planning and Development Study (OAPADS) 
was an innovative attempt to unite the activities of 
local government, the provincial government and a con­
sortium of consultants for the study of local government 
structure, land use, economic base, transportation, pub­
lic services and financial capability. In addition, the 
Province payed for about three-fourths of the total study 
cost and all of the regional government component. In 
brief, the hope was that the study would be effective and 
that with the input of the elected local councils there 
would be provision for effective local participation 
which, in turn, might bring about local support, or con­
currence, with the ultimate recommendations.^ Clearly, 
this was not to be, and the responsibility for developing 
a regional government plan was dropped squarely into the 
lap of the provincial govenrment.
In a departure from past practice the Government, in
2this case the Department of Municipal Affairs, embarked 
on a course of doing the local government study internally.
^W. H. Palmer, "The Progress of the Regional Govern­
ment Program in Ontario," October 9, 1970, p. 15.
2With the reorganization of 1972, the Department of 
Municipal Affairs was incorporated into the Ministry of 
Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs.
229
In short, the Department started, for the first time, to 
develop an internal competence for carrying out needed 
local government studies. This capability was assigned 
to the Urban and Regional Planning Division of the Munic­
ipal Organization Branch of the Ministry of Treasury, 
Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs under the reorgan­
ization.^ In the past, of course, the Department of 
Municipal Affairs had assigned the various local govern­
ment studies to independent commissions or commissioners. 
There are several possible reasons for this departure.
The Department may simply have wanted to develop this 
internal capacity all along and this merely provided a 
timely framework for doing so. More likely, however, is 
the fact that by doing its own research the Department 
could guarantee its own outcomes. One observer feels 
that this may be true because the Government has been 
"desperately" trying to surround Metro Toronto with other 
regional municipalities in order to shut off the rapid 
growth of Metro and, concomitantly, to allay the potential
threat that Metro might become a "super-city" capable of
2threatening the power of the Province. If this presump­
tion is true, Oshawa would be a vital cog in the provincial
^Interview with Mr. Gardiner Church, June 26, 1972. 
2Interview with Mr. David Barnes of the Bureau of 
Municipal Research, June 20, 1972.
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plan. Additionally, as was previously mentioned, the 
Department has to contend with the fact that the designa­
tion of the Pickering area as a site for a new, huge 
international airport added a further element to any 
analysis of the Oshawa-centered region. Based on the 
available evidence, my own analysis leads to the conclu­
sion that the Government's motives were mixed and that 
all of the above probably provided input into the final 
decision.
At any rate, the ultimate result of this decision 
was the Government's East of Metro proposals which were 
made public at a meeting of the affected local government 
officials on the evening of December 18, 1972.
East of Metro Proposals
The initial problem faced and met by the Govern­
ment's East of Metro proposals was the problem of defining 
the region in terms of its external boundaries. In this 
regard, the new proposals launched into an immediate 
attack upon Paterson's recommendations, especially on 
those relating to the northern boundary of the proposed 
region.
The new proposals asserted that all of Paterson's 
research and all public statements by township councillors 
and politicians from Oshawa, Ajax and Bowmanville led to 
the inevitable conclusion that the Townships of Rama, Mara,
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Thorah, Brock and Scott and the Villages of Beaverton and
Cannington are not a logical part of an Oshawa-centered
region. Further, it was asserted that by any measure of
community, the orientation of these seven communities is
toward Orillia, Lindsay, or Toronto. In addition, the
Toronto-Centred Region Plan specifies an easterly growth.
Increasingly, then, this trend will serve to accentuate
the differences between the rural north and the urban
south.^ In addition, local opinion in the north reflects
this lack of community. All of the seven municipalities
mentioned expressed a desire to be included in a rural
based region rather than with an urban centered one.
Additionally, Oshawa, Bowmanville and Darlington have
officially asked that the northern areas be excluded from
2the proposed Oshawa-centered region.
In respect to Paterson's proposed east and west 
boundaries, the government took the following basic posi­
tion; On the west the feeling was that, with some rela­
tively minor adjustments, Paterson's western boundary 
recommendation would be suitable. The OAPADS proposed 
eastern region, on the other hand, presented difficulties. 
The OAPADS boundary ran along the eastern portions of
Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovern­
mental Affairs, Proposal For Local Government in an Area 
East of Metro, December, 1972, p. 12.
^Ibid., pp. 12-14.
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Cartwright and Darlington Townships. This would probably 
be an appropriate boundary if the region were created 
along a north-south axis as Paterson proposed. However, 
if the idea of a region stretching from the north of Lake 
Simcoe to Lake Ontario is to be rejected, the eastern 
boundary must be reconsidered. The East of Metro report 
makes the argument that over the next few years, under 
the Toronto-Centred Region plan, the growth emphasis will 
likely be shifted increasingly to the area east of Metro 
Toronto. Thus, by the year 2000 Port Hope and Cobourg 
will become major centers of growth. The feeling is that 
as they become growth centers it is likely that the popu­
lation of that area will be oriented increasingly toward 
their west; in other words, toward Oshawa and Toronto. 
Clearly, as a result, the area between Oshawa and Port 
Hope will come under increasing development pressure, and 
unless strong and stable municipalities exist in the area, 
it will be extremely difficult to prevent random develop­
ment. Finally, the decision to build a major airport in 
the Pickering area will serve to increase development 
pressure.^ The East of Metro report also asserted that 
the historical perspectives of the people in the United 
Counties is a further point in favor of the extension of 
the Oshawa-centered region to the east. The United
^Ibid., pp. 14-16.
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Counties is one of the few units of County government 
which, because of its east-west axis, reflects emerging 
communities of interest. The councils of Bowmanville and 
Darlington asked that the regional boundary be extended 
to the east because of this perceived natural community 
of interest. In light of these assertions, then, the pro­
vince is taking the position that the eastern boundary 
recommended by Paterson is rejected.^
Clearly, from the above discussion, it seems that 
a rough outline of the region being proposed by the East 
of Metro report is one running from Pickering Township 
on the west to the eastern side of Cobourg and from Lake 
Ontario on the south it goes only two or three townships 
north. More specifically, the external boundary recom­
mendations of the East of Metro report are as follows;
On the west it is proposed that the regional boundary be 
the center of the Rouge River channel from Lake Ontario 
to where it meets with Little Rouge Creek; then along 
Little Rouge Creek to the present boundary between Picker­
ing Township and Metropolitan Toronto; then north to Finch 
Avenue and then west to the west bank of the Rouge River; 
then along the Rouge to the eastern edge of the Cedarbrae 
golf course and north along that line to the York Region 
boundary. Then it goes north approximately along the
^Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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ninth concession of Markham (the exact location in this 
vicinity will correspond to the western limits of the 
land acquired by the Province and the Federal Government 
for both the proposed new North Pickering Community and 
the new airport) and along the western border of the air­
port land to a line between lots five and six of Uxbridge 
Township. From there it will run north along the Ontario- 
York boundary to the north end of Uxbridge Township. The 
northern boundary will be the northern limits of Uxbridge 
Township, Reach Township, Scugog Township and Cartwright- 
Township; then along the Cartwright-Manvers boundary, 
south to the second concession of Manvers which it fol­
lows east to the Manvers-Caven boundary; then south to 
the Caven-Hope line and east along the northern boundary 
of Hope, Hamilton and Alnwick Townships. Finally, on the 
east, the region would be bounded by the eastern limits 
of Alnwick and Haldimand Townships. On the south, of 
course. Lake Ontario is the region's boundary.^
Thus, the region being recommended by the province 
includes all of twenty-two municipalities and parts of 
four others. In addition, these proposals affect the 
boundaries of Metropolitan Toronto, the Region of York, 
the counties of Simcoe, Ontario, Victoria, Peterborough, 
Hastings and the United Counties of Northumberland-Durham.
^Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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Those municipalities within the proposed region are; 
the Townships of Pickering, Uxbridge, Reach, Scugog, 
Cartwright, East Whitby, Darlington, Clarke, Hope, 
Hamilton, Haldimand and Alnwick; the towns of Ajax, 
Uxbridge, Whitby, Bowmanville, Port Hope and Cobourg; 
the Villages of Pickering, Port Perry and Newcastle; 
and the City of Oshawa. The municipalities from which 
parts are included are: Scarborough, Markham, Whitchurch-
Stouffville and Manvers.^
As has been noted, the government's East of Metro 
report recommends a two-tier region which would include 
a great deal of consolidation among the presently exist­
ing municipalities. The end result of the consolidation 
proposals would be a total of nine area municipalities 
instead of the present twenty-two municipalities. For 
the purposes of the East of Metro report, the airport 
and new community sites are treated as if they will form 
a separate area municipality within the region. It must 
be made clear, however, that the provincial government 
has not yet completed its study of the possible internal 
arrangements for this unique area.
1Donald Irving, Proposal for Local Government Reform 
in an Area East of Metro Toronto, Statement by Mr. Donald 
Irvine, Parliamentary Assistant to the Treasurer (M.P.P. 
Greville-Dundas), Eastdale Collegiate Institute, Oshawa, 
Ontario, December 18, 1972, p. 16.
2Proposal for Local Government Reform in an Area
East of Metro, p. 31.
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The various municipalities proposed by the govern­
ment are as follows: Municipality number one would
include Ajax, Pickering Village and that part of Picker­
ing Township which lies south of the seventh concession 
and which is not included in the airport or the new com­
munity sites, and excluding the West Rouge area. The 
approximate population of this municipality is 35,600.
In addition, about 4,000 people in the West Rouge area 
would enter the borough of Scarborough and thus as a part 
of Metropolitan Toronto. The second proposed area munic­
ipality will consist exclusively of the present town of 
Whitby. This municipality would include a population of 
approximately 23,677 people. Proposed municipality num­
ber three will be the present City of Oshawa, the Town­
ship of East Whitby and the western ten lots of Darling­
ton Township. This municipality would be the most popu­
lous municipality with 98,100 people. The fourth pro­
posed area municipality consists of the remainder of 
Darlington, plus Bowmanville, Clarke, Newcastle and the 
two southern-most concessions of Manvers. In terms of 
land area, this would be an extremely large municipality 
with about two hundred square miles. It will, however, 
only have a population of about 22,300 people. Munici­
pality number five consists of Hope Township, the Towns 
of Port Hope and Cobourg and all but the most northern 
township of Hamilton Township. This municipality would
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have a population of about 28,800. Area municipality num­
ber six consists of Alnwick, Haldimand and the northern­
most concession of Hamilton with a population of only 
about 4,400 people. The seventh area municipality will 
include Uxbridge Township, the Town of Uxbridge and that 
part of Pickering Township north of the seventh conces­
sion and not included in the airport site, and excluding 
the extreme southwest corner of Uxbridge Township which 
would become part of Whitchurch-Stouffville. The popula­
tion of this area municipality will be about 7,600 people. 
Municipality number eight consists of Reach, Port Perry, 
Scugog and Cartwright Township with a population of 
approximately 9,300. Finally, the ninth municipality 
consists of the airport site. While the precise bound­
aries of this municipality have yet to be determined, 
clearly that area which is to be purchased by the Pro­
vince and the Federal Government would be established as 
a separate area in the region. This includes the north­
east corner of Scarborough, the eastern two concessions 
of Markham and a small area in Whitchurch-Stoufville.
This municipality would probably include a population of 
around 7,000 people.^
^Irvine, Proposal For Local Government Reform in the
Area East of Metro, pp. 20-21.
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As was noted at an earlier point, the Paterson 
(OAPADS) recommendations adhered very closely to a pat­
tern of representation by virtue of population and, at 
the same time, created a system in which the support of 
more than one area municipality was necessary to ensure 
a clear majority on the regional council. This notion, 
of course, is in line with government policy and it is 
considered desirable to try to maintain this kind of 
balance in any region east of Metropolitan Toronto.
In the 1972 East of Metro proposals the government 
makes it clear that four factors are considered of over­
whelming importance for the development of a scheme for 
intra-region representation.^ First, in order to insure 
a degree of popular access to the regional level, the 
report asserts that the regional councillors should gain 
their offices by virtue of popular vote rather than by 
sub-regional appointment. Additionally, a side advantage 
of such a direct system of elections is that it is clear 
and simply and easily understood by the electorate. 
Second, and at the same time, it is felt that in order to 
insure the necessary coordination between the area and 
regional councils, all regional councillors should sit on 
an area municipality council as well. This can easily be
^The following is from Proposal for Local Govern­
ment Reform in an Area East of Metro, pp. 58-60.
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accomplished by making the stipulation that anyone who 
wishes to sit on the regional council must indicate 
prior to the election that he is seeking a regional 
council seat. Then, upon assuming one of the regional 
seats available to his municipality, he will automat­
ically become a member of the local council. In essence, 
then, under this type of system there will be two types 
of candidates; those who are running for regional coun­
cil and those running specifically for local council.
In short, the government is taking the position that this 
sort of electoral system would provide the electorate 
with the opportunity to become familiar with both region­
al and local issues. In this scheme the remaining local 
council seats will be filled according to the established 
practices of each municipality. Finally, if the regional 
councillor for any reason ceases to be a member of one 
council, the other seat is also vacated.
Third, the government is taking the position that 
the head of an area municipality must be constantly aware 
and involved with regional issues and, further, must be 
able to bring the various local problems to the regional 
council. Accordingly, the government proposes that the 
head of each local municipality assume both regional and 
local responsibilities and a seat on the regional council 
ex officio. Fourth, it is possible that in some of the
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more urban areas it might be desirable to identify 
regional councillors with a sub-municipal area. With 
this possibility in mind it seems wise to leave it up to 
the discretion of the urban areas whether to establish a 
ward system of elections for regional purposes and with 
all area municipalities for local purposes.
Following the above strictures, the East of Metro 
report notes an intention to adhere as closely as pos­
sible to representation by population. In the rural 
areas, however, there will necessarily be a higher level 
of representation because of sparse population. See 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 for the government's proposals for 
regional representation.
Table 6.6 graphically displays the fact that the 
regional council has been structured roughly on the basis 
of population while, at the same time, taking into account 
the need to assure regional representation in the more 
rural areas. Further, note that the total number of 
regional councillors would be twenty-nine plus a Regional 
Chairman, who would be initially appointed by the Province 
and selected by the sitting regional council thereafter.
As was earlier suggested, the Province proposes that the 
regional council be elected from the electorate of each 
area municipality, either by ward or at large (Table 6.8).
TABLE 6.6









1 35,576 15.0 4 13.4 8,393
2 23,677 10.0 3 10.0 7,892
3 98,132 41.5 11 36.7 8,921
4 22,316 9.4 3 10.0 7,438
5 28,805 12.2 4 13.4 7,201
6 4,372 1.9 1 3.3 4,372
7 7,607 3.2 1 3.3 7,607
8 9,318* 3.9 2 6 .6 4,659
9 6,886 2.9 * *
+chmn
* * it *
TOTALS 236,693 100.0% 30 100%
*Plus a large seasonal population
‘♦Representation to be determined in a later proposal
to
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1 35,576 15.0 4 13.4 8,893 50 4 . 3
2 23,677 10.n 3 10.0 7,892 59 5.1
3 98,136 41.5 11 36.7 8,921 85 7. 3
4 22,316 9.4 3 10.0 7,438 200 17.1
5 28,805 12. 2 4 13.4 7,201 205 17.5
6 4,372 1.9 1 3.3 4,372 170 14.5
7 7,607 3.2 1 3.3 7,607 100 8.6
8 9,318^ 3.9 2 6.6 4,659^ 215 18.4
9 6,886 2.9 ★ it
+Chair-
man
♦ * * * 84 7.2
236,693 100% 30 100% 1,168 100%
N>
W
♦plus a large seasonal population 
♦♦to be determined in a later proposal
Source: East of Metro Report, p. 37.
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Further, all regional councillors will be fully partici­
pating members of their respective local councils.^
In terms of the purely local councils, the proposal 
envisages that each area municipality will have a local 
council consisting of a head of council, who ex officio 
becomes a member of the regional council, plus the num­
ber of strictly local councillors and that number of 
regional councillors to which it is entitled.^ The local 
councils are displayed in Table 6.8. For the first area 
municipality the council would consist of one strictly 
local councillor and three regional councillors plus the 
council head. Number two would have two strictly local 
councillors and two elected to the region plus the coun­
cil head. For the third area municipality there would be 
ho strictly local councillors and ten elected to the 
region plus the local council head. The fourth munici­
pality would have two local councillors and two elected 
to the region in addition to the council head. The fifth 
area municipality would have one strictly local council­
lor and, in addition to the council head, three council­
lors elected to the region. Municipalities number six 
and seven would each have four strictly local councillors
^Irvine, Proposal for Local Government Reform in an
Area East of Metro Toronto, pp. 23-24.
^Ibid., p. 24.
TABLE 6.8
COMPOSITION OF LOCAL COUNCILS















1 1 3 1 5
2 2 2 1 5
3 0 10 1 11
4 2 2 1 5
5 1 3 1 5
6 4 0 1 5
7 4 0 1 5
8 3 1 1 5
9 Representation will be discussed in later proposal
+regional
Chairman
Total 17 21 9*
*plus any regional representation whicn might be allocated to Municipality *9
Source : East of Metro Report, p. 62.
en
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with no elected regional councillors plus the head of 
council. The eighth municipality would have three 
strictly local councillors and one elected to the region 
in addition to the local council head.^ The ninth munic­
ipality is left in an undetermined state.
Finally, in terms of representation, it is clear 
that the government feels that the various lower-tier 
councils will be performing fewer and less important 
functions than will the region but will be important as 
points of access for citizens to the regional council.
In light of this notion the government clearly feels that 
it is desirable to minimize the number of people sitting 
on the local councils who are not at the same time mem­
bers of the regional council.
It is at this point that the division of functions 
between the two tiers becomes an imperative question. The 
feeling very clearly is that it will take the full cooper­
ation of all levels of government to effectively cope with 
the potential and actual problems of this proposed region­
al municipality. Very simply, the relevant point is that 
developments in Oshawa, or Port Hope-Cobourg, or anywhere 
else in the region will likely shape and alter develop­
ments in other parts of the region. Clearly, then, it is
^Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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of utmost importance that the major local powers be under 
the domain of the region. The policy implication of this 
is that a one-tier structure might be best. At the same 
time, however, the provincial government is striving to 
prevent the possibility of undue remoteness, which implies 
that a two-tier structure would be most suitable. The 
East of Metro proposal took the position that in order 
to ". . . facilitate effective problem solving while main­
taining significant local units, it is proposed that a 
strong region with a reduced number of municipalities be 
created."^ The proposal, then, is that the region be 
given the major powers while, at the same time, maintain­
ing the tradition of two-tiered regional municipalities.
Interestingly, the report proposes that the region
have the ability to delegate and reassume functions to
the various area municipalities with the approval of the 
2Minister. This proposal is one which would probably 
have the effect of reinforcing the hegemony of the region­
al municipality over the local area municipalities.
The position of the provincial government is that 
any schema for the division of functions between the tiers 
must:
^Proposal For Local Government Reform in an Area
East of Metro, p. 53.
^Ibid., p. 57.
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- minimize problems of remoteness by establishing 
area municipalities with councils responsive to 
local needs;
- provide flexibility concerning the performance 
of functions, according to the need for a high 
level of coordination;
- provide an effective mechanism for municipal 
decision-making concerning the refinement and 
implementation of development plans for the 
area;
- allow a broader sharing of financial resources, 
thus minimizing the need for every area munici­
pality to attract industrial and commercial 
assessment at the cost of planning principles 
and the environment.1
In general terms, then, the government's plan is 
that the regional municipality will have responsibility 
for planning in general, as well as in providing such 
major services as water, sewers, waste disposal, regional 
roads, regional parks, police and social services. The 
area municipalities, on the other hand, will have the 
role of meeting immediate demands and will articulate the 
needs of a strictly local nature. At the same time, the 
very existence of these various area municipalities will 
insure that local government will not become remote. In 
addition, the area municipalities will provide such ser­
vices as zoning, local parks, fire protection, garbage 

























By Regional Council on the basis of 
proportion of equalized taxable 
assessment and tax equivalent 
assessment in each area municipality.
Regional
Regional and Local
To insure orderly growth and protec­
tion of the region's environment it 
is clear that the Regional Council 
must exercise the responsibility for 
broad land-use planning. The Region­
al Council will therefore have the 
difficult but essential chore of 
establishing priorities and guide­
lines for the growth of this area.
The regional council will be the 
planning authority and no planning 
boards, regional or local, will be 
established. Local municipalities 
would exercise the duties and respon­
sibilities for zoning and purely 
local planning issues.
Appointments to conservation 
authority - regional.
The regional council serves the func­
tions of a health unit.
Local and Regional
The Regional Council shall provide a 
police force for most of the region, 
but the Province may assume some 
police responsibility in some of the 
rural areas initially.
Local but with Regional Fire Co­









common services such as purchasing, 
personnel, training and equipment.
Treatment or disposal to be a 
Regional function. Construction 
and maintenance of all sewage works 
to be Regional. Inspection and 
standards for all sewers to be re­
gional. Separation of storm and 
sanitary to be regional.
Supply, purification, construction 
and maintenance of all distribution 
mains to be Regional functions. The 
regulations and standards for all 
water mains and the inspection of 
water mains to be a regional func­
tion. All distribution mains are a 
regional function.
Treatment or disposal - Regional; 
Collecting or receiving - local.
Arterial roads planning, construc­
tion, and maintenance - Regional. 
Local roads and local streets - 
local. Region has veto power over 
area traffic by-laws; has traffic- 
light control; and may approve any 
sidewalk to be built along a Region­
al road. Area council to pass 
traffic by-laws for area roads, 
build and maintain sidewalks, and 
share parking controls with Region. 
Public transit to be a Regional 
function.
Existing hydro-electric commissions 
with jurisdiction over hydro are con­
tinued until such date as the Minis­
ter may by order designate. All 
other functions of public utilities 
commissions are transferred to Re­
gional Council. Pending study by the 
provincial government of the recom­
mendations of Task Force Hydro, the 
role of Hydro Commissions will be 
resolved at a later date.
Local buildings to be local. Regional 
buildings to be regional.
Source: East of Metro Report, pp. 54-56.
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Again, it should be noted that this division of functions 
makes it quite clear that, especially in terms of plan­
ning, the regional municipality will enjoy hegemony. The 
relevant notion here is that, within the context of the 
Toronto Centred Region concept, the region should have 
the overall capability to plan in the area without being 
frustrated by an inability to establish local priorities 
and by the necessity for constant negotiating and compro­
mising with various special purpose bodies and local 
councils.^ The point, very simply, is that the tiers are 
not to be considered equal, especially in the planning 
field. In order to insure orderly, planned development 
throughout the entire region, the regional municipality 
will have the commanding voice.
Quite clearly, a proposal such as this is going to 
bring on a great deal of local reaction. In addition, 
the provincial government has maintained a continuing pub­
lic position that time and a forum for public reaction 
should be allowed. Accordingly, this proposal notes that 
the residents of the proposed region and of surrounding 
areas should attempt to apprise themselves of the propos­
al's contents. Further, it was suggested that the resi­
dents send to the Minister, in the form of a brief, their
^Ibid., p. 56.
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analysis of it and any suggestions for changing it. Addi­
tionally, the hope was expressed that the involved munic­
ipalities would consider the proposal very carefully and 
submit their analysis and opinions to the Minister. Out­
side of these formal briefs, the Province felt that it 
was important that a complete and candid dialogue take 
place, on a face-to-face basis, in a series of municipal- 
provincial meetings.^
The provincial government was likely unprepared for 
the initial stridency of opposition to their proposals. 
This opposition ranged from a concern for perceived local 
self-interest on one hand to concern about provincial 
authoritarianism on the other. In terms of the perceived 
provincial authoritarianism, the following quotation from 
a newspaper editorial seems to sum up the typical reac­
tion:
Is it any wonder that these mayors and coun­
cillors, who under normal conditions are scarcely 
the kind of people who hurl epithets at a provincial 
treasurer or march discourteously out of an audi­
torium, did so when they were informed that their 
town and village councils would be merged into a 
large regional municipality stretching from Scar­
borough to beyond Cobourg?
There are important principles involved here. 
The British North America Act places the munici­
pality firmly under provincial jurisdiction. How­
ever, the rhetoric of the Robarts-Davis years has 
stressed the concept of partnership. The reality 
has been that of a despot who talks of participa­
tory democracy when there are no decisions to be
^Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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made, and uses unrestrained power when important 
actions are to be taken.
In this case the illusion of democracy at 
work is maintained by the invitation to send 
responses to the province by the end of February. 
What dozens of planners with a mountain of statis­
tics have erected must be answered— and within a 
few weeks— by a host of small, disorganized munici­
palities which are unlikely to have a single 
planner on their payrolls.!
Another, more fundamental, criticism was that this 
proposal looks fine on paper; however, it must be real­
ized that merely redrawing municipal boundaries on the 
map and creating bigger units of local government will 
not necessarily accomplish very much. The point simply 
is that in order for this proposed new municipality to do 
its job it will require a great deal of outside financial 
input for the planning and for the services which are 
essential to development. Additionally, in order to 
serve the purpose of decentralization it will have to 
successfully attract industry to provide employemnt for 
its residents concomitant with a strong assessment base 
for municipal tax revenues. Otherwise, it will likely 
become nothing more than a newer and larger bedroom com­
munity for Metropolitan Toronto as the pressure on housing
and transportation within Metro continues to grow and
2spills out into the surrounding areas. Metro Chairman
^Walter Pitman, "The Furor Over the Oshawa Regional 
Plan," Toronto Star, January 4, 1973, p. 9.
2Toronto Star, "Eastern Region Is Fine— On Paper," 
December 21, 1972, p. 6.
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Albert Campbell reinforced this point with the assertion 
that by taking part of Scarborough into the new region 
and, at the same time, preventing an extension of Metro 
Toronto's boundary, the provincial government has left 
Metro with sufficient land for only about five years of 
growth, especially in terms of housing. After the limit 
is reached, the excess will increasingly overflow into 
the surrounding areas.^ This situation, then, must be 
evaluated in light of the statement of a provincial plan­
ning official that " . . .  the Province is desperately 
trying to close in Metro on all three sides--they already
have the municipality of York on the North and still need
2them on the East and the West."
Many of the initial reactions from specific and 
effected local officials were considerably more strident. 
One local official said:
Its incredible that municipalities and towns 
can be moved and destroyed by provincial edict 
. . . regional councillors will serve their people 
and they'll still have a voice but it will be a 
controlled voice— controlled by Queen's Park.3
^Toronto Star, "East Regional Plan Could Put Squeeze 
on Metro: Campbell," December 20, 1972, p. 3.
^Interview with Mr. Gardiner Church, Senior Studies 
Officer, Urban and Regional Planning Division, Municipal 
Organization Branch, Ministry of Treasury, Economics and 
Intergovernmental Affairs, June 26, 1972.
^Toronto Star, "Stunned, Dismayed Local Mayors Vow 
to Fight for Identity," December 19, 1972, p. 4.
255
The early reactions seemed to form a pattern show­
ing that those on the western end of the proposed region 
were generally more favorable than were those on the 
eastern end who were decidedly hostile. In the east, 
specifically in Port Hope and Cobourg, civic leaders 
furiously denounced the regional government plan for 
their area and, in addition. Provincial Treasurer 
MacNaughton was called a . . hired gun sent by Queen's 
Park to murder their quiet little t o w n s . O t h e r  reac­
tions from the Port Hope-Cobourg area in general were as 
follows :
Now it means we will send our tax money out 
of the area to Oshawa and we won't have enough 
representatives on the regional council to decide 
where it should be spent.
I have no idea what a regional government 
will do for us, but it better not make changes.
. . . regional government will move local govern­
ment further away from the people and it will put 
Queen's Park almost out of r e a c h .2
In addition, the day after the announcement of the gov­
ernment's regional plan the Port Hope Guide bordered its 
front page in funeral black and suggested that the local 
Conservative MPPs resign and that the regional proposal 
be put to the voters.^ In sum, the argument from the
^Toronto Star, "Port Hope, Cobourg Furious Over 
Regional Plan," December 20, 1972, p. 3.
^Ibid., p. 3.
^Toronto Star, "Two Century-old Towns Fear They'll 
be Lost in a 'Region'," January 22, 1973, p. 9.
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eastern section of the proposed region has been that 
their important linkages have historically been, and 
presently are, with Peterborough to the north rather 
than to Oshawa to the west.
Summary and Conclusions
To sum up the substance of this chapter is simply 
to move from attempts at local self-determination to 
reform via edict from on high. Briefly, the Oshawa Area 
Planning and Development Study (GAPADS) was intended as 
an instrument providing the impetus for the reform of 
local government from below, i.e., from the localities 
themselves. The study commission, however, could not 
agree upon the recommendations of the study group and 
thus terminated the study. In short, GAPADS was great 
when it served to keep the province from initiating its 
own study, but when the study group actually made recom­
mendations for a regional municipality the commissioners 
could not bring themselves to take the serious political 
step of accepting the recommendations. The upshot of 
termination, of course, was that the localities abandoned 
the local government reform field to the province. As 
was noted earlier, the local officials seemed to be taking 
the position that it was safer to let the province take 
the reform initiative and criticize from the sidelines. 
This seems to have been a not very subtle hint that
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whatever proposal the province might make for regional 
local government, it would not be satisfactory to the 
localities.
The provincial government responded to this chal­
lenge with the East of Metro proposals outlined above. 
Predictably, these proposals were met with a storm of 
protests from the localities, especially those from the 
eastern portions of the newly proposed regional munici­
pality.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
question of local government reform in Oshawa is an exam­
ple of what is wrong with local government in urbanized 
portions of Ontario. The localities could not agree on 
a locally sponsored reform proposal because of the ser­
ious competing interests and fragmentation among the 
various local jurisdictions. This very fragmentation, 
then, had the effect of forcing the provincial government 
into the local government review process and ultimately 
allowed the province to assume a posture of imposing pro­
vinciality generated proposals upon the area in question.
Finally, it should be noted that the provincial 
East of Metro proposals are potentially more integrative 
than were the preliminary proposals of the OAPADS study. 
That is, the OAPADS recommendations attempted to set up a 
regional municipality which would have at once included
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heavily urbanized areas along with large portions of 
rural areas which are likely to remain rural for the 
foreseeable future. The provincial East of Metro pro­
posals, on the other hand, include relatively rural 
areas, but these rural areas are ones which are coming 
under increasing development pressure and share, as a 
result, many of the needs and concerns of the more 




The initial portion of this study set out the basic 
frameworks upon which this study is based. First, it was 
posited that there are two basic classes of functional 
imperatives of a particular system. The first is adapta­
tion to the physical and social environment and might be 
called the "adaptive" or "problem-solving" function. The 
second is the maintenance of internal solidarity and might 
be called the "internal" or "integrating" function. In 
the course of this study adaptation has been conceived 
in terms of the ability of an organization to reallocate 
or recommit a part of its resources to new uses without 
destroying the organization. In other words, adaptive 
behavior is a conscious effort to impose change. Further, 
at the same time that change, or adaptation, takes place 
with the system it must be able to integrate these changes 
if it is to survive. It was further asserted that these 
functional imperatives imply a tension that must necessar­
ily exist between them in many cases. In short, adapta­
tion, because it often requires some rearranging of inter­
nal relations as well as of expectations and rewards, 
induces stress into the system and may thereby threaten
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its integration. This built-in conflict between the sys­
tem's two basic imperatives seems to be incapable of per­
manent solution. A successful system attempts to strike 
a series of temporary balances between the two needs.
The substantive portions of this study have, in 
part, been concerned with the unavoidable implication that 
a system may meet at least temporary failure because it 
overemphasizes problem solving anc tries to move too fast, 
because it may exclude certain groups from policy making, 
or because it fails to reconcile conflict among the vari­
ous segments of the system.
In the process of describing and analyzing, in some 
detail, the local government reform program of Ontario as 
well as its specific programs in two of the proposed 
regions, one is increasingly faced with a single unavoid­
able conclusion in terms of the potential conflict between 
the contradictory functional imperatives of adaptation and 
integration. This conclusion simply is that the adapta­
tion undertaken via the regional government program in 
Ontario, regardless of certain unsettling affects, has in 
no way provided a threat to the system's integration on 
the whole. This, however, is not to say that certain ten­
sions and, indeed, conflicts have not arisen out of the 
Ontario Government's decision to proceed with a program of 
local government reform. And it is these tensions that 
have been highlighted by the preceding case studies;
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tensions that, to some extent, are the product of these 
contradictory functional requirements referred to above.
The case studies of the proposed regional municipal­
ities in Hamilton on one hand and Oshawa on the other have 
allowed us to view not only the tensions created but also 
the attempts that have been made to pacify, mitigate or 
reorient these tensions. In sum, what has been highlighted 
is an integral part of the normal, ongoing process of 
assessing how the system is operating, determining where 
significant deviations are occurring, identifying the 
source of the problems and taking action to try to either 
eliminate or pacify the source of the conflicts and ten­
sions .
In the case study referring to regional government 
in the Hamilton area, the need for local government reform 
was thoroughly documented. The need was, in fact, not at 
issue in the region. The tensions that did develop were 
a result of the Steele Commission's proposals which called 
for inclusion of the Town of Burlington in a Hamilton- 
centered regional government. It was this proposal which 
threatened to scutt.le the regional government program.
This proposal raised a storm of protest from residents and 
officials of Burlington. This protest was brought to a 
head when a plebiscite on the issue was held in Burlington 
in 1969. The result was that eighty-eight per cent of the
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Burlington residents opposed joining in any region with 
Hamilton.
As a result of the tension and conflict arising 
from the Steele Commission's proposals the Ontario gov­
ernment engaged in further adaptive behavior, i.e., the 
government adopted a hands off policy in regard to the 
Steele Commission proposals. In short, the government 
did not draw up legislation on these recommendations and 
adopted a policy of inaction which indicates a wish that 
the Steele Commission proposals would die a quiet death.
The notion that conflict between adaptation and 
integration is never ending and that a system attempts to 
arrive at a series of compromises in order to maintain 
balance can be demonstrated by reference to the Govern­
ment's 1973 proposals for a regional municipality in the 
Hamilton area. These proposals were clearly in response 
to the conflict and tension resulting from Burlington's 
desire to be included in a regional municipality in which 
Hamilton would not be included. The 1973 proposals, in 
short, included the Town of Burlington in the proposed 
Peel-Halton region. As a result of this action, the Pro­
vince then proposed a single-tier municipality for Hamil­
ton as the best way to offset the voting imbalance brought 
about because of the exclusion of Burlington from the 
Hamilton area. The success of this compromise, of course,
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remains to be seen. Municipal leaders in Hamilton still 
seem to believe that Burlington should be included in any 
regional government of which Hamilton was a part.
As in the Hamilton case study, the Cshawa case 
study demonstrated an attempt at adaptation which was 
thwarted by conflict and tension although the situation 
was a very different one from that in Hamilton. To sum­
marize briefly, in Oshawa the identical local government 
reform proposals were generated by a locally directed 
planning and development study. The study proposals, 
however, never reached the implementation stags because 
of strong opposition from many elements of the study area. 
As a result, the province felt it necessary to involve 
itself directly in the Oshawa problem and come up with 
internally derived proposals for that area. The govern­
ment’s proposals, in fact, are an excellent example of 
reacting to and trying to mitigate the problems which were 
instrumental in bringing about the earlier tensions and 
conflicts.
The original OAPADS recommendations created many 
obvious conflicts because of an attempt to set up a 
regional municipality including both heavily urbanized 
areas along with large portions of rural areas which not 
only were likely to remain rural for the foreseeable 
future, but which also seemed to have few real community
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of interest linkages with the urbanized portions of the 
proposed municipality. In short, then, the OAPADS recom­
mentation was for a regional municipality created along a 
north-south axis. The provincial East of Metro proposals, 
on the other hand, took the position that any regional 
municipality created along this rural-urban, or north- 
south axis, would from the beginning be doomed to flounder 
in a sea of conflicts. Rural-urban tensions would be 
created which would serve to divert the avelopment of an 
internally consistent, or integrated, local government for 
the region. The provincial East of Metro proposals, then, 
called for the creation of a regional municipality along 
a west-east axis. This simply means that while these 
proposals call for a municipality with areas that are 
rural in nature, they are rural areas which are coming 
under increasing development pressure and share, as a 
result, many of the needs and problems of the more heavily 
urban portions of the proposed regional municipality.
This development is partly a result of a prior policy 
decision on the part of the provincial government. The 
province's Toronto-Centred Region Plan envisages a well- 
structured, urbanized zone from Bowmanville on the east to 
Hamilton on the west with a population of 5.7 million by 
the year 2000. This plan would include the stimulation of 
the eastern portion of this corridor to a higher growth
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rate.^ A concomitant part of this plan is a shift in 
development pressure, hopefully from the west of Metro 
to the east. This would include the development of a 
significant peripheral urban center in the Port Hope- 
Cobourg area after 1980. In short, the provincial posi­
tion is that:
A more dynamic Port Hope-Cobourg nucleus could 
become a springboard to Eastern Ontario. . . .
The Port Hope-Cobourg district possesses physical 
capability for large scale urban development.
The provision of water supply and sewage disposal 
facilities to these new urban areas can be at a 
cost comparable with, and possibly cheaper than, 
costs for similar services in Metropolitan 
Toronto.2
This proposed encouragement of urban development in the 
Port Hope-Cobourg area reflects the conviction that decen­
tralization of high growth rates away from Metropolitan 
Toronto must begin soon and that these are appropriate 
plans to encourage new growth. These ongoing development 
plans seem to be the reason for the province's proposals 
for a regional municipality along an east-west axis and, 
more specifically, the reason for the extension of the 
proposed municipality to include the Port Hope-Cobourg 
area. Clearly if this kind of development takes place, 
it will serve increasingly to bring about a community 
of interest within the regional municipality and
^The Government of Ontario, Design for Development: 
The Toronto-Centred Region, May 5, 1970, p. 3.
^Ibid., p. 20.
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concomitantly, foster the development of an integrated 
system.
In summary, then, the adaptation-intégration frame­
work which posits endemic tensions and conflict between 
these two needs has served well in guiding the focus of 
the description and analysis of the regional government 
program in Ontario. In serving in this capacity, the 
framework has also provided the basis from which to make 
some statements explaining policy decisions which are 
otherwise less clear. In particular, Leonard Sayles' 
notion that change, or adaptation, is an integral part of 
the normal, ongoing process of assessing how the system is 
operating, determining where significant deviations are 
occurring, identifying the source of the disturbances, and 
taking corrective action seems to uniquely capture the 
sequence of events as observed in both the Hamilton and 
the Oshawa case studies.^ This framework, however, does 
not serve to completely explain the unhappiness observed 
on the part, particularly, of local officials when informed 
of specific local government reform plans. This situation 
can, however, be partially explained by Selznick's. concept 
of "recalcitrance" as well as by Gulick's observations 
about the perceived immortality of governmental institu­
tions .
^Leonard R. Sayles, "Accommodating for Change," p. 229
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Clearly the bitterness expressed by local officials 
over local government reform plans can be partially 
explained in terms put forward by Luther Gulick. Gulick 
notes that :
Each defined human institutions, especially when 
created by law and endowed with even the smallest 
modicum of power, tends to develop into an inde­
pendent "institutional personality." This involves 
not only asserting itself, but also extending 
itself and seeking to perpetuate itself. This 
apparently is a law of group structure, as it is 
of individual existence. And among governmental 
institutions, the suicide complex is notably 
absent . . . The existence of a fixed and immortal 
boundary tends to create and sustain a fixed and 
immortal governmental institution.!
This can, clearly, be directly applied to the local offic­
ials in both Hamilton and Oshawa. Regional government 
will probably mean a loss of influence for many local 
officials and a diminished role for others. This seems to 
be perceived by many local officials and the resulting 
fear is not far below the surface in the reactions of 
these officials. Regional government implies a change 
that will serve to re-order many of the status and influ­
ence relationships on both the community and the individual 
level. It is this fact and the uncertainty it implies that 
must serve to create many of the extremely hostile and 
indeed, paranoid, reactions on the part of many local 
officials. Gulick, however, does not provide us with the
^Luther Gulick, The Metropolitan Problem and American 
Ideas, p. 36.
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linkage needed to analyze what the reaction of local offi­
cials may mean for the future of a regional municipality. 
In Chapter I it was hypothesized that Selznick's concept 
of "recalcitrance" would provide that needed linkage.
The concept of recalcitrance, it will be remembered, 
revolved around the "tools of action," which in this situ­
ation are those local officials who will ultimately be 
instrumental in answering the question of whether the 
reforms are successful or whether they prove to be a fail­
ure. In brief, this concept takes into account the fact 
that plans, programs, or reforms merely reflect ideal or 
technical choice. Organized action cannot escape an 
involvement, or a commitment, to personnel, institutions 
or procedures which may effectively qualify the initial 
ideal plan.
Quite clearly, the concept of recalcitrance captures 
the tension that must exist between "the notion and the 
act." This is of particular interest if it can be assumed 
that the local officials heading a new regional government 
are, to some extent at least, hostile to the whole concept 
of regional local government. In short, it seems that 
hostile "tools of action" could subvert the intention of 
regional local government in all of its reform phases. 
There are, however, some problems with this line of rea­
soning. First, it cannot be assumed that officials in
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charge of a new regional municipality will be hostile to 
its aims. The Metropolitan Toronto experiment, for exam­
ple, has evidenced quite the opposite. Second, it must 
be remembered that the Province of Ontario has reserved 
certain sources of power vis-a-vis regional governments 
to itself. The province, for example, appoints the first 
regional Chairman. It also controls many of the finan­
cial strings necessary to local government. Finally, in 
the realm of planning, the Ontario Municipal Board has 
the ultimate responsibility and may "interfere" with local 
governments if they refuse to comply with provincial pol­
icy. In short, the province creates regional municipal­
ities by simple legislation and may control them either 
administratively or by legislation. These unique facts, 
then, seem to negate the concept of recalcitrance as a 
significant factor in the local government reform program, 
at least in its initial stages.
Finally, this study has been based, to a great degree, 
on the notion that structural characteristics of local 
government do have some independent effect on local gov­
ernmental policy. This approach often may be somewhat 
misleading to the extent that it implies that reforming 
government institutions in the metropolis can solve spe­
cific problems such as urban blight, crime, housing.
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poverty, transportation, pollution and other urban ills. 
Yet, as Thomas Dye notes, there is evidence that the 
structure of government does effect the outcome of public 
policy, and this evidence lends validity to the struc­
tural approach.^ In short, this study is based upon the 
notion that institutional arrangements are inexorably 
linked to the nature of the urban environment and, thus, 
to the content of public policy.
^Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Engle­
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 179.
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